Mental Development in the Child and the Race

Chapter 6: Suggestion

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§ 1. General Definition

THE rise of hypnotism in late years has opened the way to an entirely new method of mental study. The doctrine of reflexes was before largely physiological, and only pathological cases could be cited in evidence of a mechanism in certain forms of consciousness as well as out of it; and even pathological cases of extreme sensitiveness to casual suggestion from the environment or from other men did not receive the interpretation which the phenomena of hypnotic suggestion are now making possible, i.e. that suggestion by idea, or through consciousness, must be recognized to be as fundamental a kind of motor stimulus as the direct excitation of a sense organ. Nervous reflexes may work directly through states of consciousness, or be stimulated by them; these states of consciousness may be integral portions of such reflexes; and, further, a large part of our mental life is made up of a mass of such ideo-motor 'suggestions,' which are normally in a state of subconscious inhibition.

Without discussing the nature of the hypnotic state in the first instance, nor venturing to pass judgment in this connection upon the question whether the suggestion theory is sufficient to explain all the facts, we may yet isolate the aspect spoken of above, and discuss its general bearings in the normal life, especially of children. Of course, the question

(101) at once occurs, is the normal life a life to any degree of ideomotor or suggestive reactions, or is the hypnotic sleep in this aspect of It, quite an artificial thing? Further, if such suggestion is normal or typical in the mental life, what is the nature of the inhibition by which it is ordinarily kept under -- in other words, what is its relation to what we call will? Leaving this second question altogether unanswered for the present, [1] it has occurred to me to observe children, especially my own H. and E., during their first two years, to see if light could be thrown upon the first inquiry above. If it be true that ideo-motor suggestion is a normal thing, then early child life should present the most striking analogies to the hypnotic state in this essential respect. This is a field that has hitherto, as far as I know, been largely unexplored by workers in the psychology of suggestion.

It is not necessary, I think, to discuss in detail the meaning of this much-abused but, in the main, very well defined word, 'suggestion.' The general conception may be sufficiently well indicated for the present by the following quotations from authorities. They all agree on the main phenomenon, their definitions differing in the place of emphasis, according as one aspect rather than another supplies ground for a theory. I may gather them up in my own definition, which aims to describe the fundamental fact apart from theory, and is therefore better suited to our preliminary exposition. I have myself defined suggestion as "from the side of consciousness . . . the tendency of a sensory or an ideal state to be followed by a motor state,[2] in the manner typified by the abrupt entrance from without into consciousness of an idea or image, or a vaguely conscious stimu-

(102)--lation, which tends to bring about the muscular or volitional effects which ordinarily follow upon its presence." [3]

Janet defines suggestion as " a motor reaction brought about by language or perception." [4] This narrows the field to certain classes of stimulations, well defined in consciousness, and overlooks the more subtle suggestive influences emphasized by the Nancy school of theorizers. Schmidkunz makes it: "die Herbeirufung eines Ereigrusses durch die Erweckung seines psychischen Bildes." [5] This again makes a mental picture of the suggested 'event' in consciousness necessary, and, besides, does not rule out ordinary complex associations. It neglects the requirement insisted upon by Janet, i.e. that the stimulus be from without, as from hearing words, seeing actions, objects, etc. Wundt says: "Suggestion ist Association mit gleichzeitiger Verengerung des Bewusstseins auf die durch die Association angeregten Vorstellungen." [6] In this definition Wundt meets the objection urged against the definition of suggestion in terms of complex association, by holding down the association to a 'narrowed consciousness'; but he, again, neglects the outward nature of the stimulus, and does not give an adequate account of how this narrowing of consciousness upon one or two associated terms, usually a sensori-motor association, is brought about. Ziehen: "In der Beibringung der Vorstellung liegt das Wesen der Suggestion." [7] Here we have the sufficient recognition of the artificial and external source of the stimulation, but yet we surely cannot say that all such stimulations succeed in getting suggestive force. A thousand things suggested to us are rejected, scorned, laughed at. This is so marked a fact in current theory, especially on the pathological

(103) side, that I have found it convenient to use a special phrase for consciousness when in the purely suggestible condition, i.e. 'reactive consciousness.' [8] The phrase 'conscious reflex' is sometimes used, but is not good as applied to these suggestive reactions; for they are cortical in their brain seat, and are not as definite as ordinary reflexes.

For our present purposes, the definition just given from my earlier work is sufficient, since it emphasizes the movement side of suggestion. The fundamental fact about all suggestion, -- not hypnotic suggestion alone, which some of the definitions which I have cited have exclusive reference to, [9] -- is, in my view, the removal of inhibitions to movement brought about by a certain condition of consciousness which may be called 'suggestibility.' The further question, what makes consciousness suggestible, is open to some debate. There are two general statements -- not to elaborate a theory here, however -- which are not done justice to by any of the current theories. We may say, first, that a suggestible consciousness is one in which the ordinary criteria of belief are in abeyance; the coefficients of reality, to use the terms of an earlier discussion of belief, [10] are no longer apprehended. Consciousness finds all presentations of equal value, in terms of uncritical reality-feeling. It accordingly responds to them all, each in turn, readily and equally. Second: this state of things is due primarily to a violent reaction or fixation of attention, resulting in its usual monoïdeism, or 'narrowing of consciousness.' For belief is a motor attitude resting upon complexity of presentation and representation. Just as soon as this mature complexity is destroyed, belief

(104) disappears, and all ideas 'become free and equal' in doing their executive work. Each presentation streams out in action by suggestion; and stands itself fully in the possession of consciousness, with none of the pros and cons of its usual claim to be accepted as real, gaining also the still greater establishment which comes from the return wave upon itself of its own motor discharge. The question of suggestion be comes then that of the mechanism of attention in working three results: (I) the narrowing of consciousness upon the suggested idea, (2) the consequent narrowing of the motor impulses to simpler lines of discharge, and (3) the consequent inhibition of the discriminating and selective attitude which constitutes belief in reality.

The truth of these general statements is thoroughly confirmed by the observation of children, in whom the general system of adjustments, which constitute the 'worlds of reality' of us adults, are not yet effected. Little children are credulous, in an unreflective sense, even to illusion. Tastes, colours, sensations generally, pains, pleasures, may be suggested to them, as is shown by the instances given in later pages.

It is, however, to the truth of the fundamental fact of normal motor suggestion found in children, that I wish to devote a large part of this chapter; and observations of reactions clearly due to such suggestion, either under natural conditions or by experiment, lead me to distinguish the varying sorts of suggestion mentioned in the following paragraphs, in what I find to be about the order of their appearance in child-life.

Endnotes

  1. See, however, Chap. XIII., below.
  2. Science, Feb. 27, 1891, where many of the observations given in this chapter were first recorded.
  3. Cf. also Handbook of Psychology, II., 297.
  4. Aut. Psych., p. 218.
  5. Psych. der Suggestion.
  6. Hypnotismus u. Suggestion, II. Abs.
  7. Philos. Monatshefte, XXIX., 1893, p. 489.
  8. Handbook of Psychology, Feeling and Will, pp. 60 ff., and Chap. XII.
  9. See the section below in this chapter (§ 7) in which the main facts of hypnosis are briefly stated, and the further references to the theory of hypnotism in § 3 of the chapter on Volition, below.
  10. Handbook, II., Chap. VII.

§ 2. Physiological Suggestion

By 'suggestion' is understood ordinarily ideal or ideo-motor suggestion, -- the origination from without of a motor

(105) reaction, by producing in consciousness the state which is ordinarily antecedent to that reaction; but observation of an infant for the first month or six weeks of its life leads to the conviction that its life is mainly physiological. The vacancy of consciousness as regards anything not immediately given as sensation, principally pleasure and pain, precludes the possibility of ideal suggestion as such. The infant at this age has no ideas in the sense of distinct memory images. Its conscious states are largely affective. Accordingly, when the reactions which are purely reflex, and certain random impulsive movements, are excluded, we seem to exhaust the contents of its motor consciousness.

Yet even at this remarkably early stage H. was found to be in a degree receptive of suggestion, -- suggestion conveyed by repeated stimulation under uniform conditions. In the first place, the suggestions of sleep began to tell upon her before the end of the first month. Her nurse put her to sleep by laying her face down and patting gently upon the end of her spine. This position itself soon became not only suggestive to the child of sleep, but sometimes necessary to sleep, even when she was laid across the nurse's lap in what seemed to be an uncomfortable position.

This case illustrates what I mean by physiological suggestion. It shows the law of physiological habit as it borders on the conscious. No doubt some such effect would be produced by pure habit apart from consciousness; but, consciousness being present, its nascent indefinite states may be supposed to have a quality of suggestiveness, which works to increase the fixedness of the habit. Yet the fact of such a colouring of consciousness in connection with the growth of physiological habit is important rather as a transition to more evident suggestion.

The same kind of phenomena appear also in adult life.

(106) Positions given to the limbs of a sleeper lead to movements ordinarily associated with these positions. The sleeper defends himself, withdraws himself from cold, etc. Children learn gradually the reactions upon conditions of position, lack of support, etc., of the body, necessary to keep from falling out of bed, which adults have so perfectly. All secondary automatic reactions may be classed here, the sensations coming from one reaction, as in walking, being suggestions to the next movement, unconsciously acted upon. The state of consciousness at any stage in the chain of movements, if present at all, must be similar to the baby's in the case above, -- a mere internal glimmering, whose reproduction, however brought about, reinforces its appropriate reaction.

The most we can say of such physiological suggestion is, that the conscious state is always present, and that the ordinary reflexes may be subsequently abbreviated and modified.

Professor Ribot says as much as this. "When a physiological state has become a state of consciousness, through this very fact it has acquired a particular character.... It has became a new factor in the psychic life of the individual -- a result that can serve as a starting-point to some new (either conscious or unconscious) work." And again: "Volition is a state of consciousness . . . it marks a series, i.e. the possibility of being recommenced, modified, prevented. Nothing similar exists in regard to automatic acts that are not accompanied by consciousness.... Each state of consciousness . . . in relation to the future development of the individual, is a factor of the first order." [1] Schneider,

(107) also, writing from the phylogenetic point of view, says: "All purely physiological movements serve a single definite purpose, are always the same; psychological movements, an the contrary, have the peculiarity that they serve different purposes, follow upon quite different stimulations, and adapt themselves to circumstances by combination and modification.... Otherwise we would not have any consciousness, for there would be no use for it.... So in connection with every movement which is accompanied by a phenomenon of consciousness, we may hold, that this phenomenon of consciousness is really necessary (wirklich nothig ist) for the determination of the movement." [2] A more positive pronouncement on the presence of consciousness in all reactions to which the term 'suggestion' may be applied is that of Moll. He says: " There is no suggestion without consciousness. It makes no difference whether the suggestion is made through imitation or by a command.... I must insist in opposition to Mendel that there is consciousness of what is suggested, and that this is the main point in the matter. A suggestion without consciousness is to me inconceivable." [3]

In hypnotic experimentation, the influence of such subconscious or physiological suggestions is now generally recognized under the general doctrine of hyperaesthesia of the senses. Ochorowicz calls the general phenomenon of suggestion ideoplasty,[4] and when no clear idea is necessary to the effect, as in my 'physiological' suggestion, he speaks Of 'physical ideoplasty.' He says: "We have ideoplasty whenever the thought alone of any functional modification determines such functional modification . . . the thought of yawning itself produces yawning, etc." [5]

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A particular observation made upon my child E. during her second year may serve to make clear this first stage of suggestion. She learned to go to sleep sucking her bottle, the rubber of which was left in her mouth while she slept. Now, at any sound, touch, or other sudden stimulation, such as the flaring up of the light, she began with more or less vigour to suck the bottle, giving no other sign of awaking whatever, and really not awaking, but only passing from a deeper sleep, or less consciousness, to a lighter sleep, or more consciousness. Now, as I interpret it, the stimulus, arousing more brain process, heightened the sleep or dream consciousness, brought out the sensations in the lips about the rubber, and these sensations by physiological suggestion set up the sucking movements. These movements in turn had their habitual influence in sending the child off into deep sleep again. Then, later, it is probable that even the lip sensations were not necessary; but the increased dynamogeny of the increased sensory consciousness simply poured itself into the lip-movement channels, since they were associated last and always with the conditions of sleep.

