The Symbolic Process and its Integration in Children
Chapter 10: The Self and Reflective Behaviour (Thinking)
John Fordyce Markey
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IT seems rather dangerous to attempt to define such a term as "thinking." It appears to be a catch-all of so many things regarding which we are ignorant or confused, a depository for unexplained odds and ends of behaviour, second perhaps to the word consciousness in ambiguity, for thinking is added unto the sins of consciousness. However, the process which would include " thinking " must be that during mediate response, in the field of excitation when the ordinary routine and otherwise balanced stimulus response situations or wholes fail to function. There are a large number of behaviour processes which are characterized by immediate and adequate response to stimuli, in which there is no place in the causal sequence for the phenomena called " thinking." The equilibrium established by this immediate type of response is accounted for without the assumption of such an intermediate process. Thinking is a function of mediate response-stating the proposition in very general terms. Without any further explanation of thinking at this point, the mediate response cue will. be followed.
In animals other than man, psychologists account in general for the processes occurring during a period of excitation and mediate response without assuming socalled reflective or ideational thinking.[1]
In experiments on animal behaviour a disturbing stimulus is provided in connection with a problem to be solved before an adequate response can be completed.
( 132) Thus the adjustment or problem solving behaviour can be observed. So thoroughly has this been studied by psychologists and neurologists that it can be explained quite well upon the basis of the organic responses which occur, the activity of muscles and glands, bio-physical and bio-chemical processes, engramic effects and the like. A great deal of this behaviour is directly observable in overt response or by instruments. A simple illustration-many others might be used-will bring out some of the important elements for present purposes.
A dog, for example, is presented with a situation in which he must jump an obstacle, a fence, in order to obtain food. His responses to this obstacle define it for him. He may run along the fence, may smell along the edges, step up on to the vertical surface, try to push through to the food, and finally jump over. An analysis of the fence is here accomplished by the responses of the dog. Into this set of responses, which results in an analysis of the fence-obstacles, will enter past habits, muscular " memory," ecphorized engrams, conditioned responses, or in short, the whole behaviour mechanism with its past experiences. The meaning-of the obstacle for the dog (not that he " reflects " or " thinks " about it) is given in this complex of responses, they define the obstacle. It is something which he jumps over in order to reach the food. In a causal or mechanistic explanation of behaviour, this is the only place to look for meaning. The meaning of the stimulus is to be found in the total complex of responses to it.
It might also be pointed out that between the initial food stimulus and the final response of eating, what goes on is a series of immediate responses to stimuli and organic influences. This is ore fact which makes possible an explanation not involving thinking. There are, of course, some responses which take a relatively long period to complete, but, in general, they are to be explained in a similar manner. However, there are borderline cases.
Köhler, in his stimulating book, The Mentality of Apes, gives instances where the ape stopped random and useless
(133) activity, surveyed the situation or scratched the head, then immediately executed a correct solution of the problem. He says that this pause is striking in contrast to other behaviour. He concludes that the ape acts with "insight" (Einsicht). Anyone reading through his experiment with an unbiased attitude must agree that he presents facts which justify him in distinguishing this type of activity—whether it is called insight or by another name is not as important as the specific facts described. Here there is a type of mediate behaviour in which some sort of integration evidently occurs which enables the ape to correctly solve his problem. The act of integration is made possible, or at least facilitated, by the pause. In such a mediate response there is a clear break which must be accounted for. Another example of a mediate type of response is that already described in the delayed reactions of raccoons, the dog, and young children.
If it would add anything to our knowledge of what takes place in the ape's behaviour during this period of " insight," it would be justifiable, it seems, to call it some kind of thinking. Similarly, the mutual interaction of different behaviour patterns of the ape might be called reasoning, in that there is evidently some sort of reaction towards consistency occurring in the ape's behaviour among the complex of responses, including those already acquired for responding to less complicated problems. The dog's analysis of the obstacle, described above, by more active responses is not greatly different, although simpler. However, these terms add little to our knowledge of what happens. Insight does poorly enough as a pointer. Or, to call such activity " sensory thought," as Hunter does for the short delayed reactions, seems to add little to our knowledge of what takes place. At best " sensational psychology " gives us little enough information regarding what happens in the limited phase of psychology to which it may be pertinent. A more fruitful line of investigation is that of determining more exactly what sort of action goes on rather than positing supposed "sensory elements " which themselves remain unexplained.
( 134) This is not to decry anything which a study of qualities, feelings, so-called sensations, and the like, may contribute to our understanding of behaviour. But it does emphasize the necessity of going much further than these terms take us. If they are accepted at all their role is apparently that of pointers to a problem and not the basis for analysis.
