The Symbolic Process and its Integration in Children
Chapter 11: Symbolic Origins and the Group —The Content of the Symbolic Process
John Fordyce Markey
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HAVING considered symbolic integration and reflective behaviour from the standpoint of interacting behaviour systems, it now remains to redirect attention to the group as such.
To the bow-wow, the pooh-pooh, the ding-dong, and the yo-he-ho theories of the origin of language may be added, with due respect to Jespersen and others, the sing-song theory. Although the role of song and rhythm may have been more or less important, a more certain aspect apparently is that regarding the origin of language in emotional situations, and probably those social situations involving sex behaviour, as Jespersen also suggests (1923, p. 433 f).
Symbols must have developed only after long association had conditioned instinctive cries or sounds to specific behaviour in which two or more individuals were involved. In order that the mnemic traces become sufficiently vivid and consistent to result in the necessary integration, a highly emotional state was most probably necessary. While the festive group occasion of song and dance may have served as a background, it is probable that definite sex behaviour furnished the relatively similar, recurrent, and specific activity necessary for the conditioning process associated with a highly emotional facilitating state. Specific sounds, being associated with this type of behaviour, would furnish a similar stimulus which could be produced and interchanged by each person.
Writers on language have pointed out the tendency for speech reactions to develop in adolescents, the young lovers, the newly-weds or those going through such
( 160) emotional changes. This is also a common observation on the part of numerous persons. A case or two illustrate. Chamberlain (1906, pp. 139 f) cites the case of a young woman in late adolescence who developed a language apparently thoroughly informed with the necessary machinery of human speech and yet entirely her own creation. Two persons of my acquaintance tell me that they developed, at the ages 42 and 60, a set of sound symbols, about 20 in number, the meaning of which is conveyed by the tone and context in which they are uttered. The attempt is to express by tonal sounds. These two persons had developed a great regard for each other, and it is evident that this language developed as play and emotional expression. They were unable to tell me the exact meaning of the words. Some examples are
Suni--has different meanings on different occasions. Used during a story as indicating a secret cave, etc.
Madis -- Tone of voice indicated meaning.
The " baby-talk " of adolescents is another illustration. It is probable that any more pronounced emotional state tends to facilitate language behaviour--for instance, poetical utterances by artists, or profane utterances under emotional stress.
Apropos to the origin of language, a considerable amount of paper has been used on discussions regarding the child's invention of speech. If the social origin of language is sound, the nucleus drops out of such a discussion. The child comes into the world a behaviour mechanism which is soon able to vocalize. Symbols develop in this behaviour process only in collaboration with other persons. These symbols indicate specific behaviour and any sound which becomes properly integrated and conditioned to the parties involved becomes a symbol. Thus the symbol may be unique, due to its basis in particular behaviour, however, not as an individual, but as a social product. If the child's vocalizations are allowed to become thus conditioned and
(161) integrated, there will undoubtedly arise perhaps a considerable number of unique symbols in connection with different social situations and specific experience. Various cases have been reported of children continually associated together who have developed a set of often unintelligible words whereby they have communicated with each other. The first language of the child is a special language which is understood by those concerned on the basis of specific behaviour and sounds. Upon this is integrated the native language. Vocally, the child at first has the possibility of a number of different phonetic systems. But when the native language is finally acquired, the child is then restricted according to the predominant phonetic system of that language (Vendryes, 1925). Of course, after the child has acquired symbols, he can invent other symbols for which there is a basis in action, just as a Newton can discover a scientific law, but underlying these is the preexisting social basis.
It is after the early period that we have the age of learning secret and invented languages, beginning in some few cases as early as the sixth year. Chrisman, Hale, and others have investigated some of these phenomena. It seems that most of the argument on the invention of symbols has been beside the point. The child may furnish a new sound just as it evidently furnished "ma-ma," " pa-pa," etc., but the symbol itself is a social invention.
Although the origin of language in the race according to the previous analysis must have been the social-vocal situation, it is quite evident that the symbols were soon extended to other social gestures and signs which undoubtedly existed long previous to symbols, just as they exist now in other animal groupings. Thus there was a whole set of sign situations, [1] i.e., stimuli which functioned as signs ready to become symbol situations as soon as symbolic integration occurred.[2] In general, gesture and sign-situations form a basis for symbols. Symbols grew out of group behaviour and experience and were extended
( 162) to include all the phases of group life. There is no brew 1: in the group process, only a continuation from the previous modes of action.
Certain aspects of the symbolic content of this group I, process are to be sketched in the remaining part of the chapter.
In previous chapters the personal, personality, " self " and " other," i.e., the " human " aspects associated with the development of symbols were elaborated. A great deal more could be said regarding these and other aspects closely associated with these " personal " phases. As an example, Park and Burgess in a very stimulating manner have attempted to distinguish the " meaning " and " communication " aspects from the non-symbolic aspects in four types of social interaction ; namely, competition, conflict, accommodation, and assimilation (1924, Ch. VIII-XI). Although it seems very questionable to me (1925) whether social contact is most satisfactorily limited to the " communicative " and " meaning " or symbolic process phase, still this does not invalidate some important distinctions which they have pointed out regarding the nature of the interaction involved. It may be admitted -without overlooking the advantages of a wider use of the term-that " social " may be used in a restricted sense: if the definition is clearly understood and kept in mind, hence does not lead to confusion. Another important example is given in the " social attitude " and " social value " system of sociology, as outlined, for instance, by Thomas and Znaniecki (1920). Such a system of sociology rests directly for its basis upon the symbolic process. The stimulus-symbol represents the social value, and the defining responses the social attitude. Thus the social value and the social attitude are merely opposite ends of the same thing, and their relation is made clearer when thought of as these phases of symbolic integration. The term " value " is perhaps unfortunate, but the term " attitude " has evidently come to stay in generalizing certain content of the social process.