Liébault was brought to recognize this phenomenon by the possibility of suggesting purely physical functions successfully to very young children. [6]

We may adopt a diagrammatic representation of the elements of a motor reaction at this point for convenience, calling it the 'motor square.' Figure IX. presents a square of which each corner represents a physiological process, as it may occur with or without consciousness, as follows: --

Let sg= suggestion (sensory process); mp= seat of motor process; mt = movement of muscle; mc = consciousness of movement (kinæsthetic process). The sides of the square

(109) are connections between the seats of these processes. The relation of the elements of the 'motor square' to other cere-

Figure9 Motor square, Figure 10 physiological suggestion

bral elements, and the relation of this scheme to others proposed by Lichtheim, Kussmaul, etc., are spoken of later. [7]

The stimulus sg (Fig. X., in which crosses at the corners indicate nervous processes only, and circles indicate vague states of consciousness) starts the motor process mp; it leads to movement, mt, which is reported to consciousness, mc. The line between sg and mc is broken, because at this stage m infancy, associations are only just beginning to be formed between a feeling of muscular movement and its stimulating sensation.

The cases of 'physiological suggestion,' as now described,[8] tend, inasmuch as they involve elements of consciousness, to take more definite form, as 'sensori-motor suggestions,' to which we may now turn.

Endnotes

  1. Diseases of Personality, pp. 15-16. Ribot in his text, however, notes mainly the phylogenetic advantage of consciousness as memory, on which see below, Chap. IX., § 3, and Chap. X., § § 2, 4.
  2. Der thierische Wille, p. 53.
  3. Hypnotism, p. 267 (italics his).
  4. Ochorowicz, Mental Suggestion, p. 25. (So the translator; 'idioplasy' is perhaps better.)
  5. Ibid. 354-5
  6. See illustrative cases given in earlier editions of the work, pp. 113 f., and also in Ochorowicz, loc. cit., p. 247 (with his context).
  7. Below, Chap. XIII., §. 3.
  8. Among confirmatory observations sent me, those of A. G. Parrot of Farmington, Conn., are varied and careful.

§ 3. Sensori-motor Suggestion

These cases of suggestion may again be best illustrated from the phenomena of infancy, before a close definition is attempted. And first we may note some instances of what may be called general suggestions of this sort.

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I. General. -- Various Sleep Suggestions. -- From the first month on, there was a deepening of the hold upon the child H. of the early method of inducing sleep. The nurse, in the meantime, added two nursery rhymes. Thus position, pats, and rhyme sounds were the suggesting stimuli. Not until the third month, however, was there any difference noticed when the same suggestions came from other persons. I myself learned, during the fourth month, to put her to sleep, and learned with great difficulty, though pursuing the nurse's method as nearly as possible. Here, therefore, was a sleep suggestion from the personality of the nurse, -- her peculiar voice, touch, etc.,—of which mention is made more fully below. At this time I assumed exclusive charge of putting H. to sleep, in order to observe the phenomena more closely. For a month or six weeks I made regular improvement, reducing the time required from three-quarters of an hour to half an hour, finding it easier at night than at midday. This indicated that darkness had already become an additional sleep suggestion, probably because it shut out the whole class of sensations from sight, thus reducing the attention to stimulations which were monotonous. [1]

In the following month (sixth), I reduced the time required, day or night, to about a quarter of an hour, on an average. In this way I found it possible to send her off to sleep at any hour of the night that she might wake and cry out.

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I then determined to omit the patting, and endeavour to bring on sleep by singing only. The time was at first lengthened, then greatly shortened. I now found it possible (sixth to seventh month) to put her to sleep, when she waked in the dark, by a simple refrain repeated monotonously two or three times. In the meantime she was developing active attention, and resisted all endeavours of her nurse and mother, who had been separated from her through illness, very stubbornly for hours, while she would go to sleep for myself, even when most restless, in from fifteen to thirty minutes. This result required sometimes firm holding down of the infant and a determined expression of countenance.

At the end of the year, this treatment being regular, she would voluntarily throw herself in the old position at a single word from me, and go to sleep, if only patted uniformly, in from four to ten minutes. This continued through the second year; even when she was so restless that her nurse was unable to keep her from gaining her feet, and when she screamed if forced by her to lie down. The sight of myself was sufficient to make her quiet; and in five minutes, rarely more, she was sound asleep. I found it of service, when she was teething and in pain, to be able thus to give her quiet, healthful sleep.

This illustrates, I think, as conclusively as could be desired, the passage of purely physiological over into sensory suggestion; and this is all that I care, in this connection, to emphasize.

Food and Clothing Suggestion. -- H. gave unmistakable signs of response to the sight of her food-bottle as early, at least, as the fourth month, probably a fortnight earlier. The reactions were a kind of general movement toward the bottle, especially with the hands, a brightening of the face, and crowing sounds. It is curious that the rubber on the bottle seemed

(112) to be the point of identification, the bottle being generally not responded to when the rubber was removed. This was also true of E., to whom the rubber alone without the bottle became a remarkable quieting agent, as I have already mentioned. The sight of the bottle, also, was suggestive much earlier than the touch of it with her hands.

H. began to show a vague sense of the use of her articles of clothing about the fifth month, responding at the proper time, when being clothed, by ducking her head, extending her hand or withdrawing it. About this time she also showed signs of joy at the appearance of her mittens, hood, and cloak, before going out.

II. Suggestions of Personality. -- It was a poet, no doubt, who first informed us that the infant inherits a peculiar sensibility for its mother's face, —a readiness to answer it with a smile. This is all poetic fancy. It is true that the infant does smile very early; E. clearly smiled at me on her seventh day and at her mother on the ninth. But it is probably a purely reflex indication of agreeable organic sensation. When the child does begin to show partiality for mother or nurse, it is because the kind treatment it has already experienced in connection with the face has already brought out the same smile before in this organic way; the mother's face, that is, grows to suggest the smile. At first it is not the face alone, but the personality, the presence, to which the child responds; and of more special suggestion, the voice is first effectual, then touch, as in the case of sleep above, and then sight. Such suggestions are among the most important of infancy, serving as elements in the growth of the consciousness of self and of external reality, as we shall have occasion to see later on.

Delaying for the moment the further analysis of this remarkable class of suggestions, the question occurs, are not

(113) these so-called 'suggestions' simply cases of the association of ideas? I think we are warranted in answering, 'No'; for the reason that it is not an associated idea that is brought up; unless we are prepared to enlarge the ordinary conception of association to include phenomena of the vaguest psychological meaning. The muscular movement is produced without the production of an idea of that movement, largely through native pathways of discharge, or by the production of organic conditions, such as sleep, which involve muscular conditions. Can we say that the sleep suggestions first bring up an idea or image of the sleep condition, or that the bottle brings up an idea of the movements of grasping, or even of the sweet taste? I think the case is more direct. The energy of stimulation passes over into the motor reaction through the medium of the conscious state; although the conscious state is undoubtedly enveloped in an envelope or fringe of organic and muscular sensation which is of marked hedonic quality. Further, as will appear clearer below, it is not an association plus a suggestion, or an association plus an association, as current atomistic doctrines of association would lead us to expect. We cannot say that pleasure or pain always intervenes between the present state of consciousness and the motor reaction, i.e. mother's face, pleasure recalled, expression of pleasure, or present bottle, sweet taste, movements to reach. I believe all this is quite artificial and unnatural. The most that can be said is that the conscious state as a whole, with its hedonic colouring, serves to bring about a modification of the reaction, whether it be a native one, or one established by association or habit. [2]

The elements are as before for physiological suggestion, except that the reaction begins with a clearly conscious

(114) process at sg (Fig. XI.), and the child is getting associations between sg and mc.

The phenomenon of 'personality-suggestion,' to which we may now return, is so important in the growth of the child's consciousness of himself, of his belief in realities about him, and of his social life, that it should be closely scrutinized. This is the more important because such an analysis has never been made upon the basis of actual observation of children. The treatment which follows is based upon most

Figure 11, sensori-motor suggestion

detailed and watchful inspection of H. and E., together with careful but less intimate observation of two other young children, one of them a boy, with especial reference to the development of the sense of their own relation to the persons who moved about them.[3]

As outcome of this kind of observation, and with no intermixture of interpretation, which may be now left over, I find no less than four phases of attitude involved in what afterwards becomes the so-called 'social sense' in the child. I say 'afterwards becomes,' because all of them belong in the 'projective' [4] stage of the child's sense of self, i.e. they all go to furnish data which he afterwards appropriates to himself as 'subject.' These four phases are indescribably subtle

(115) and indescribably intermixed in the subjective ensemble of the growing child. So much so that I shall not attempt in all cases to cite actual situations to justify each point: rather, the view I take rests upon innumerable situations, and their differences from one another. Just as one is utterly unable to give examples of his own phases of attitude expressive of the nuances of meaning which the actions of others bring out of him, so entirely a matter of insight and intuition must his sense be of what is in the child's mind in the various social situations which confront him from day to day. Nevertheless, the drift of the infant's development is very clear to the sympathetic observer; and I think the instances which I cite will be sufficient to excite in all those familiar with little children a sense of the truth of the general portrayal.