Approaching an explanation of such activity from the standpoint of the behaviour involved, it is possible to come to a clearer understanding of the nature of it. Concerning this type of activity in the apes, the situation is such that the ape can see all of the elements in it. It does not involve the adjustment to absent or unseen factors (Kohler, 1925, Pp. 53 ff 276 f). Kohler thinks this a very important point. He indicates that tests which place before an animal a series of nonsense stimuli with most of the problem hid, are apt to be quite unreliable as tests of animal intelligence. There are a whole set of influences stimulating the ape. He is already habituated to respond to different aspects of the situation. Thus there is in operation a complex of habit tendencies or ecphorized engrams of a more or less concordant nature in connection with the present original responses. The objective constitutes a central stimulus to these responses in association with facilitation and gradient domination. The reaction pattern of the ape thus contains the background necessary to a co-ordination and integration which will give a correct solution of the problem. It is undoubtedly the effecting of an integration by the interaction of these responses which Kohler calls " insight." Such behaviour on the part of the ape is apparently as complex as, and probably even more complexly organized than, that of the subjects responding with only a short-delayed reaction. Also, the factors operative in delayed response such as residual kinaesthetic and muscular responses of a relatively plastic and temporary or mnemic nature, enabling the animal to retain absent stimuli, even for a short delay, would greatly facilitate the integration of behaviour called "insight." We must also remember that an organism is a dynamic unit with irradiation, facilitation, and more than
(135) mere additive summation of behaviour tendencies and impulses. These give some further important cues for a more adequate and detailed explanation of this type of behaviour.
Such behaviour as we have been discussing, however, seems to be relatively short in duration and somewhat infrequent in occurrence. Thus it is not as important in behaviour as it might otherwise be. Apes, taken in the long run, are about as stupid as humans.
If this type of mediate response, as shown by the apes, also probably some dogs, and some children (Walton's and Hunter's experiments-this type of response for the raccoons is questionable on account of the possibility of motor or other cues), is called by the vague term " thinking," it need not be assumed that reflective thinking is present, nor can " thinking " be regarded as an explanation. However, such behaviour, particularly of the ape, does at least represent an intermediate or sub-symbolic stage between immediate response and reflective behaviour.
Concerning reflective thinking, the term implies an immediately potential self-awareness or reference and the attachment of " meaning " to acts and objects. For this attachment of meaning, the act or object must be represented in the ape's behaviour system as a stimulus in order for reactions to occur toward it as another part of the ape's behaviour. While the act or object is not represented in this manner, the object of meaning or of response is relatively outside, although not separate from, the ape's behaviour system. Thus one side of the meaning equation is not adequately given in the ape's own responses. Further, for self-awareness or reference to exist, there must be a somewhat developed integration of the " self " in behaviour. From the analysis of symbols, previously given, it will be seen that these requirements of reflective thinking are met in symbolic integration and not before. Perhaps a more specific and preferable term for reflective thinking is reflective behaviour[2] ; consequently, it will be used hereafter to designate the characteristics given above.
( 136)
Such characteristics of reflective behaviour do not seem to be given in the ape's activity. The process involved is apparently one of integrating relatively separate reactions into a total response. A situation in relatively loose connection with behaviour is being directly defined by the response of the ape and their integration toward the situation. It is not responses in the behaviour of the organism itself which are being defined, thus giving both parts of a meaning equation therein. This is shown by the evident lack of the ability of the ape to use symbols or adequately substitute within its behaviour a representative of an absent stimulus, a tool for example. In reality it is, as already indicated, a type of behaviour similar to, although more complex than, the dog's analysis of the fence obstacle previously discussed.
Some observers of child behaviour have assumed that a child, before it has developed language habits, " understands " the meaning of words. This is perhaps true, if by understanding it is meant that he is conditioned to respond with a certain response to a given word, just as a horse has learned to start at a clicking sound, a dog comes when called, a chick runs for food at the hen's cluck, or as any other animal may have established a conditioned response. There seems no adequate reason to assume an " understanding " in a reflective sense ; the child's behaviour may be accounted for otherwise.
Further, there has been considerable discussion as to the remarkable ability of the child, after he has acquired symbols, to generalize and use symbols appropriately for a large number of similar objects or situations. Upon a slightly critical examination, this assumption regarding the child's ability to manipulate abstract characteristics is found to be exactly the opposite. It is the child's inability to discriminate differences. The gestalt psychologists have demonstrated how different stimuli may have the same value due to certain configurations on a background. This characteristic of using a symbol for similar situations is similar to the behaviour of the adult who calls everything a tree which is tall, has rough bark and branches, or who calls anything with coloured petals a flower. This
( 137) would not represent a great understanding or power of generalizing about trees or flowers in the eyes of a botanist. Nor does the fact that a child overlooks such differences show great abstract powers-rather it shows lack of experience and ignorance.
In the older children and adults there are more complex mediate responses to stimuli covering long periods of time. From this standpoint we have annihilated both time and space. The adjustment process is interrupted, delayed and stretched out.
The most complete and adequate explanation of this delay is to be found in the functioning of symbolic mechanisms whereby symbols are substituted for acts and objects. Thus the causal gap is filled in for this type of mediate response. Self-integration and " awareness " are aspects of the symbolic process, due to the fact that the symbol in its integration involves the differentiation of the " self " from" others," as has been previously described. Symbols also furnish a basis for so-called meaning.
The problem of meaning must receive more specific analysis. The basis which makes meaning possible is the sequential or functionally dependent relationship existing between parts of behaviour. Of course, before meaning has arisen in behaviour, it does not exist as such; however, the functional relationships do definitely exist. For instance, a wriggling string stimulates the cat to chase it ; if meaning were present, a string would mean something "to be chased." Food stimulates the dog to eat; if meaning were present, food would mean " something to eat." Similarly, as was loosely said before in regard to the dog's analysis of the fence, if meaning were present the meaning of the fence would be given in the dog's responses to it. Causally or functionally speaking, the meaning for a person of any act or object exists in the total responses to it both mnemic and original in association with other individuals and objects. For example, the meaning of the act " hello " is found in the response to it both by others and by oneself. One does not say " hello " to a post --at least under ordinary circumstances-it is a meaningless
( 138) gesture. The meaning of turning an electric switch is to be found in the complex responses made to the light coming on, otherwise turning a switch becomes nonsense. Thus the basis for meaning exists causally in all behaviour.