However, the present purpose is to examine the content
( 163) of the symbolic process from the standpoint of the complex social act, or from the group viewpoint. The problem may be introduced and pictured briefly.
With such a knowledge of past, present, and future as the symbolic process has given, some persons have been inclined to regard symbols as having fetish powers. It seemed enough to get persons to use proper symbols for the group to maintain the activity necessary for its best interests. This is at present the naive assumption behind a great amount of preaching as well as ethical and academic teaching. It is the old complaint, pupils are trained to give " proper " speech reactions to an instructor, but this may not mean the proper responses to the actual situation outside the classroom. The young boy still eats green apples and obese adult his chocolates in spite of admonition.
The failure of the causal experiential content of symbols to be adequate for the production of " proper conduct " in the group has resulted in the group introducing extraneous and some very drastic causal factors such as supernatural sanctions, ostracism, punishment, and the like, to give substantial body to the symbols of group behaviour. As a concrete example, there is some dispute as to whether children must have " corporal punishment " or whether they may be controlled otherwise by more indirect social means. Faris is carrying on some interesting experimentation in this latter connection. It is to be hoped that his results will soon be available and that other research will be added in this field of social control.
In view of such facts as the above it seems necessary to examine more closely what the content of the symbolic process is before going on to the problem of social control by symbols.
The facts brought out in the past chapters should have made it quite clear that symbols are developed in action and are stimuli for action. The converse of this is that symbols mean no more nor carry no more content than the social experience of the individuals of the group can bring into them. This may seem a hard statement, and
( 164) certainly, in the eyes of some, will detract from the glamour of symbols, ideas, and knowledge. It means that, after all, the control of the individual and the group rests upon action and experience in the final analysis. Apparently, about the best we can do is to make the accumulation of experience less and less expensive. A main problem is how to short-cut and eliminate futile experimentation. The mobility of experience is very significant in this respect. The increased mobility made possible by symbolic behaviour (thinking and reasoning), and the utilization of experience in symbolic situations may make a small amount of experience function in many different ways, still new additional experience becomes necessary with new and changing conditions. Laboratory methods are very valuable in getting knowledge under controlled conditions, and certainly in the future we shall have to prepare and allow for much more social experimentation than we have done in the past. From the standpoint of the content of the symbolic process the question turns directly to those phases of group life which are most active and most decisive in action as being of outstanding and controlling significance in symbolic behaviour.
The field of greatest amount of group activity is that concerning the maintenance, i.e., materialistic and economic, phases of social life. The overwhelming proportion of activity given to such primary interests as group maintenance is quite evident. This is true at present, and evidently was as much or more true for pre-literate peoples.
Malinowski (1923) has pointed out how symbols among preliterate people function mainly in facilitating the useful practices and arts of these people. Symbols naturally have the most favourable possibility of gaining content and precision in such behaviour.
Not only is there a very rich action basis in this phase of social life, but the action is decisive. Symbols which correlate economic activity gain clear-cut meaning. It is a matter of the life and survival or non-survival of the group and its members. The causal results are much more evident than for some other types of action.
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Not only do these symbols furnish a content concerned directly with maintenance, but they furnish the body of experience upon which other and more removed symbols must depend in the main for their content, as experience and action are the only source of symbolic content. Hence, philosophies, theologies, and the like appear as outgrowths of the experiences gained in the more primary and persistent activity of the group.
The basic importance of the materialistic and economic phases of social life have been so well established that it requires little elaboration. Philosophers, historians, anthropologists, geographers, especially anthropogeographers, economists, conspicuously Marx and the historical materialists, sociologists, notably Sumner, Ward and many others have presented a large array of facts upon this subject. Such a conception of the deterministic character of material and economic factors is most consistent with the mechanistic explanation, in the sense in which it is being used as implying causal relationships with a chemical and physical basis, of the symbolic process.
Beginning with the primary dependence of the group upon these life-preserving activities, the content of the symbolic process may for convenience be divided on the one hand into those activities directly concerned with consummatory processes, preservation and sustenance, and extending to all forms of pleasurable or aesthetic enjoyment in which symbolic behaviour is involved. On the other hand, there is the symbolic content involved in the techniques, methods, principles and machinery for the production and distribution of the things necessary for sustenance, and secondarily for the enjoyment and welfare of the group. It is in this realm that knowledge and symbols find their greatest use as " means " to the " end " of group preservation and gratification. A significant part of such techniques is that called " social control." The means of control are not so essentially important in themselves, but are important as means of maintaining and ordering social behaviour to facilitate the maintenance and welfare of the group exercising the control.
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Park and Burgess (1924, pp. 51-54) give a classification which is applicable as indicating main phases of symbolic content. It is, the economic process concerned with production and exchange of goods and particularly of values and the like, the political process including the more active questions of control, the cultural process including the shaping and defining of social forms, patterns, mores, etc., and the historical process which results in cultural continuity. By these processes the interests and welfare of the group and its members are more or less satisfactorily maintained.
A detailed elaboration of human culture would be necessary in order to completely describe the content of the symbolic process. Only the control mechanism will receive further consideration in the concluding chapter.