I. The first thing in the environment of the infant which it notes -- apart from the ordinary fixed and static stimulations, such as sounds, lights, etc. -- are movements. The first attempts of the infant at anything like steady attention are directed to moving things -- a swaying curtain, a moving light, a stroking touch, etc. And further than this, the moving things soon become more than objects of curiosity; these things are just the things that affect him for pleasure or pain. It is movement that brings him his food, movement that regulates the stages of his bath, movement that dresses him comfortably, movement that sings to him and rocks him to sleep. In that complex of sensations, the nurse, the feature of moment to him, of immediate satisfaction, or redemption from pain, is this: movements come to succour him. Change in his bodily feeling is the vital requirement of his life, for by it the rhythm of his vegetative existence is secured; and these changes are accompanied and secured always in the moving presence of the one he sees and feels about him. This, I take it, is the first and great association

(116) of the infant with other persons, the earliest reflection in his consciousness of the world of personalities about him. At this stage his 'personality-suggestion' is this pain-movement-pleasure psychosis: to this he reacts with a smile, and a crow, and a kick.[5]

Many facts tend to bear us out in this position. My child cried when I handled her in the dark, although I imitated the nurse's movements as closely as possible. She tolerated a strange presence as long as it remained quietly in its place: but let it move, and especially let it usurp any of the pieces of movement-business of the nurse or mother, and her protests were emphatic. The movements tended to bring the strange elements of a new face into the vital association, pain-movement-pleasure, and so to disturb its familiar course: this constituted it a strange 'personality.'

It is astonishing, also, what new accidental elements may become parts of this association. Part of a movement, a gesture, a peculiar habit of the nurse, may become sufficient to give assurance of the welcome presence and the pleasures which the presence brings. Two notes of my song in the night stood for my presence to H., and no song from any one else could replace it. A lighted match stopped the crying of E. for food,[6] although it was but a signal for a process of food-preparation lasting several minutes: and a simple light never stopped her crying under any other circumstances. So with this first start in the sense of personality we find also reasons for the differences of different personalities; but this constitutes the next phase.

2. It is evident that the sense of another's presence thus

(117) felt in the infant's consciousness rests, as all associations rest? upon regularity or repetition: his sense of expectancy is aroused whenever the chain of events is started. And this is embodied at this stage largely in two indications: the face and the voice. [7] But it is easy to see that this is a very meagre sense of personality; a moving machine which brought pain and alleviated suffering would serve as well. So the child begins to learn in addition the fact that persons are in a measure individual in their treatment of him, and hence that personality has elements of uncertainty or irregularity about it. This growing sense is very clear to one who watches an infant in its second half-year. Sometimes its mother gives a biscuit, but sometimes she does not. Sometimes the father smiles and tosses the child; sometimes he does not. And the child looks for signs of these varying moods and methods of treatment. Its new pains of disappointment arise directly on the basis of that former sense of regular personal presence upon which its expectancy went forth.

This new element of the child's 'social sense' becomes, at one period of its development, quite the controlling element. Its action in the presence of the persons of the household becomes hesitating and watchful. Especially does it watch the face for any expressive indications of what treatment is to be expected; for facial expression is now the most regular as well as the most delicate indication. It is unable to anticipate the treatment in detail, and it has not of course learned any principles of interpretation of the conduct of mother or father lying deeper than the details. It is just here, I think, that imitation arises, as will appear later,[8] and becomes so

(118) important in the child's life. This is imitation's opportunity. The infant waits to see how others act? because its own weal and woe depends upon this 'how'; and inasmuch as it knows not what to anticipate, its mind is open to every suggestion of movement. Its attention dwells upon details, and by the regular principle of motor reaction which imitation expresses, it acts these suggestions out.

All through the child's second year, and longer, his sense of the persons around him is in this stage. The incessant 'why?' with which he greets any action affecting him, or any information given him, is witness to the simple puzzle of the apparent capriciousness of persons. Of course he cannot understand 'why': so the simple fact to him is that mamma will or won't, he knows not beforehand which.

But in all this period there is germinating in his consciousness -- and this very uncertainty is an important element of it -- the seed of a far-reaching thought. His sense of persons -- moving, pleasure-or-pain-giving, uncertain but self-directing, persons -- is now to become a sense of agency, of power, which is yet not the power of the regular-moving door on its hinges or the rhythmic swinging of the pendulum of the clock. The sense of personal actuation, 'projective agency,' is now forming, and it again is potent for still further development of the social consciousness. For he begins to grow capricious himself, and to feel that he can be so whenever he likes. Suggestion begins to lose the regularity of its working; or to become negative and 'contrary' in its effects. At this period it is that obedience begins to grow hard, and its meaning begins to dawn upon the child as the great reality. It means the subjection of his own agency, his own liberty to be capricious, to the agency and liberty of some one else.

3. With all this, the child's distinction between and among

(119) the persons who constantly come into contact with him grows on apace? in spite of the element of irregularity of the general fact of personality. As before he learned the difference between one presence and another, -- a difference which was overcome in the discovery that every presence is of irregular value; so now he learns the difference between one character and another -- the regularity of personal agency, as opposed to the regularity of mere associations of movement and to the irregularity of the apparently capricious. Every character is more or less regular in its irregularity. It has its tastes and modes of action, its temperament and type of command. This the child learns late in the second year and thereafter. He behaves differently when the father is in the room. He is quick to obey one person, slow to obey another. He cries aloud, pulls his companions, and behaves reprehensibly generally, when no adult is present but his nurse, who has no authority to punish him. This stage in his 'knowledge of man' leads to those active differences of conduct on his part which make imitation, and the discipline of obedience, a sword with two edges, one for good and one for evil. This general appreciation of character, together with the full-blown social feeling, which constitutes the fourth phase in my division, may be left for later discussion, as well as the part played by this kind of suggestion in the genesis of the moral sense. [9]

To sum up: 'personality-suggestion' is the general term for the stimulations to activity which the child gets from persons. It develops through three or four roughly distinguished 'stages,' all of which illustrate what I have called his 'projective' sense of personality; namely, I. a bare distinction, on the ground of peculiar pain-movement-pleasure complexes, of persons from things; 2. a sense of the irregu-

(120)-larity or capriciousness of the behaviour of these persons, which is the germ of his sense of agency, as opposed to the regular causal series of conditions which things go through; 3. his distinction, vaguely felt but reacted to with great exactness, between the characteristic modes of behaviour or personal character of different persons; 4. after his sense of his own subject-agency arises by a process of imitation, he gets what is really social feeling: the sense of others as 'ejective,' that is, as like and equal to himself.[10]

III. Deliberative Suggestion. -- By 'deliberative suggestion' I mean a state of mind in which co-ordinate sense-stimuli meet, confront, oppose, further, one another. Yet I do not mean 'deliberation' in the full-blown volitional sense, but suggestion that appears deliberative, while still inside the reactive consciousness and still representing a single reaction upon a single state of consciousness. In real deliberation, as appears below, there are two or more pictured alternatives, upon the conscious co-ordination of which action follows. But here the different elements are ingredients in a single sensory complex, -- one suggestion, -- and the motor reaction waits upon the issue of the whole. The competition of processes is probably in large measure subcortical. So the state is still to be classed as sensori-motor, not ideo-motor, since it does not require intelligent memory and representation. The last three months of the child's first year are, I

(121) think, clearly given over to this kind of consciousness. Motor stimulations have multiplied, the emotional life is budding forth in a variety of promising traits, the material of conscious character is present i but the 'ribs' of mental structure may still be seen through, response answering to appeal in a complex but yet mechanical way. The child lacks self-consciousness, self-decision, self in any developed form.

As an illustration of what I mean, I may record the following case of deliberative suggestion from H.'s thirteenth month: it was more instructive to me than whole books would be on the theory of the conflict of impulses. When about eight months old, H. formed the peculiar habit of suddenly scratching the face of her nurse or mother with her nails. It became fixed in her memory, probably because of the unusual facial expression of pain, reproof, etc., which followed it, until the close proximity of any one's face was sufficient suggestion to her to give it a violent scratch. In order to break up this habit, I began to punish her by taking at once the hand with which she scratched and 'snapping' her fingers with my own first finger hard enough to be painful. For about four weeks this seemed to have no effect, probably because I only saw her a small part of the tune, and only then did she suffer the punishment. But I then observed, and those who were with her most reported, that she only scratched once at a time, and grew very solemn and quiet for some moments afterwards, as if thinking deeply; and soon after this climax was reached she would scratch once impulsively, be punished, and weep profusely, then become as grave as a deacon, looking me in the face. I would then deliberately put my cheek very close to her, and she would sit gazing at it in 'deep thought' for two or even three minutes, hardly moving a muscle the whole time, and then either suddenly scratch my face and be

(122) punished again, or turn to something (noise, object, watch chain, etc.) which I was careful enough to provide in Qnier to aid her by drawing off the attention. Having scratched, she began to cry, in anticipation of the punishment. Gradually the scratching became more rare. She seldom yielded to the temptation after being punished, and so the habit entirely disappeared. I may add that her mother and myself endeavoured to induce a different reaction by taking the child's other hand and with it stroking the face which she had scratched. This movement in time replaced the other completely, and the soft stroking became one of her most spontaneous expressions of affection. [11]

Now the first act of scratching was probably accidental, one of the spontaneous reactions or physiological suggestions so common with an infant's hands; it passed, by reason of its peculiar associations, into a sensori-motor reaction whenever the presence of a face acted as suggestion, -- so far a strong direct stimulus to the motor centres. Then came the pain of punishment, -- a stimulus to the inhibition on the next occasion, not by exciting a clear memory, but by working itself directly into the suggesting psychosis, and thus reducing the motor tendency. For a time the tendency remained strong enough, however, to cause the reaction; then there followed an apparent balance between the two, and finally the pain element predominated in the suggestion, and the reaction was permanently inhibited. The stroking reaction gained all the strength of violent and repeated association with the elements of this mental conflict, and was thus soon fixed and permanent.

Taking this as a typical case of 'deliberative suggestion,' -- and I could instance many others from H.'s life history

(123) and from E.'s, -- two inferences may be brought out in passing: there is nothing here that requires volition, meaning by 'volition' a new influence of any kind, -- active consciousness; if we do call it so, we simply apply a different term to phenomena which in their simplicity we call by other names. And, second, suggestion is as original a motor stimulus as pleasure and pain. Here they are in direct conflict. Can we say that H. balanced the pleasure of scratching and the pain of punishment, and decided the case on this egoistic basis? What pleasure did the scratching have more than any other muscular exercise? It was simply a sensori-motor habit which the pain inhibition tended to break up.

So also, apart from pathological aboulia, which is described later on, we find a corresponding condition in adult life. As I have said elsewhere, "there is a state of conflict and hindrance among presentations which is mechanical in its issue, . . . so states of vexation, divided counsel, conflicting impulse, and hasty decision against one's desire for deliberate choice. We often find ourselves drawn violently apart, precipitated through a whirl of suggested courses into a course which we feel unwilling to acknowledge as our own." [12] Many of the conditions of deliberation are there, but not the fact of it.