Now, for the meaning of an act or object to appear as a distinct part of behaviour, it is necessary, as explained, for the organism to produce a stimulus which is a substitute for the act or object, but at the same time is differentiated by definite responses from the act or object, and responds to this self-stimulation. This is exactly what occurs in symbolic activity. Thus meaning is behaviour of a particular type. It consists in responding to a stimulus symbol. One part of behaviour represents the object or act and this first part is being defined by the other parts of behaviour. It is the first part of behaviour-representing the act or object-in which analysis takes place; thus the analysis takes place in the object. This analysis is carried on by the responses toward the part of behaviour representing the object.
In order to avoid the accusation that meaning has been surreptitiously smuggled into behaviour, the explanation of the genesis of symbols by social behaviour and social interchange of stimuli must be recalled. This process of the integration of symbols was explained in terms of the behaviour of interacting organisms.
The behaviour system represents a remarkable mechanism of analysis and definition of complex stimuli. Within a symbolizing behaviour system there is one part of the integrated behaviour which stimulates and presents absent situations, past events, possible future events-the whole range of the universe for which adequate symbols are at hand. Another part is in process of making original responses, also auxiliary and residual mnemic responses which are possible due to the past experience, habits, and bodily processes which are present. How complex this system of reaction tendencies maybe can be partially realized when we consider the processes already described as well as the complex behaviour observed in other animals. The plasticity which exists in the sub-symbolic delayed-
(139) -response mechanisms shown in the dog's or ape's behaviour and even more developed in humans is operative. With such an integrated symbolizing behaviour system operating as a unit, there are the processes necessary for analysing and defining, forgetting the meaning of our universe both social and physical.
This causal analysis of reflective behaviour and of meaning given above holds some important implications for knowledge. We do not know objects directly, but only indirectly through substituting some act representative of them and thus stimulating ourselves to respond to the substitutions as we would to the objects themselves. This involves a mechanism of interchangeable stimuli through which persons may take the role of the act or object. This means that knowledge as such rests upon a sufficiently consistent use of these stimuli by both parties. Too great an inconsistency robs them of their adequacy as substitute stimuli, and confusion, not knowledge, is present. Due to similarities between individuals, they have been able to develop a large body of consistently interchangeable stimuli.
This fact of mutual interdependence means that knowledge, meaning and ideas are not confined within a skull of the cerebral cortex-however important this centralizing mechanism is-but exist as a social process observable and analysable. Social interaction is essential just as the cerebral cortex is necessary, and as long as this is true reflective behaviour cannot be said to be confined to one exclusive of the other, as some would wish to confine it to the brain. An analogy with tennis playing may serve to illustrate the point. The play of muscles in the individuals is a very important and essential part, but the game consists in essence of the interplay between the players in which rackets, balls, net, and court are also essential. An observer confining his attention exclusively to the muscles of a player might be inclined to place the tennis game there, but this would hardly give us an adequate account of the process of the game. Nor will brain processes alone give us an adequate account of reflective behaviour. A man
( 140) who is genuinely alone, socially speaking, i.e., freed from all social influences, cannot " know " anything. Actually cut a man from his fellows, in " isolation," and you cut his mind in two, leaving not two dead halves, but dissolution. Thought is impossible. Knowledge must be obtained by the confirmation of potential symbols by social action and behaviour-otherwise it is meaningless. Separate man from the confirmatory reactions and response of others and his universe of knowledge tumbles. The fact that a person can for a time accept a substitute confirmation is apparently incidental. There must be recurrence for knowledge. The more exact the recurrences, the more confirmed and clear the knowledge; also, the more general the recurrences, the more established is the known apt to be.
The indirect character of the symbol is also emphasized by the analysis of Ogden and Richards (1923) in the Meaning of Meaning, in which they attempt to formulate a basis for a science of symbolism. They give a very suggestive account of symbol-situations. They insist upon the distinction of the symbol from the object symbolized, going so far as to say that only an imputed relation exists between the symbol and the referent or object symbolized. However, this statement, as well as their repeated insistence upon it, might mislead the less critical reader into the conception that the connection is less close than it actually is. While the connection is partially indirect, it is not arbitrary, as their treatment might lead some to think. Even in those cases where symbols do appear to be quite arbitrary, such as in Algebra for instance, this arbitrariness depends upon a frame of reference which is so highly standardized that symbols may be shifted according to agreement with it. But the frame of reference itself rests and depends upon intricately adjusted and agreed standards of action which are anything but arbitrary. It is true that the symbol may be arbitrary in its superficial aspect before it becomes a symbol. That is, originally there may be no relation between " mama " and " mother " before " mama " begins to be associated
( 141) with the mother. But when it becomes a symbol in action for mother, more action; no amount of logical abstraction can do away with a causal relation similar to that which holds regarding the other responses of the child to the mother and the relation is something more than a merely " imputed relation."