Endnotes

  1. I found by accident, in this connection, the curious fact that a single flash of bright light would often put H. immediately to sleep when all other processes were futile. In her fifth month I despaired one evening, after nearly an hour's vain effort, and lighted the gas at a brilliant flash unintentionally. She closed her eyes by the usual reflex, and did not open them again, sleeping soundly and long. I afterwards resorted to this method on several occasions, carefully shielding her eyes from the direct light rays, and it generally, but not always, succeeded. Shortly after reporting this in the columns of Science (Feb. 27, 1891), I heard from a prominent psychologist that his wife could confirm the observation from experience with her own children.
  2. Ochorowicz describes the same class of phenomena as 'ideorganic associations based on habitude,' Mental Suggestion, p. 232.
  3. Some observations on the presence of something similar to this class of suggestions in animals have already been given above, Chap. I., §. 3.
  4. See above, Chap. I., § 3
  5. Undoubtedly this association gets some of its value from the other similar one in which the movements are the infant's own. It is by movement that he gets rid of pain and secures pleasure.
  6. Observations made in her fourteenth week.
  7. I have special observations on H.'s responses to changes in facial expression up to the age of twenty months. Her changes of attitude indicated most subtle sensibility to these differences -- and normal children all do, I think. Animals show the same remarkable 'projective intuition,' if the expression be allowed.
  8. Below, Chap. XI., § 3.
  9. Below, Chap. XI., § 3.
  10. The reader may notice in this connection the section below on 'bashfulness,' which is found to be a native organic response to the presence of persons, considered as 'projects' of a personal kind. It is curious to note that besides general gregariousness which many animals show in common, they have in many instances special sense indications of the presence of creatures of their own kind or of other kinds. Dogs and cats each recognize both dogs and cats by smell. Horses seem to be guided by sight. Fowls are notoriously blind to shapes of fowls, but depend on the calls which they hear of their kind or their young. Experiments seem to show that many of these responses are probably not congenital. (See Morgan, Habit and Instinct.)
  11. A somewhat similar action by a boy of nine months has been reported to me by Rev. C. H. Huestis of Barrington, Nova Scotia.
  12. Handbook, II, p. 299. This kind of complex suggestion, however, undoubtedly serves to give a ready organic basis for the earlier and more obscure acts of volition, which are described loater on (Chap. XIII, § 4).

§ 4. Ideo-motor Suggestion

By ideo-motor suggestion I mean the condition in which the stimulus is a clearly pictured idea, a presentation or object with all its 'meaning,' or a revived image of memory or imagination.

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Imitation.[1] -- For a long period after the child has learned to use all his senses' and after his memory is well developed, he lacks conscious imitation entirely. I have been quite unable with my children to confirm the results of Preyer, who attributes imitation to his child at the age of three to four months.

In support of the assertion that imitation is rather late in its rise, the following experiences may be reported. As a necessary caution, the rule was made that no single performance should be considered real imitation unless it could be brought out again under similar circumstances. This rule is necessary, I think, merely for caution, since the 'copy ' set for imitation is likely to be some simple movement of lips, hands, etc., which the child has made himself before, and is likely to make again. It is possible also from the mere fact of dynamogeny that the motor discharge in shedding itself outward would tend in a general way to find its most permeable native pathway toward the muscles which repeat the copy, since the movements are natural and easy. At any rate, such cases, if they exist, shade up gradually into conscious imitations. [2]

It is probable, therefore, that cases of imitation recorded as happening as early as the third month are merely coincidences. For example, I recorded an apparent imitation by H., of closing the hand, as late as May 22 (beginning of the ninth month), but afterwards I wrote, " experiment not confirmed with repeated trials running through four succeeding days." H.'s first clear imitation was on May 24, in knocking a bunch of keys against a vase, as she saw me do

(125) it, in order to produce the bell-like sound. This she repeated over and over again, and tried to reproduce it a week later, when, from lapse of time, she had partly forgotten how to use the keys. But on the same day, May 24, other efforts to bring out imitation failed signally, i.e. with more or less articulate sounds, movements of the lips (Preyer's experiments), and opening and closing of the hands. Ten days later, however, she imitated closing the hand on three different occasions. And a week afterward she imitated movements of the lips and certain sounds, as pa, ma, etc. [3] From this time forward the phenomenon seemed extended to a very wide range of activities, and began to assume the immense importance which it always comes to have in the life of the young child.

When the imitative impulse does come, it comes in earnest. For many months after its rise it may be called, perhaps, the controlling impulse, apart from the ordinary life processes. As a phenomenon, it is too familiar to need description. Its importance in the growth of the child's mind is largely in connection with the development of language and of voluntary movement generally.

The phenomena may be divided into two general classes, called simple imitation and persistent imitation.' By 'sim-

(126)-ple' imitations, reactions are characterized, in which the movement does not imitate well, but is the best the child can do. He does not try to improve by making a second attempt. This is evidently a case of simple sensori-motor suggestion, and is peculiar psychologically only because of the more or less remote approximation the reaction has to the model that the child copies.

The reaction at which imitative suggestion aims is one which will reproduce the stimulating impression, and so tend to perpetuate itself. When a child strikes the combination required, he is never tired working it. H. found endless delight in putting the rubber on a pencil and off again, each act being a new stimulus to the eye. This is specially noticeable in children's early efforts at speech. They react all wrong when they first attack a new word, but gradually get it moderately well, and then sound it over and over in endless monotony. The essential thing, then, in imitation, over and above simple ideo-motor suggestion, is that the stimulus starts a motor process which tends to reproduce the stimulus and, through it, the motor process again. From the physiological side we have a circular activityCsensor, motor; sensor, motor: and from the psychological side we have a similar circle -- reality, image, movement; reality, image, movement, etc.

The square to the left (Fig. XII.) is the first act of imitation; the movement (mt) now stimulates (dotted line a) the eye again (sg'), giving the second square, which by its movement (mt') furnishes yet another stimulus (dotted line a'); and so on.

By 'persistent imitation' is meant the child's effort, by repetition, to improve his imitations. Its extreme importance justifies its separate discussion in a later place. [5]

(127) Surveying the ground that we have gone over so far in this chapter, the progress of suggestion may be seen by the following brief definitions: --

I. Physiological suggestion is the tendency of a reflex or secondary automatic process to get itself associated with and influenced by stimulating processes of a physiological

Figure 12, imitation

and vaguely sensory sort. Perhaps the plainest case of it, on a large scale in animal life, is seen in the decay of instincts when no longer suited to the creature's needs and environment.

2. Sensori-motor and ideo-motor suggestion is the tendency of all nervous reactions to adapt themselves to new stimulations, both sensory and ideal, in such a way as to be more ready for the repetition or continuance of these stimulations.

3. Deliberative suggestion is the tendency of different competing sensory processes to merge in a single conscious state with a single motor reaction, illustrating the principles of nervous summation and arrest.

4. Imitative suggestion is the tendency of a sensory or ideal process to maintain itself by such an adaptation of its discharges that they reinstate in turn new stimulations of the same kind.

Whether any simpler formulation of these partial statements may be reached, is a question which may be delayed

(128) until we have looked more closely at certain other instances of suggestion, which have not been described before, and at the conditions of nervous adaptation in general.[6]

Endnotes

  1. In this chapter the word 'imitation' is used to denote 'conscious' social imitation -- its usual popular sense.
  2. See the remarks on the question of 'instinctive imitation,' below, Chap. XlI., § 2.
  3. The majority of recorded observations agree in making vocal imitations later than visual-movement imitations. Egger, loc. cit., p. 8; Tracy, Psychology of Childhood, p. 57 (for citations); Stevenson, Science, March 3, 1893. The first vocal imitation of my other child, E., was observed in her eleventh month, when she tried to say 'tick,' in reference to the clock, after her mother, together with 'ps' for 'pussy,' and 'po' for 'pop.'
  4. This is akin to Preyer's distinction between 'spontaneous' and 'deliberate' imitation. He is wrong in making both classes voluntary. The contrary is proved for spontaneous imitation by the fact that many elements of facial expression are never acquired by blind children. We could hardly say that facial expression was a voluntary acquisition, however gradually it may have been acquired. See Preyer, Senses and Will, p. 293.
  5. Chap. XIII., § 2. The general discussion of the position of imitation in the mental life, especially its phylogenetic value, is reserved for later chapters (Chaps. IX.-XIII.).
  6. See Chap. VII on 'The Theory of Development,' and Chap. IX on 'Organic Imitation.'

§ 5. Subconscious Adult Suggestion

There are certain phenomena of a rather striking kind coming under this head whose classification is so evident that discussion of the general psychological principles which they involve is not necessary. The kind of fact which I have in view may be illustrated with sufficient clearness merely by the recital of the following observations.

Tune-suggestion. -- Professor Ladd has pointed out in de- tail -- what has for a long time been taken for granted -- that dream states are largely indebted for their visual elements, what we see in our dreams, to accidental lines, patches, etc., in the field of vision, when the eyes are shut, due to the distended blood vessels of the cornea and lids, to changes in the external illumination, to the presence of dust particles of different configuration, etc. [2] The other senses also undoubtedly contribute to the texture of our dreams by equally subconscious suggestions. And there is no doubt, further, that our waking life is constantly influenced by equally trivial stimulations.

I have tested in detail, for example, the conditions of the rise of so-called 'internal tunes' -- we speak of 'tunes in our heads' or 'in our ears' -- and find certain suggestive influences which in most cases cause these tunes to rise and

(129) take their course. Often, when a tune springs up 'in my head,' the same tune has been lately sung or whistled in my hearing, though quite unconsciously to myself. Often the tunes are those heard in church the previous day or earlier. Such a tune I am entirely unable to recall voluntarily: yet when it comes into my mind's ear, so to speak, I readily recognize it as belonging to an earlier day's experience. Other cases show various accidental suggestions, such as the tune 'Mozart' suggested by the composer's name, the tune 'Gentle Annie' suggested by the name Annie, etc. In all these cases it is only after the tune has taken possession of consciousness, and after much seeking, that the suggesting influence is discovered.

Closer analysis reveals the following facts. The 'time' of such internal tunes is usually dictated by some rhythmical subconscious occurrence. After hearty meals it is always the time of the heart-beat, unless there be 'in the air' some more impressive stimulus; as, for example, when on shipboard, the beat is with me invariably that of the engine throbs. When walking it is the rhythm of the foot-fall. On one occasion a knock of four beats on the door started the Marseillaise in my ear: following up this clue, I found that at any time, different divisions of musical time being struck on the table at will by another person, tunes would spring up and run on, getting their cue from the measures suggested. Further, when a tune dies away, its last notes often suggest, some time after, another having a similar movement -- just as we pass from one tune to another in a 'medley.' It may also be noted that in my case the tune memories are auditive: they run in my head when I have no words for them and have never sung them -- an experience which is consistent with the fact that these 'internal tunes' arise in childhood before the faculty of speech. They also have

(130) distinct pitch. For example, on April 9, 1892, I found a tune 'in my head' which was perfectly familiar, but for which I could find no words. Tested on the piano, the pitch was f-sharp and the time was my heart-beat. I finally, after much effort, got the unworthy words, 'Wait till the clouds roll by,' by humming the tune over repeatedly. The pitch is determined, probably, by the accidental condition of the auditory centre as respects pitch-readiness, or by the pitchcolouring of the external sound which serves as stimulus to the tune.

Dreams as Emotion Stimulus. -- Another important realm of suggestion, not hitherto explored, is seen in the influence of dreams on the waking life. Dreams react to deepen waking impressions, and to strengthen the hold of dominant presentations and impulses. This fact seems to have its primary application to emotion. We cannot tell how much of the active momentum of our waking life we owe to dream stimulation. The following case of fact, in the life of my little girl H., indicates that such a stimulus may be of enormous importance. When two years and three months of age, she was accidentally run over by a dog. Before this she had been very fond of dogs. She was not much hurt, but very much frightened, and repeated to every one the words, 'Doggie run over baby.' The next day she saw a dog on the street and showed some signs of fear until the brute ran away. About the second night after the occurrence her mother and I were awakened by a violent outcry in H.'s room. On going in, the child was found sitting in bed undergoing a paroxysm of fear from a bad dream. She repeated again and again after leaving the room, 'Doggie run over baby ana' (ana was her word for there), pointing into her bedroom. Evidently she had lived over again in her dream the occurrence with the dog. The effect on her waking life

(131) was very marked. The next day she could not be induced to go into her bedroom, protesting, 'Doggie in ana,' and crying lustily if the endeavour wa.s made to carry her. Further, for several days the sight of a dog on the street threw her into such convulsive fits of fear that her nurse brought her home to be quieted -- a much more violent exhibition, be it noted, than that which occurred after the real occurrence with the dog, but before the dream. The sight or even the picture of a dog long excited great emotion, and it is not unlikely that she will carry for life this antipathy, which will appear later to be unaccountable. [3]

Normal Auto-suggestion. -- A further class of suggestions, which fall under the general phrase 'auto-suggestion,' of a normal type, may be illustrated. In experimenting upon the possibility of suggesting sleep to another, I have found certain strong reactive influences upon my own mental condition. Such an effort, which involves the picturing of another as asleep, is a strong auto-suggestion of sleep, taking effect in my own case in about five minutes if the conditions be kept constant. The more clearly the patient's sleep is pictured, the stronger becomes the subjective feeling of drowsiness. After about ten minutes the ability to give strong concentration seems to disintegrate, attention is renewed only by fits and starts and in the presence of great mental inertia, and the oncoming of sleep is almost overpowering. A frequent cure for insomnia, speaking for myself, is the persistent effort to put some one else asleep by hard thinking of the end in view, with a continued gentle movement, such as stroking the other with the hand.

On the other hand, it is impossible to bring on a state of drowsiness by imagining myself asleep. The first effort at

(132) this, indeed, is promising, for it leads to a state of restfulness and ease akin to the mental composure which is the usual prelimunary to sleep; but it goes no farther. It is succeeded by a state of steady wakefulness, which effort of attention or effort not to attend only intensifies. If the victim of insomnia could only forget that he is thus afflicted, could forget himself altogether, his case would be more hopeful. The contrast between this condition and that already described shows that it is the self-idea, with the emotions it awakens, which prevents the suggestion from realizing itself and probably accounts for many cases of insomnia. [4]

The attempt to analyze out the emotional 'moments' which enter into the latter case yields some such result as the following. It is impossible to think of self, however vaguely and fugitively, without inducing positive emotional excitement. All the intense self-motives which practical life keeps alive -- the most vigorous expressive influences of our mental nature -- at once tend to spring up from their nascent state. There are really no proper distinctions among them: pride [5] shades down to complacency, complacency merges into mild interest, interest becomes intensified in anxiety or fear. Or the mere thought of self starts a train of affairs through consciousness about which personal concern is lively. When one thinks of himself, a kind of egoistic excitement at once arises. It is undoubtedly these subjective elements, these emotional phases, which prevent such conscious auto-suggestions from realizing themselves.

Sense Exaltation. -- Recent hypnotic discussions have shown the remarkable exaltation which the senses may

(133) attain in somnambulism, together with a corresponding refinement in the interpretative faculty. Events, etc., quite subconscious, usually become suggestions of direct influence upon the subject. Unintended gestures, habitual with the experimenter, may suffice to hypnotize his accustomed subject. The possibility of such training of the senses in the normal state has not had sufficient emphasis. The young child's subtle discriminations of facial and other personal indications are remarkable. The prolonged experience of putting H. to sleep -- extending over a period of more than six months, during which I slept beside her bed -- served to make me alive to a certain class of suggestions otherwise quite beyond notice. [6]

In the first place, we may note the intense auto-suggestion of sleep already pointed out, under the stimulus of repeated nursery rhymes regularly resorted to in putting the child asleep. Second, surprising progressive exaltation of hearing and the interpretation of sounds coming from her in a dark room. At the end of four or five months, her movements in bed awoke me or not according as she herself was awake or not. Frequently after awaking I was distinctly aware of what movements of hers had awaked me. [7] A movement of her head by which it was held up from her pillow was readily distinguished from the restless movements of her sleep. It was not so much, therefore, exaltation of hearing as exaltation of the function of the recognition of sounds heard and of their discrimination.

Again, the same phenomenon to an equally marked degree

(134) attended the sound of her breathing. It is well enough known that the smallest functional bodily change induces changes in both the rapidity and the quality of the respiration. [8] In sleep the muscles of inhalation and exhalation are relaxed, inhalation becomes long and deep, exhalation short and exhaustive, and the rhythmic intervals of respiration much lengthened. Now degrees of relative wakefulness are indicated with surprising delicacy by the slight respiration sounds given forth by the sleeper. Professional nurses learn to interpret these indications with great skill. This kind of hearing-exaltation became very pronounced in my operations with my child. After some experience the peculiar breathing of advancing or actual wakefulness in the child was sufficient to wake me. And when awake myself, the change in the infant's respiration-sounds to those indicative of oncoming sleep was sufficient to suggest or bring on sleep in myself. In the dark, also, the general character of her breathing-sounds was interpreted with great accuracy in terms of her varied needs, her comfort or discomfort, etc. The same kind of suggestion from the respiration-sounds now troubles me whenever any one is sleeping within hearing distance.[9]

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The reactions in movement upon these suggestions are very marked and appropriate, in customary or habitual lines, although the stimulations are quite subconscious. The clearest illustrations in this body of my experiences were afforded by my responses in crude songs to the infant's waking movements and breathing-sounds. I have often waked myself by myself singing one of two nursery rhymes, which by endless repetition night after night had become so automatic as to follow in a reactive way upon the sense-stimulus from the child. It is certainly astonishing that among the things which one may get to do automatically, we find automatic singing: but writers on mental defect have noted that the function of musical or semi-musical expression may be reflex.[10]

The principle of subconscious suggestion, of which these simple facts are less important illustrations, has very interesting applications in the higher reaches of social, moral, and educational theory. I have applied the phrase 'plastic imitation' to certain of the social and educational phenomena.[11]

Endnotes

  1. Mr. A. G. Parrott has sent to me confirmation by himself of many of the observations of this section.
  2. Ladd, 'Psychology of Visual Dreams,' in Mind, N. S., Vol. I. (I892),
    p. 299.
  3. Féré cites a case of hysterical paralysis brought on by a dream, Sensation et Mouvement, p. :5. See also Brain, January, 1887.
  4. This is confirmed by the fact that insomnia readily yields to hypnotic suggestion.
  5. A friend informs me that when he pictures himself asleep or dead, he cannot help feeling gratified that he makes so handsome a corpse.
  6. It is well known that mothers are awake to the needs of their infants when they are asleep to everything else.
  7. This fact is analogous to our common experience of being awaked by a loud noise and then hearing it after we awake; although the explanation is not the same.
  8. Cf. Vierordt in Gerhardt's Handbuch der Kinderkrankheiten, p. 215.
  9. This is an unpleasant result which I find confirmed by professional infants' nurses. They complain of loss of sleep when off duty. Mrs. James Murray, an infants' nurse in Toronto, informs me that she finds it impossible to sleep when she has no infant in hearing distance, and for that reason she never asks for a vacation. Her normal sleep has evidently come to depend upon continuous soporific suggestions from a child. In another point, also, her experience confirms my observations, viz., the child's movements, preliminary to waking, awake her, when no other movements of the child do so -- the consequence being that she is ready for the infant when it gets fully awake and cries out.

    I may add that these vague suggestive influences noting upon the operator, have not been sufficiently weighed in the practice of hypnotism. Ochorowicz points this out. It is almost impossible for the operator to give suggestions which he has not himself taken in a measure from the patient, or which both he and the patient have not gotten in common from a common psychic atmosphere. There is, I fancy, a good deal of this reciprocal influence in the cases of striking rapport between particular operators and patients. Of course I can more easily give effective suggestions to you, if I am myself getting what I suggest in whole or part from you in the first instance.

  10. Cf. Wallaschek, Zeitsch. für Psychologie, VI., Hefte 2, 3.
  11. Mind, January, 1894; cf. Chap. XII., § 2, below.

§ 6. Inhibitory Suggestion

An interesting class of phenomena which figure perhaps at all the levels of suggestion now described, may be known as 'inhibitory suggestions.' The phrase, in its broadest use, refers to all cases in which the suggesting stimulus tends to suppress, check, inhibit, movement. We find this in certain

(136) cases just as strongly marked as the positive movementbringing kind of suggestion. The facts may be put under certain heads in relation to the types of suggestion already enumerated, the general theory being left over for the doctrine of mental development found in subsequent chapters.

Pain Suggestion. -- Of course, the fact that pain inhibits movement occurs at once to the reader. As far as this is true always, and is a native inherited thing, it is organic, and so falls under the head of 'physiological suggestion' of a negative sort. The child shows contracting movements, crying movements, starting and jumping movements, shortly after birth, and so plainly that we need not hesitate to say that these pain responses are provided for in his nervous system; and that, in general, they are inhibitory and contrary to those other native reactions which indicate pleasure. Our theory provides, as stated below, a way of accounting for this state of things.[1]

The influence of pain, besides being thus a physiological datum, extends everywhere through mental development. It is one of our main objects to try to ascertain its exact function, both in individual and in race development; so any further word upon it here would only anticipate later detailed treatment. The general fact, however, is this: that pain suggests a lively muscular revolt away from every stimulus which produces it; and this statement includes, of course, the inhibition of any movement which brings pain, since this movement is itself felt as a stimulating or incoming process along those afferent nerve courses which serve as the apparatus of the muscular sense.

Control Suggestion. -- This covers all cases which show any kind of restraint set upon the movements of the body short of that which comes from voluntary intention. The

(137) infant brings the movements of his legs, arms, head, etc., gradually into some kind of order and system. This is accomplished by a system of orgamc checks and counterchecks, by which associations are formed between muscular sensations and certain other sensations, as of sight, touch, hearing, etc. The latter serve as suggestions to the performance of those movements, and those only, which produce the former. The infant learns to hold up his head, to raise his trunk, to extend his hands, to grasp with thumb opposite the four fingersCall purely by such control suggestions.

These cases come so near to the sphere of voluntary action -- indeed, they pass so directly into volitions -- that they are more profitably discussed in the chapter devoted to that topic. We will there see reasons for rejecting the view of some, that these are voluntary acts on the part of the child. The few new observations which I have to offer on this topic may also be reserved.