It may be somewhat arbitrary, whether a person eats prunes or dates for breakfast ; but having eaten, all the cathartics and emetics which may be applied cannot do away with a causal relation established between the individual and the prunes or dates, although it may change the character of the causal relation in some important respects. Neither is a symbol, after it is integrated, something arbitrary. A symbol also represents direct causal relation. It is probable that these writers would not insist upon its too arbitrary character if pressed for a closer analysis on this point, particularly in view of their emphasis upon the fact that meaning is dependent upon the relation in a psychological context. Not enough consideration of the essential social factors in symbolic integration is perhaps responsible for their attribution of a greater arbitrariness to symbols than can accurately be assigned to them. Of course, their criticism of certain fetish characteristics of symbols is sound on another basis, and the distinction between a symbol and the object symbolized is necessary and valid.
Such an explanation of meaning as has been given above shows that all knowledge is acquired in the same manner. Our knowledge of so-called physical objects is not " known " in a different manner than our knowledge of good, or bad, or progress. However, there are important differences between knowing one thing and another. These are the specific causal processes involved. The only difference between " seeing " a chair in which one may sit and " seeing " one in which one cannot sit is a matter of the causal factors involved, and not a difference in the process of knowing. The latter involves causal sequences which do not involve the actual presence of the chair, and in some cases sequences which are called pathological. It is
( 142) the causal or functional analysis which is the important task in analysing knowledge. To say that we know a physical object in the same manner that we know an idea is not to confuse the symbol. with the object symbolized, the symbol tree with the tree itself, for instance. It merely means that to " know " either of these objects requires the symbolization of them and responses toward this symbol; that is, the operation of the symbolic behaviour mechanisms.
Certain important facts for introspective psychology are to be drawn from this explanation of reflective behaviour. In reflective behaviour there are the differentiating responses representing or symbolizing the act or object. The completeness with which the object is analysed depends upon both the ability to take the role of the object and also the completeness with which the other differentiating responses operate. The main fallacy of the introspectionist is the assumption that we know directly instead of indirectly by such symbolic behaviour. He assumes that we can know directly by direct observation of so-called sensory and central processes. According to the previous analysis, the method of obtaining knowledge is seen to be indirect by the use of symbols. Hence, we are unable to know what the central processes are until we are able to symbolize them to some degree, not by direct introspection. At present we are not able to symbolize central process adequately enough to make even this method as profitable as desirable. We may symbolize a strained feeling in the region of the eyes just as we can symbolize a pain in the abdomen. But we can hardly introspect for the causal sequence behind the strain in the head any more than we can introspect to see whether we have appendicitis or not. In either case, we lack sufficiently fine symbolic integrations to carry on a very extensive analysis, even when aided by instruments for attacking the causal factors involved. The technique of the Freudians and the psycho-analysts gives us very clear evidence that the so-called introspective attempt at direct observation is a failure. The subject is often unable to
( 143) directly get at mnemic connections which, if allowed to run off under their own ecphoric influences, easily come to light through causal connections.
Such a verbal report as given in free association and the like is not to be confused with introspection. In the verbal report the stimulus-situation and symbol are being responded to (the stimulus fallacy for introspection), and it is the analysis contained in these. responses which is valid. It is not an attempted description of so-called internal process by the subject. The verbal report is in principle the same as a chemist's analysis of Sodium. The controls and conditions are, of course, much different, but the method of reaction is the same.
As a matter of fact, what the introspectionist regards as a unique method is either a cul de sac or merely the application of the method of observation used in all sciences. There is some difference in the objects analysed, but the method is the same. For the usual introspection does not analyse so-called sensory or central process as such, but some stimulus symbol which has been imputed to the central processes and which are not sufficiently representative of them simply because we have not yet the knowledge to make them so. At present we are able to integrate few substitute acts or symbols which can be adequately checked causally as being representative of these internal processes. We lack in technique. As soon as we have adequately formed symbols of these central processes, introspection may amount to something, but it will have changed faces on us-it will no longer be introspection as it is now technically considered. It will be a behaviouristic analysis, even though it maybe practised upon one's self. If introspection merely meant a behaviouristic analysis of one's responses, there could hardly be objection to it. Nor could objection be found to such a procedure on the ground that it is in the responses of individuals that the analysis occurs. All analysis is of this nature. But the analysis of one's own responses will amount to a great deal more when the idea that we can directly know them is exchanged for the conception that
( 144) their analysis is to be found in dependent and associated behaviour relationships and sequences.
Now most of our so-called introspection is merely the manipulation of symbols similar to any reasoning or thinking process. It is not a direct observation of " sensory " or central brain processes. Most of the value which so-called introspection has contributed has been on another score than that of introspection. It has been a result of the observation of human behaviour on the same basis as we observe all things of which we have knowledge--the same manner in which any stimulus is examined, either by a physicist or a chemist, or a so-called introspectionist.
This point needs special consideration. Knowledge is a result of symbolization in a behaviour framework. All knowledge apparently is obtained through the process of behaviour responses to stimuli, from the chemist to the psychologist or sociologist. The chemist has symbols for different chemicals. He may perform certain specific response to test the validity of the symbol to represent the substance. He may also control the conditions under which he makes the analysing responses whereby he knows the symbolized substance. This knowledge is held together by symbolization. The psychologist labels certain responses, " imagery " for example, but he has much less control first, in determining whether the reaction is actually made -the chemist has little difficulty in testing a white granulated substance for salt-and second, in discovering the causal relations of the reaction if it is present. The method of knowing is the same, however, in either case. The stringency of control and check on the causal sequence is the essential difference in method between a so-called very accurate piece of knowledge, such as the law of gravity, for instance, and the most flighty piece of knowledge, such as a day-dream fantasy. A large number of persons who argue for introspection are not really arguing for introspection, but merely for what they confuse with introspection, namely, the application of our only means of obtaining knowledge to behaviour and social facts. The study of what a stimulus-symbol is, be it the symbol
( 145) "image" or a stone, is not introspection as such. It is probably necessary to recall that while the symbol stone and a particular stone are different, the known or knowledge aspects are similar in either case, and this is the point being emphasized. The symbol stone has as content the behaviour responses to stone themselves, as well as to the actions of persons pertaining to stones, which responses have subsequently been directed toward the symbol, thus giving it content ; also a particular stone is not known as such without the attachment of this symbolic character which the stone-stimulus takes on. Thus a particular stone is in reality a symbol, and hence calls forth these same responses to it.[3] In the above discussion it is this common method of making responses of knowing which is similar in both cases, so that the distinction between the symbol and the object symbolized is not being ignored or confused. The distinction may be taken care of by the statement that the causal connections are different in the different situations. The emphasis here is upon the method of knowing which is the similarity being pointed out without neglecting the fact that symbols have specific content processes which differ. It is usually when an individual tries to look directly inside at his own brain action or, as usually put, directly in at his own so-called sensory processes or sense data, without adequate instruments to see what he is trying to look for, that he may be properly said to have " introspected."
Further in regard to the verbal report, as such it is useful. Such a report, however, must be considered causally as a response to stimuli and not so much as a report symbolically valid on its face. As a matter of fact, the scientific study of all speech reactions requires the application of a similar methodological principle; namely, speech reactions are primarily to be considered causally or functionally as a response to the total stimulus situation before the reagent. Thus, for instance, responses to a questionnaire give us
( 146) information concerning speech reactions to it, and are not to be considered as merely responses to an hypothetical situation proposed in a question. Only after analyses of the stimulus can it be judged whether the response is mainly to the hypothetical situation or to the other aspects involved, and then it remains to be seen whether the response is similar when the hypothetical situation is actually encountered. For example, a question," Have you a prejudice against negroes ? " may be answered in the negative, while in reality the person would strenuously object to fraternal relations with coloured people. Application of the above methodological principle should put us on guard against such speech reactions-all are to be regarded as responses to the whole stimulus-situation, which naturally may be so well defined in some cases that a verbal response can be causally well defined.
Now regarding the analysis of the symbolic process, this has been attempted here on the same basis as that on which all scientific analysis of knowledge is carried on. It has been studied, not as a process of introspection, but as an objective social process observable and subject to analysis with the symbolic tools and behaviour response available. It is becoming more and more possible to put this process into a frame of measurement where different observers can obtain the same result. The antithesis between subjective and objective drops out of the way. The mysterious thing called imagination turns out to be a constructive phase of the symbolic process capable of statement in scientific terms. Imagination may designate a play with symbols, or in a more active sense, an integration and redintegration of social objects, future plans, social situations, and the like. While the symbolic process may be somewhat difficult to observe in all respects until we have developed more precise symbolic behaviour patterns with which to observe it, yet it may be studied as a causal process, using as checks the more tested parts of knowledge, while indicating certain aspects requiring more substantial corroboration. The symbolic process of acquiring knowledge can be turned upon the symbolic
( 147) process itself, just as it can be turned upon chemistry and physics or mathematics. The fact that with particular people at particular times the symbolic process may not be observable does not thus show the process itself to be out of range of observation. The important fact is that it is observed upon innumerable occasions and as a process, the period of integration in children being particularly instructive. We " see " or symbolize it in essentially the same manner that the biologist, for example, " sees " the operation of cells and the mechanisms of heredity, or the economist sees a business cycle. In either case more perfected technique is, of course, desirable.
It is clear that such an analysis places the symbolic process as observable and objective, or more preferable, non-subjective, as compared with the usual use of subjective. To say it is observable does not mean that its colour must be named. It might also be difficult to name the colour of a tennis game or a dog fight, yet both are quite observable. If observing Pavlov's reflex is objective, in the same way observing the symbolic process, ideas, etc., is also objective. Both are performed by similar behaviour processes. We observe with all of our responses and not only with seeing, hearing, and the like. To assume that so-called sense data and sensory processes are the elementary form of knowledge is not warranted. It is the social interchange in symbolic integration which gives us knowledge.