Contrary Suggestion. -- By this is meant a tendency of a very singular kind observable in many children, no less than in many adults, to do the contrary when any course is suggested. The very word 'contrary' is used in popular talk to describe an individual who shows this type of conduct. Such a child or man is rebellious whenever rebellion is possible; he seems to kick constitutionally against the pricks. My child E. showed it in her second year in a very marked way. When told that a new taste was 'good' -- a suggestion readily taken in its positive sense by her sister at that age -- she would turn away with a show of distaste even when she had liked the same taste earlier. When asked to give her hand into mine, -- a case of direct imitative suggestion, -- she thrust it behind her back. The sight of hat and cloak was a signal for a tempest, although she enjoyed outdoor excursions. These are only instances from many of her

(138) contrary suggestions at this period. The tendency yielded to the all-conquering onset of imitation late in her second year, and she is now (third year) as docile an imitator as one could desire.

The fact of 'contrariness' in older children -- especially boys -- is so familiar to all who have observed school children with any care, that I need not cite further details. And men and women often become so enslaved to suggestions of contrary that they seem only to wait for indications of the wishes of others in order to oppose and thwart them.

Contrary suggestions are to be explained as exaggerated instances of control. It is easy to see that the checks and counter-checks already spoken of as constituting the method of suggestive control of movement -- that these may themselves become so habitual and intense as to dominate the reactions which they should only regulate. The associations between the muscular series and the visual series, let us say, which controls it, comes to work backwards, so that the drift of the organic processes is toward certain contrary reverse movements. Certain of the other associates of the control series also, especially those which, by strong contrasting experiences of pleasure and pain, represent in any sense a contrary series, may become dominating. While in the case of simple movements, as I have said, the dominant associates are only the same motor and visual series read backwards; yet the range of contrast effects secured by association extends to all cases of opposing systems of movement and suggestions of conduct. So contrary suggestion becomes clear as a case of auto-suggestion in which the stimulating sensation or thought is itself started up in sharp contrast and habitual opposition to a present external suggestion of the regular kind.

In the higher reaches of conduct and life we find interest-

(139)-ing cases of very refined contrary suggestion. In the man of ascetic temperament, the duty of self-denial takes the form of a regular contrary suggestion in opposition to every invitation to self-indulgence, however innocent. And the overscrupulous mind, like the over-precise, is a prey to the eternal remonstrances from the contrary which intrude their advice into all his decisions. In matters of thought and belief, also, cases are common of stubborn opposition to evidence, and persistence in opinion, which are in no way due to the cogency of the contrary argument, or to real force of conviction.

Bashfulness. -- I may first report observations on this interesting fact of child-life, considered as an exhibition of what has been called 'inhibitory suggestion'; and then show its bearings.

The general character of a child's bashfulness need not be enlarged upon. Its form of expression is also familiar. It begins to appear generally in the first year, showing itself as an inhibiting influence upon the child's normal activities. Its most evident signs are nervous fingerings of dress, objects, hands, etc., turning away of head and body, bowing of head and hiding of face, awkward movements of trunk and legs, and in extreme cases, reddening of the face, puckering of lips and eye muscles, and finally cries and weeping. An important difference, however, is observable in these exhibitions according as the child is accompanied by a familiar person or not. When the mother or nurse is present, many of the signs seem to be useful in securing concealment from the eye of strangers -- behind dress or apron or figure of the familiar person. In the absence, however, of such a refuge the child sinks often into a state of general passivity or inhibition of movement, akin to the sort of paralysis usually associated with great fear.

This analogy with the physical signs of fear gives a real

(140) indication, I think, of the race origin of bashfulness, which is probably a differentiation of fear. This I cannot dwell upon now, but simply suggest that bashfulness arose as a special utility-reaction on occasion of fear of persons, in view of personal qualities possessed by the one who fears. The concealing tendency also shows the parallel development of intimate personal relationships of protection, support, etc., and so gives indications of certain early social conditions.

My observations of bashfulness -- not to dwell upon descriptions which have been made before by others -- serve to throw the illustrations of it into certain periods or epochs which I may briefly characterize in order.

I. The child is earliest seized with what may be called 'primary' or 'organic' bashfulness akin to the organic stages in the well-recognized instinctive emotions, such as fear, anger, sympathy, etc. [2] This exhibition occurs in the first year and marks the attitudes of the infant toward strangers. It is not so much inhibitory of action in this first stage; it rather takes on the positive signs of fear, with protestation, shrinking, crying, etc. It falls easily under the type of reaction described as 'sensori-motor suggestion,' above; being very largely provided for in the nervous equipment of the child at this age.

The duration of this stage depends largely upon the child's social environment. The passage from the attitude of instinctive antipathy toward outsiders, and that of affection equally instinctive toward the members of the household, over into a more reasonable sense of the difference between proved friends and unproved strangersCthis depends directly upon the growth of the sense of general social relationships es-

(141)-tablished by experience.[3] One of the most important elements in the child's progress' in this way' out of its 'organic' social life, is the degree and variety of its intercourse with other children, and indeed also with other adults, than those of its own home. Children carried to summer hotels every year, or brought frequently into the drawing-room to see the mothers' callers, soon lose all 'fear of strangers' and become quite frankly approachable, even showing great liking for society at the tender age of a year and a half or so. On the other hand, children kept in extreme isolation from strangers, young or old, may show extraordinary paralysis of all motor functions, of a markedly organic kind, steadily for two or three years later on in their development, when brought suddenly into the presence of those who are unfamiliar. [4]

The rapidity with which a child gets over its organic bashfulness varies also remarkably with the attitudes of older children whom he sees. Nothing else cures a child of this physical shyness as quickly as the example of an older child. This is also one of the marked offices of imitation. It presents to the imitative child an example or 'copy,' which tends to bring out his action in definite ways earlier than his own organic growth would in itself have warranted. The child by instinct imitates movements, etc., which he would otherwise have waited to acquire largely by accident. In this way the stages of social growth are very materially shortened.

2. I find next a period of strong social tendency in the child, of toleration of strangers and liking for persons generally, in great contrast to the attitudes of organic distrust of the earlier period just mentioned. There seems to be in this a reaction

(142) against the instinct of social self-preservation characteristic of the earlier stage. It is due in all likelihood to the actual experience of the child in receiving kind treatment {rom strangers -- kinder in the way of indiscriminate indulgence than the more orderly treatment which it gets from its own parents. Everybody comes to be trusted on first acquaintance by the child, through the teachings of his own experience, just as in the earlier years everybody was treated by him, under the instincts of his inherited nature, as an agent of possible harm.

That this new phase of social attitude is learned from experience is seen in the absence of this confidence, on the part of the child, toward animals. The fear, purely of the organic stage, persists in the child's thoughts of animals which are new to him, and only becomes more confirmed as he fails to get the same reasons for 'modifying his opinion' that teach him to tolerate strange persons more and more comfortably. The contrast is strongly brought out sometimes when such a young child meets animals in public places. He then turns to persons for protection, even to the strange persons before whom, under ordinary circumstances, he would stand abashed. His native sense of social protection, at first limited to his natural protectors in his own house, has come to extend to all persons, as against such common enemies as the brutes. Later on, as we know, the domestic animals get taken over, also, from the one class into the other.

3. Finally I note the return of bashfulness in the child's third year and later. This time it is bashfulness in the proper sense of the term, rid of the element of fear, and rid, largely, of its compelling organic force and methods of expression. The bashful five-year-old smiles in the midst of his hesitations, draws near to the object of his curiosity, is evidently overwhelmed with the sense of his own presence

(143) rather than with that of his new acquaintance, and indulges in actions calculated to keep notice drawn to himself.

The reality of this group of the child's social attitudes, and the great contrast which they present to those of the organic period, can hardly have too much emphasis. It is one of the great outstanding facts of his progressive relation to the elements of his social milieu. There is a sort of self-exhibition, almost of coquetry, in the child's behaviour; which shows the most remarkable commingling of native organic elements with the social lessons of personal well- and ill-desert which are now becoming of such importance in his life. All this makes so marked a contrast to the exhibitions of organic bashfulness that it constitutes in my opinion a most important resource for the study of the evolution of the social sense.

In this last case we have before us, in short, a phenomenon of rather complex self-consciousness -- a thing of ideal value -- and its suggestion-complexes, as they body themselves forth in the child's reactions, tell of his extraordinary progress in the understanding of himself and the world. He now begins to show the germ of modesty and of all the emotions akin to and contrary to it.

With this degree of progress we may now leave the child, not undertaking the discussion of the development of true modesty in its later stages in the intricate special movements of adolescence: but it remains to point out the congruity between this scheme of the child's different behaviours in respect to persons and the different personal suggestions which in an earlier place [5] we found him actually getting from others.

It will be remembered that several aspects of the child's

(144) personal environment were found to appeal to him in a progressive way. It seemed fair to think that persons are at first to him only a peculiar part of his 'projected'' presented, objective, world of things. He has 'personal projects,, as we found it well to call them' before he has any sense of himself as a spiritual being or as the subject of his own mental processes. The getting of objects seems to be part of the business for which his nervous equipment more or less adequately provides, and among these objects, the persons who move around him get themselves characterized by very important marks.

The observation of organic bashfulness tends' when viewed in connection with this earlier point, to confirm this view of the way the child begins to apprehend persons; and at the same time, it enables us to see a little farther. For strange as it may appear' we are here confronted with an element of organic equipment especially fitted to receive and respond to these peculiar objects, persons' 'personal projects., The child strikes instinctively an extraordinary series of attitudes when persons appear among his objects' attitudes which other objects, qua objects, do not excite. And later in life' in the organic effects indicative of modesty, such as blushing, hesitating, etc.' we find similar signs of a social rapport which has grown into the very fibres of our nerves. These attitudes extend somewhat to animals, as we have seen; and that makes it all the more striking. For animals are persons, to a child of that age; they act upon him through his animal parts, through physical pains, pleasures, fears, etc., and that is the only way that persons also can act upon an infant a year old.

We have to say, therefore, that the child is born to be a member of society, in the same sense, precisely, that he is born with eyes and ears to see and hear the movements and

(145) sounds of the world, and with touch to feel the things of space; and, as I hope to show later in detail? [6] all views of the man as a total creature, a creation, must recognize him not as a single soul shut up in a single body to act, or to abstain from acting' upon others similarly shut up in similar bodies; but as a soul partly in his own body, partly in the bodies of others, to all intents and purposes, so intimate is this social bond a service for which he pays in kind, since we see in his body, considered simply as a physical organism, preparation for the reception of the soul-life, the suggestions of mind and spirit, of those others. I do not see wherein the community of the senses together, in a single life of nervous activity, differs very much in conception from this community of men, bound together by the native ties which lie at the basis of their most abstract and developed social organizations.

Again, the second phase of the child's actions in the presence of persons -- the freer, more ready reception of strangers and intercourse with them' seen usually during the second year -- this also gives us what our earlier notes on 'personality-suggestion' would lead us to expect. We saw that the child begins to find out more about persons, and so to gain associations which give him the beginning of certain expectations regarding them; self-formed expectations, that is, no longer dependent merely upon the stirrings of instinct and inherited impulse. He learns that pleasure almost always comes from persons, and so does the alleviation of pain. This is a mortal blow at organic bashfulness, as every father and mother knows. A lump of sugar will very soon release the inhibitions of the shy year-old. Then he further learns something of the characteristics of persons, the irregularity of personal action, the presence of the 'personal equation'

(146) of mood and feeling in those nearest to him. This leads him to seek out methods, somewhat individual to himself, of pleasing these near persons and of securing their smile and approbation, or of escaping the reproofs which even his shyness brings; and these he substitutes for the blinder attempt, which nature taught him, to hide his physical person.