There are two senses in which the symbolic process may be called subjective : first, in an anthropocentric, or personal, sense-the reference of acts and objects to one's self as a subject ; second, it is a region of the constructions of new objects and may thus be called subjective in the sense that the new symbol is in process, but not yet integrated. If someone wishes arbitrarily to use the term " subjective " to apply to anything going on inside a person, the use by strict definition might be legitimate, but it should apply to heart or gland action as adequately as to brain action, and would only be partially and in a limited sense descriptive of the symbolic process. Or if one wishes
( 148) arbitrarily to designate those symbols in which the causal factors seem to be predominantly personal, that may be legitimate if the use of it is thus understood. Subjective, however, needs considerable sterilization before it can be used thus with assurance of proper connotation. But an application of the term " subjective " to the symbolic process, or to ideas as a label of unobservability, and as antithetical to objective is not sufficiently accurate ; also the general use of the term itself is too loose to be of practical use in this respect. To designate the two aspects already indicated seems to be the most accurate use of the term " subjective," and then it is used at the risk of considerable misunderstanding. To show the observable and objective character of reflective behaviour does not necessarily mean an attack upon an individual's personal existence or activity which he feels particularly his own, but it should help to disclose more clearly the character and nature of such existence. Further, the symbolic process is only one of the many phases of the behaviour of individuals. Neither the symbolic process nor reflective behaviour are to be identified with so-called images. " Images," as immediate responses, apparently may exist without symbols. But for " images " to become objects of reflective behaviour the symbolic process must be present, although not necessarily in spoken symbols. Head's (1920-21) experiments, upon aphasia patients suffering from unilateral lesions, indicate that apparently images may function at least in the absence of the proper use of spoken words. Certain patients, being absent from their room, could not accurately describe in words the location of the furniture, but could do so by pointing.
Neither is reflective behaviour to be confined to the operation of the vocal and subvocall apparatus, although its genesis evidently lies here. Any act or object capable of symbolic reference may involve reflective behaviour.
It seems apparent from the analysis of the symbolic process that knowledge, as this term is generally used, exists only through this process of symbolization.
Max Muller, who was an ardent exponent of the proposi-
( 149) -tion that we cannot think without the use of words, gives the following illustration of an attempt to do so. The illustration may not prove anything, and certainly it does not prove that thoughts and words, in the narrow sense, are the same, even though words are necessary in order that thought function. Of course, if within the meaning of the term " word " there are included all the responses going with it which make it a symbol, we have a much better case, for thinking certainly consists of the process of symbolization.
The experiment is an interesting one, to say the least.
. . " I now proceed to describe a counter-experiment, or rather the fruitless efforts which some philosophers have made in order to prove that they could conceive a simple concept, at least, such as dog, without having a name for it. I have described the same experiment before, and if it seemed childish, all I can say is that this is not my fault. We are told that people have to begin by shutting their eyes and ears, and holding their breath. They then sink into some kind of semi-consciousness, and when all is dark and still, they try their new art of ventriloquism, thinking thought without words. They begin with a very simple case. They want to conjure up the thought of a-I must not say what, for it is to be a nameless thing, and every time that its name rises it is gulped down and ordered away. However, in confidence, I may whisper that they want to conjure up the thought of a dog.
" Now the word dog is determinately suppressed; hound, cur, and all the rest, too, are strictly excluded. Then begins the work. ` Rise up, thou quadruped with ears and a wagging tail ! ' But alas ! the charm is broken already. Quadruped, ears, tail, wagging, all are words which cannot be admitted.
" Silence is restored, and a new effort begins. This time there is to be nothing about quadruped, or animal, or hairy brute. The inner consciousness sinks lower, and at last there rises a being to be developed gradually and insensibly into a dog. But alas! 'being' too is a word,
( 150) and as soon as it is whispered, all the nameless dogs vanish into nothing.
" A last appeal, however, remains. No animal, no being is to be talked of ; complete silence is restored; no breath is drawn. There is something coming near, the ghost appears, when suddenly he is greeted by the recognizing self with Bow-wow, bow-wow! Then, at last, the effort is given up as hopeless, the eyes are opened, the ears unstopped, the breath is allowed to rise again, and as soon as the word dog is uttered, the ghost appears, the concept is there, we know what we mean, we think and say Dog. Let anyone try to think without words, and, if he is honest, he will confess that the process which he has gone through is somewhat like the one I have just tried to describe " (1887, p. 58-59).
The fundamental character of the integration of the self has been referred to in numerous places. Special consideration of this social fact should be included in connection with the subject of reflective behaviour.
When the child first develops " self " and symbolic integration, the " self " plays an outstanding role, as we have pointed out in various places. It is not so much due to the fact that the child is ego-centric or " believes " himself to be the centre of the universe as that he actually is the centre of his " known " universe. His own behaviour becomes a centre of symbolization and knowledge for him.
The self-centred character of the child's thinking has been analysed very strikingly by Piaget (1926), whose researches show that it is not until about seven or eight years that the child is able to take the point of view of the other person. He calls this period up to seven years the period of ego-centric thought. Following it begins the period of socialized thought. The use of " socialized " in this sense is unfortunate on account of the implication that the integration preceding is not social. This is
( 151) decidedly not true. The facts previously stressed should be sufficient to show its pre-eminent social character. However, a greater degree of social integration becomes possible when, according to Piaget, at about seven to eight the child learns to reflectively place himself in the role of the other person, a thing which, it is evident from our analysis, he has before been doing unreflectively.