And he also learns our habits, the regularities of character in adults, and so learns that nobody means to hurt him, after all. It is amusing how soon a two- or three-year-old child 'sizes up' a stranger, and meets him halfway with conduct more or less appropriately attuned to the indications of character shown in the face and acts of the newcomer.

So, with all this, the instinctive or 'organic' bashfulness gets rapidly rubbed away. But it is now clear that the means of this freedom from it are all social. A child's growth away from the instinct of social fear to the apprehension of social truth, and all his actions midway in this progress, come only from varied and persistent experience of people and appeals to living examples. How can character be apprehended if characters are absent? And how can character schemes be grown into, if the regularity of the child's life is of so narrow a scope that all the threads of his social relationship run the same way, and no tangles and confusions arise to bring out his own strenuous action and his rebellions against his native reflex ways of behaviour?

The oncoming of true bashfulness, finally, -- the bashfulness which shows reflection, in its simpler form, upon self and the actions of self, -- represents the child's direct application of what he knows of persons to his own inner life. It is what we have called the 'subjective' stage in his sense of personality. [7]

(147)
But, as we shall also see, this grows only apace with the contrary movement by which he assigns his own enriched mental experience back to his teacher, and seeks his further judgment upon it. The child, when he knows himself able to draw a figure, for example, does not know this alone, or this completely. He has also the sense of the social 'copy' or example from which the lesson was learned, and further and with it, he knows that his performance is again subject to revision in light of the approval or disapproval of teacher or friend. The performances of the self cannot in any case be freed from the sense of possible inspection by others, and the child shrinks from this inspection. This has further development below. Suffice it to say that in this higher rapport, which involves clearly the sense of self-agency, but self-agency still tied down to the agency of other people like self, -- here in the real reflective relation of self to others, -- comes the third and crowning stage of the class of phenomena known by the word 'bashfulness.' My children do their imperfect tasks for me because they know me to understand and be indulgent: even the elder assumes the patron, and says of the younger: 'She is so little, you know.' But in the presence of the stranger whose opinion is not known beforehand, they are bashful with the sense of new standards perhaps firmly insisted upon. This is where the inhibiting suggestion of true bashfulness appears: that of modesty, and clearly also that of certain ethical emotions.

The whole situation becomes, I may add, an extraordinary point of vantage for estimating the development view of the origin of the social and personal sense. We have in it direct evidence of the growth of the social instinct by accretions from experiences of social conditions -- or if we go into refinements of biological theory, from the adding up of

(148) variations all fitted to survive socially -- and direct evidence, further? of the lines of progress which these experiences and variations have marked out. For the infant is an embryo person, a social unit in the process of forming; and he is, in these early stages, plainly recapitulating the items in the social history of the race.[8]

This social evolution presents a phase, therefore, of general development in which the theory that the individual goes through stages which repeat the race-stages of his species ought to find illustrations of more than common value. For the social life is a late attainment, whether considered anthropologically or racially, and the child waits to begin the series of 'laps in the social race' until he meets us, his observers, face to face. The embryology of society is open to study in the nursery.

I think, accordingly, that several important hints at the history of societies, both animal and human, are afforded by the phenomena of bashfulness as now described. These I can do no more than mention at present.

Organic bashfulness would seem to represent the instinctive fear shown by the higher animals, coupled with the natural family and gregarious instincts which they have. This shades up into the more fearless and more confiding attitudes of certain passably peaceable creatures, which take kindly to domestication, and depend more upon animal organizations and natural defences, such as those afforded by geographical distribution, coloration, habits of life, etc., for their protection. For the social protections are after all more effective for the defence of racial life and propagation than the special instinctive armament of individuals. Then, of course, only in man do we find the stage of reflective

(149) thought on self and the social relations of self, which is seen germinating in the child in the third year or later.

The parallel seems also to be worth something to the anthropologist when he comes to inquire into the history of the human species. Admitting with Westermarck that man as a species is monogamous and tends to family life, we should find in his earliest history the period corresponding to the organic bashfulness of the child; and its instinctive presence in the very young child lends some support, perhaps, to Westermarck's view. The later tribal and nomadic conditions possibly tended to release the cords of an instinct so purely defensive, and to bring in the freer range of peaceful pursuits represented, it is conceivable, by the second stage of the child's history; while again the stage of development of the distinctly industrial, artistic, and commercial life of man, with its social ways of solving all problems of public welfare, corresponds to the more reflective attainments of the period which is seen dawning in the true bashfulness of the three-year-old. For there can be no doubt that recent writers are correct in finding that the more refined egoism is a reflex from the more generalized socialism; a thesis which social psychology takes now from the analyses of men like Balzac and Bourget and the insights of Tarde and the historians of society; but one which it is itself quite able, I think, to make good by its own methods of inquiry.

Endnotes


  1. See especially, Chap. VII. and Chap. XVI., § 2.
  2. On which last see Chap. XI., § 3, below, and cf. my Handbook of Psychology, II., Chap. VIII., § 7.
  3. The experience, i.e., largely got through imitation and its clarifying influence upon the sense of self in the child; see below, Chap. XI., § 3.
  4. See the remarks on such 'isolation,' in reference to the development of personality, in my short article in the Century Magazine, December, 1894, repeated in substance below, Chap. XII., § 3.
  5. Cf. § 3 of this chapter, above, which restates an article on 'Personality Suggestion,' in The Psychalogical Review, I., p. 274, May, 1894.
  6. Now made the principal thesis of the volume Social and Ethical Interpretations
  7. See Mind, January, 1894; also below, Chap. XI., § 3.
  8. See the discussion of the biological theory of 'Recapitulation,' above, Chap. I.

§ 7. Hypnotic Suggestion

The facts upon which the current theories of hypnotism are based may be summed up under a few heads, and the recital of them will serve to bring this class of phenomena into the general lines of classification drawn out in this chapter.

(150) The Facts. -- When by any cause the attention is held fixed upon an object, say a bright button, for a sufficient time without distraction, the subject begins to lose consciousness in a progressive way. Generalizing this simple experiment, we may say that any method or device which serves to secure undivided and prolonged attention to any kind of a 'suggestion,' -- be it object, idea, anything that can be thought about, -- this brings on what is called hypnosis to a person normally constituted.

The Paris school of interpreters find three stages of progress in the hypnotic sleep: First, catalepsy, characterized by rigid fixity of the muscles in any position in which the limbs may be put by the experimenter, with great suggestibility on the side of consciousness, and anæsthesia in certain areas of the skin and in certain of the special senses; second, lethargy, in which consciousness seems to disappear entirely, the subject cannot be aroused by any sense stimulation by eye, ear, skin, etc., and the body is flabby and pliable as in natural sleep; third, somnambulism, so called from its analogies to the ordinary sleep-walking condition to which many persons are subject. This last covers the phenomena of ordinary mesmeric exhibitions at which traveling mesmerists 'control' persons before audiences and make them obey their commands. While other scientists properly deny these distinct stages as such, they may yet be taken as representing extreme instances of the phenomena, and serve as points of departure for further discussion.

On the mental side the general characteristics of hypnotic somnambulism are as follows: I. The impairing of memory in a peculiar way: In the hypnotic condition all affairs of the ordinary life are forgotten; on the other hand, after waking, the events of the hypnotic condition are forgotten. Further, in any subsequent period of hypnosis the events of

(151) the former similar periods are remembered. So a person who is habitually hypnotized has two continuous memories; one for the events of his normal life, only when he is normal, and one for the events of his hypnotic periods, only when he is hypnotized.

2. Suggestibility to a remarkable degree. By this is meant the tendency of the subject to have in reality any mental condition which is suggested to him. He is subject to suggestions both on the side of his receptivity to impressions and on the side of action. He will see, hear, remember, believe, refuse to see, hear, etc., anything, with some doubtful exceptions, which may be suggested to him by word or deed, or even by the slightest and perhaps unconscious indications of those about him. On the side of conduct his suggestibility is equally remarkable. Not only will he act in harmony with the illusions of sight, etc., suggested to him, but he will carry out, like an automaton, the actions suggested to him. Further, pain, pleasure, and the organic accompaniments of them may be produced by suggestion. The arm may be actually scarred with a lead-pencil if the patient be told that it is red-hot iron. A suggested pain brings vasomotor and other bodily changes that prove, as similar tests in the other cases prove, that simulation is impossible and the phenomena are real. These phenomena and those given below are no longer based on the mere reports of the 'mesmerists,' but are the recognized property of legitimate psychology.

Again, such suggestions may be for a future time, and get themselves performed only when a determined interval has elapsed; they are then called deferred or post-hypnotic suggestions. Post-hypnotic suggestions are those which include the command not to perform them until a certain time after the subject has returned to his normal condition; such

(152) suggestions are -- if of reasonably trifling character -- actually carried out afterward in the normal state, although the person is conscious of no reason why he should act in such a way, having no remembrance whatever that he had received the suggestion when hypnotized. Such post-hypnotic performances may be deferred by suggestion for many months.

3. So-called exaltation of the mental faculties, especially of the senses: increased acuteness of vision, hearing, touch, memory, and the mental functions generally. By reason of this great 'exaltation,' hypnotized patients may get suggestions which are not intended, from experimenters, and discover their intentions when every effort is made to conceal them. Often emotional changes in expression are discerned by them; and if it be admitted that their power of logical and imaginative insight is correspondingly exalted, there is practically no limit to the patient's ability to read, simply from physical indications, the mental states of those who experiment with him.

4 So-called rapport. This term covers all the facts known, before the subject was scientifically investigated, by such expressions as 'personal magnetism,' 'will power' over the subject, etc. It is true that one particular operator alone may be able to hypnotize a particular patient; and in this case the patient is, when hypnotized, open to suggestions only from this person. He is deaf and blind to everything enjoined by any one else. It is easy to see from what has already been said that this does not involve any occult nerve influence or mental power. A sensitive patient anybody can hypnotize, provided only that the patient have the idea or conviction that the experimenter possesses such power. Now, let a patient get the idea that only one man can hypnotize him, and that is the beginning of the hypnotic

(153) suggestion itself. It is a part of the suggestion that a certain personal rapport is necessary; so the patient must have this rapport. This is shown by the fact that, when such a patient is hypnotized, the operator in rapport with him can transfer the so-called control to any one else simply by suggesting to the patient that this third party can also hypnotize him. Rapport, therefore, and all the amazing claims of charlatans to powers of charming, stealing another's personality, controlling his will at a distance -- all such claims are explained, as far as they have anything to rest upon, by suggestion under conditions of mental hyperaesthesia or exaltation.

I may now add certain practical remarks which may tend to mark off the range of the phenomena more clearly.