The symbolic beginnings in a child must necessarily be centred around himself as a basis. His symbols are dependent upon his social experience, which are naturally limited to experiences relating quite directly to his own behaviour in association with others. During this early period when integration centres around the self, symbols are accepted dogmatically; they are fixed words and are true for everybody. The child naively assumes this universal validity. Consequently, there is no basis in experience for reflectively placing himself in the viewpoint of other persons in making explanations to other children or adults. However, Piaget's assumption (1926, p. 41) that there is no real interchange of thought here is somewhat gratuitous in certain respects. Where there is common experience, children do obviously understand each other, and much more so do they understand adults as Piaget states. Where there is insufficient common experience, interchange of thought, even between sophisticated adults, is handicapped until this experience is acquired. The only basis for saying that there is no interchange is that the child's thinking is drawn from a common social process, but there is certainly interchange in this process. However, in justice to Piaget, apparently his main point is that previous to 7-8 there is an absence in the child of this reflective taking of the other's point of view in communication, and here he is evidently on sound ground, assuming, as appears probable, that his observations are typical in this respect. It is unfortunate that Piaget does not check his observations, which were obtained under the conditions of the institute, by more extensive observations upon children under more normal conditions, or at least by more definitely making allow-
( 152) -ances for such differences. His conclusions must be qualified on this score, and obviously some of them will have to be modified in consideration of other data, particularly those data pertaining to the social factors in the child's reflective behaviour. The observations in the institute do not seem to give a wholly rounded picture of the child's symbolic activity, or perhaps some of its important aspects were more easily overlooked.
Piaget's encumbrance with the psycho-analysts' conception of a subconscious source of a self-generated autistic type of thought lies back of his conception of its non-social character, and permits him to ignore its essential social aspects. Such a conception can hardly stand scientific analysis. There is undoubtedly a great deal going on, such as stress and strain, vague feelings, etc., in any live organism, man or other animal, which it cannot symbolize and hence cannot think reflectively about, but there seems no adequate reason for labelling this as subconscious thought, even though these processes may exert a great amount of influence upon the reflective behaviour. Further, after a child has learned to think, the early symbols and experiences may be apparently buried in a mass of later symbolic acquirement. The early experiences of a child, particularly when the symbolic world is so fixed and universal as is early childhood, may furnish very apt material for sympathies, antipathies, and complexes. These may be later submerged, but are not independently developed. The point which must be emphasized in this connection is that this " thought " is socially derived and integrated, and not autistically developed in the sense of independent self-generation. The Freudians and the psychoanalysts have certainly given us important facts regarding these buried and non-rational complexes, but there is no need of complicating the affair by unnecessary and unfounded assumptions which cannot account for their origin except in some mysterious conception. To speak then of this early period as one of non-communicable thought (Piaget, 1926, p. 45), if by " thought " he meant so-called reflective or ideational thinking, is a contradiction
( 153) of the facts and of the conception which identifies such thought with symbolic operation, which Piaget apparently accepts in general. It must be remembered that all living organisms have a great amount of non-symbolic impulses, visceral activity, glandular secretion, habits and experience which exert powerful influences and which the organism is not yet able to symbolize-reflective behaviour is still young ! Our task is to turn our research technique upon these phenomena rather than to ban them to the realm of non-communicable thoughts.
With the expanding social experiences of the child, he comes into contact with larger numbers of symbols and with more persons and groups. From such experience he learns that there are unexpected and contradictory reactions to the same symbol. He learns that a " word has several names," that his parents do not " know everything." Communication begins to be something more than saying certain words--it becomes a matter of saying the words which will elicit an understanding response from the other. Piaget's splendid work contains illustrations and materials indicating this development. At 7-8, he indicates, there is the beginning of the causal--in a more strict sense--stage of thought, in contrast to the period up to seven years' in which mechanical or logical causality is not a subject of consideration on the part of the child. The causal stage of thought has its source and development, as Piaget indicates (1926, Ch. V), in the human or anthropocentric experiences and motivations.
Thus we see that underlying reflective behaviour is the stress and strain and the dynamics of the organism as it
( 154) interacts with other organisms. Symbolic behaviour in the child develops as a social integration and first centres largely around the child's own social experiences. With the growth of the child's social contacts, he is able at about 7-8 (this age can be tentatively accepted) to reflectively put himself in another's place. It is not until about 11-12, according to Piaget (1926, p. 196), that the child begins to hold hypotheses as such, to draw conclusions from them, and to see whether these conclusions are justified or not.
At the beginning of symbolic development, everything is personal and endowed with personal qualities. With greater expansion of personal and group experience, more intermediate and causal experiences are analysed and symbolized. Objects become differentiated into nonpersonal, physical and personal objects--but still by the use of social stimuli. Physical objects are known by reacting to them as others react toward the objects and by reacting to others in connection with their own reaction to the physical objects. Thus they become known to us by the same method that is used to know social objects. In this sense all physical objects are indirectly social objects. In the scientist, reflective behaviour has gone to the degree that the immediate personal elements of symbolization may be out of sight. It is in this respect that symbolic development has reached a most complicated form. The symbolic aspect of the personality of the abstract thinker has become so finely integrated that it may become an interplay of symbols without the ego holding down one side, as is usually the case in less abstract reflective behaviour, and often the case even with the scientist. The person (or ego) may merely manipulate the symbols in order to derive a balanced result. Symbolic development apparently is by means of an expanding content and experience which comes to include as much of the universe as possible within its compass. In such an expansion the person's personal reactions become merely one among many other similar ones, and not the centre of creation. However, few people are able to thus treat themselves
( 155) statistically or quantitatively, even to meet the requirements of this effective type of symbolic integration.
To be able to carry on such complex reflective behaviour does not mean, however, that personal considerations and sympathies are ignored in social life. Working in and giving substance to the symbolic process is the whole of individual and social experience. The more complex the symbolic integration, the more effective it may be as a means of facilitating social experience, realizing personal and social ideals, and serving to develop the aesthetic phases of life. Also, such emotional factors seem to be of considerable importance in motivating and resolving reflective behaviour and in fixing engramic experiences which serve as content to symbolic behaviour. Excitation involving strong emotion results in greater mnemic impressions, as Semon states, and which is a well-attested fact of behaviour.
However, the use of symbols as emotional and aesthetic stimuli and as a means of establishing facts and analysing causal factors should be differentiated. These are two different, although not separate, phases of the symbolic process. Special techniques, such as art and literature, are developed for the manipulation of emotional and aesthetic experience. Certain symbols function very often as stimuli for strong emotional arousal. Symbols may not lose their symbolic character by such use as Ogden and Richards (1923, pp. 261-71) at times seem somewhat ready to assume, they might even become more potent as symbols by more complete ecphory of engrams, or they may become different symbols. Of course, at some times symbols do undoubtedly lose their character as symbols and merely stimulate as rhythmic sounds and the like, but usually there remains some symbolic content. The symbol must not be thought of as a too static integration.
On the other hand, we have special techniques for eliminating too personal emotions in symbolic behaviour. The scientific technique has been most successful in this respect. But even here an emotional drive for obtaining tested knowledge seems an essential aspect.
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The basic nature of self-integration as a part of the symbolic process is also illustrated by the phenomena of dual personality. Separate symbolic integrations appear so closely associated with each one of these distinct selves that in some cases there is little obvious transfer of experience from one to the other. The person is said to be " unconscious " or has no memory of what the other self, which is not immediately in control, has done. The normal personality has centres of symbolic integration around its different selves in a similar manner, but ordinarily they are all more or less effectively interconnected into a central or composite self for which symbols have a general validity. The dual personality is merely an extreme case. It is perhaps well to indicate in this connection that by so-called consciousness is generally meant a symbolic self-integration. When symbols become habitual or automatic it is probable that the self-reference has greatly diminished or is near the minimum. Such enticing problems as these are ones for special and more extended social research.
Another interesting question is, are there other means of " knowing " similar to reflective behaviour which go beyond symbols requiring a more complex behaviour integration ? The conviction on the part of various trained and serious scientists that telepathy occurs as well as the large amount of serious attention given to such subjects as clairvoyance and the like are sufficient to warn one against being dogmatic on the possibility of other forms of thinking and knowing. All such discussions as that of Ouspensky (1922), for example, in regard to the possibility of fourth-dimensional thought or intuition cannot be nonchalantly dismissed by a serious thinker in spite of some quite evident fallacies. The scientific determination and analysis of intuitive or immediated knowing, should it exist, would obviously be very significant. There is the definite possibility that other forms of thought occur, or, if there is not yet a more complex type of knowing, that such may in the future be integrated in behaviour processes. It is one of the first
( 157) tasks of the scientist to be open-minded to any of these possibilities; however, with our present knowledge, these questions are generally placed in the hypothetical or philosophical realm.
We are sure there is a large part of behaviour experience perhaps carried to a considerable degree in the emotional content of symbols which influences reflective behaviour in a remarkable subtle manner, and frequently involves contradictory or non-rational behaviour. Psychologists have clearly disclosed the irrational man, activated by influences of which he may be unaware. This is perhaps another way of saying that our symbols and reflective behaviour are products of our total experience. It is a place for more sociological investigation to supplement the data of the psychologist.
If the engramic theory holds true regarding the engramic effects of stimuli upon the germ cells, and there are some facts which point in this direction, it may be that the mechanisms underlying symbolic integration will be to a greater and greater degree transmitted by heredity, giving the infant during its plastic period a cumulative advantage of centuries of transmission of these engramic effects. Of course, the inheritance of a modicum of acquired traces is yet an open question. Still, it would be possible just by the process of mutation and selection for a cumulation of hereditary mechanisms which facilitate symbolic integration. Further, expansion in symbolic development should give greater possibilities of a new type of integration. For instance, a considerable amount of enlargement of symbolic content is undoubtedly to be obtained by studying processes in their backward sequence as well as in their forward sequence, which is our usual method of analysis. Jesperson, in applying the backward method to the study of the origin of language, has undoubtedly contributed a greater accuracy to his knowledge of it. History still remains to be written backwards. No one knows how much it will disclose which has previously been mysterious. Karl Pearson suggests that, if one could travel away from the earth more rapidly than light travels,
( 158) he would see events backwards. A man would begin life at death and end it at birth. A study of processes from all possible angles is advantageous in contributing to symbolic facility. Further, if scientific advance begins to put greater and greater amount of dynamics and movement into our knowledge content, we will require a greater and greater symbolic facility to keep knowledge within our grasp. If behaviourism has placed emphasis upon the dynamic side of behaviour phenomena, the Gestalt theorists have compounded it. As a matter of fact, most people have trouble " seeing " or symbolizing the world as it is in process, and about the best that the rest can do is to see only short sections at once. A significant need, scientifically, is the elaboration of symbols which enable us to more adequately understand and keep our bearings in a moving universe.
A further aspect of perhaps more present practical significance is that pertaining to a greater understanding of the relation of emotional fixation of engrams and particularly symbolic mechanisms. This is of great importance, especially in the early development of the plastic childhood period, when symbolic habits are first being formed and mnemic traces first being established. Another line of investigation is that regarding the idetic or vivid imagery types; such types undoubtedly facilitate symbolic development. It is important to learn the factors underlying and promoting their integration.