In general, any method which fixes the attention to a single stimulus long enough is probably sufficient to produce hypnosis; but the result is quick and profound in proportion as the patient has the idea that it is going to succeed, i.e. gets the suggestion of sleep. It may be said, therefore, that the elaborate performances, such as passes, rubbings, mysterious incantations, etc., often resorted to, have no physiological effect whatever, and only seem to work in the way of suggestion upon the mind of the subject. In view of this it is probable that any person in normal health can be hypnotized, provided he is not too sceptical of the operator's knowledge and powers; and, on the contrary, any one can hypnotize another, provided he do not arouse too great scepticism, and is not himself wavering and clumsy. It is probable, however, that susceptibility varies greatly in degree, and that race exerts an important influence. Thus in Europe the French seem to be the most susceptible, and the English and Scandinavians the least so. The impression that weak-minded persons are most available is quite mistaken. On

(154) the contrary, patients in the insane asylums, idiots, etc., are the most refractory. This is to be expected, from the fact that in these cases power of strong. steady attention is wanting. The only one class of pathological cases which seem peculiarly open to the hypnotic influence is that of the hystero-epileptics, whose tendencies are toward extreme suggestibility. Further, one may hypnotize himself -- so-called auto-suggestion -- especially after having been put into the trance more than once by others. [1]

So-called 'criminal suggestions' may be made, with more or less effect, in the hypnotic state. Cases have been tried in the French courts, in which evidence for and against such influence of a third person over the criminal has been admitted. The reality of the phenomenon, however, is in dispute. The Paris school claims that criminal acts can be suggested to the hypnotized subject which are just as certain to be performed by him as any other acts. Such a subject will discharge a blank-loaded pistol at any one, when told to

(155) do so, or stab him with a paper dagger. While admitting the facts, the Nancy theorists claim that the subject knows the performance to be a farce; gets suggestions of the unreality of it from the experimenters, and so acquiesces. This is probably true, as is seen in frequent cases in which patients have refused, in the hypnotic sleep, to perform suggested acts which shocked their modesty, veracity, etc. This goes to show that the Nancy school are right in saying that while, in hypnosis, suggestibility is exaggerated to an enormous degree, still it has limits in the more well-knit habits, moral sentiments, social opinions, etc., of the subjects. And it further shows that hypnosis is probably, as they claim, a temporary disturbance, rather than a pathological condition of mind and body.

There have been many remarkable and sensational cases of cure of disease by hypnotic suggestion reported, especially in France. That hysteria in all its manifold manifestations has been relieved is certainly true, but that any organic, structural disease has ever been cured by hypnotism is unproven. It is not regarded by medical authorities as an agent of much therapeutic value, and is rarely employed; but it is doubtful, in view of the natural prejudice caused by the pretensions of charlatans, whether its merits have been fairly tested. [1]

(156) Theory. -- Two rival theories are held as to the general character of hypnosis. The Paris school already referred to, led by Charcot, hold that it is a pathological condition which can be induced only in patients already mentally diseased, or having neuropathic tendencies. They claim that the three stages described above are a discovery of great importance. [3] The so-called Nancy school, on the other hand, led by Bernheim, deny the pathological character of hypnosis altogether, claiming that the hypnotic condition is nothing more than a special form of ordinary sleep brought on artificially by suggestion. Suggestion, they say, is only an exaggeration of an influence to which all persons are normally subject. All the variations, stages, curious phenomena, etc., of the Paris school, say they, can be explained by this 'suggestion' hypothesis. The Nancy school is completely victorious, as far as the great mass of the facts are concerned. [4]

The facts show an intimacy of interaction between mind and body, to which current psychology in its psycho-physical theories is only beginning to do justice; and it is this aspect of the whole matter which I would emphasize in this connection. It will be observed that all the phases of 'suggestion' passed in review in earlier sections of this chapter get direct illustration from similar phenomena occurring in hypnosis. I need not cite them again in detail. The hypnotic condition

(157) of consciousness may, therefore, be taken to represent the thing called 'suggestion' most remarkably.

Endnotes

  1. It is further evident that frequent hypnotization is very damaging if done by the same operator, since then the patient contracts a habit of responding to the same class of suggestions; and this may influence his normal life. A further danger arises from the possibility that all suggestions have not been removed from the patient's mind before his awaking. Competent scientific observers always make it a point to do this. It is possible also that damaging effects result directly to a man from frequent hypnotizing; and this is probable to a degree, simply from the fact that the state is abnormal and, while it lasts, pathological. Consequently, all general exhibitions in public, as well as all individual exercises of this kind, should be prohibited by law, and the whole practical application, as well as observation of hypnosis should be left in the hands of physicians and scientific men who have proved their competence and fitness.

    Farther, Liegeois suggests -- what is quite an unnecessary resource -- that every child should be hypnotized by a special of ficial, and the suggestion made to him, once for all, that no one under any circumstances shall be able to throw him into hypnosis again. In Russia, a decree (summer, 1893) permits physicians to practice hypnotism for purposes of cure under official certificates. In France public exhibitions are forbidden.

  2. On the European continent it has been successfully applied in a great variety of cases; and Bernheim has shown that minor nervous troubles, insomnia, migraines, drunkenness, lighter cases of rheumatism, sexual and digestive disorders, together with a host of smaller temporary causes of pain -- corns, cricks in back and side, etc. -- may be cured or very materially alleviated by suggestions conveyed in the hypnotic state. In many cases such are permanently effected with aid from no other remedies. In a number of great city hospitals, patients of recognized classes are at once hypnotized and suggestions of cure made. Liebault, the founder of the Nancy school, has the credit of having first made use of hypnosis as a remedial agent. It is also becoming more and more recognized as a method of controlling refractory and violent patients in asylums and reformatory institutions. It must be added, however, that 'in general' psychological theory rather than medical practice is seriously concerning itself with this subject.
  3. The best books on this side are, Binet and Fé>ré, Animal Magnetism; Janet, Automatisme Psychologique; Charcot's medical treatises (Oeuvres complètes, Vol. IX.); numerous articles in the Revue Philosophique.
  4. Their best books are, Moll, Hypnotism; Bernheim, Suggestive Therapeutics; Études nouvelles sur l'Hypnotisme; Ochorowicz, Mental Suggestion. Cf. my popular articles ' Among the Psychologists of Paris' and ' With Bernheim at Nancy' in the Nation (N.Y.), July 28 and Aug. 11, 1892, and 'Hypnotism ' in the new edition (1894) of Johnson's Universal Cyclopaedia.

§ 8. Law of Dynamogenesis

The facts of suggestion now given may be generalized under a so-called 'law,' which current psychology and biology agree in accepting as a well-established principle of the manifestations of organic and mental life. The principle of contractility recognized in biology simply states that all stimulations to living matter, -- from protoplasm to the highest vegetable and animal structures, -- if they take effect at all, tend to bring about movements or contractions in the mass of the organism. This is now also safely established as a phenomenon of consciousness -- that every sensation or incoming process tends to bring about action or outgoing process. The facts of suggestion now set forth may be taken as, in so far, an array of evidence in support of what we may call, once for all, Dynamogenesis. Certain practical illustrations of it are given in the chapters which immediately precede: they show also the sure foundation of the method of studying children which I have based upon it. I shall accordingly expect no opposition to the use of this principle as the foundation-stone of the theory of organic development developed subsequently in this work' however faulty my presentation of it may be in the eyes of competent critics in either of these sciences.

In attempting, however, to reach some kind of formula of dynamogenesis we encounter a certain difficulty. For when we had occasion to inquire in an earlier place what the main character of all suggestion is, that character which constitutes its suggestion, we found definitions very conflicting; and gave as our own definition only the most general

(158) description of the reaction called suggestive, i.e. that it involved consciousness and issues in a movement more or less closely associated in earlier experience with the particular stimulus in question. [1]

This, it is plain, constitutes suggestion a phenomenon of greater or less habit, taking hypnotic suggestion as type, in which prompt discharges in well-formed pathways is the striking fact. Numerous instances among the facts reported in this chapter come to mind. The statement ordinarily made in the more recent psychologies, to the effect that the idea of a movement is already the beginning of that movement, serves to generalize these facts, provided we understand by the 'idea of movement,' not merely the clear consciousness of a movement, but also the vaguest and most subconscious reminiscences, feelings, intimations of movement, which cluster or hang about or enter into, however meagrely, the state of mind which issues in the movement making up the suggested reaction.

But it is just as evident, when we recall the various instances in detail, that they have another and different aspect. Very many suggestions seem to perform a function which is not exhausted when we say that they issue in movements. They issue in movements, it is true; but not in exactly the movements and those alone which have been associated with these stimuli before. Many of them seem to beget new movements, by a kind of adaptation of the organism -- movements which are an evident improvement upon those which the organism has formerly accomplished.

To make this plain we have only to recall some cases from

(159) the reports made in this chapter and the earlier ones. The child reams handwriting by acting upon the suggestion which the copy set before him affords. How could he control his movements at all, if each suggestion called out only the movements which he had already learned? The child adapts himself again to persons, and differently to different persons, from week to week. How does he do this? Persons of course suggest action to him, but how does he manage to break up, in appropriate ways, the fixed organic tendencies to action in which we have found early bashfulness to consist? The child reams to estimate distance, and his visual experiences become, as we have seen, suggestions to him of hand movements remarkably adjusted to his reach and to the dimensions, etc., of things. How is this done? And so might more cases be cited.

This aspect of suggestion opens up what is one of the main problems of this book to discuss, the theory of Accommodation. It is only in point here to show that this thing, accommodation, is a fact, and that it consists in some influence in the organism which works directly in the face of habit. Suggestion works to break up habit.

We saw above, also, two views as to the presence and influence of consciousness in this matter of suggestion. Some theorists hold that there is no suggestion without consciousness; others that consciousness is not a necessary element. The dispute seems to turn upon the predominant recognition in reactions of one of the two tendencies, Habit or Accommodation. It is true and universal that consciousness tends to disappear from reactions as they are oftener repeated -- as they become, that is, more habitual. The things we have reamed to do best, most definitely, most exactly, must unalterably in a word, these things require least thought, direction, feeling, consciousness. So with our reflex and semi-

(160) automatic actions: they come to go on, as pathological cases show, without the cortex of the brain, in cases when fainting or forgetfulness deprive us of all knowledge that we do them. On the other hand, we find that whenever there is accommodation -- the breaking up of habit, the effort to learn, the acquirement of new movements, and co-ordinations of movement -- there consciousness is present, and present in vivid and heightened form according as the habit fought against is fixed, and the road to the new acquisition an uphill road. The things most new, difficult, imperfect, hard to effect, these dwell in the very focus of our personal knowledge and attention.

As I said some time ago, in summing up the two different principles: " Physiologically, Habit means readiness for function, produced by previous exercise of that function. . . . Psychologically, it means loss of oversight, diffusion of attention, subsiding consciousness.... Physiologically and anatomically, Accommodation means the breaking up of a habit, the widening of the organic for the reception or accommodation of a new condition. Psychologically, it means reviving consciousness, concentration of attention, voluntary control." [2]

So far as we have now gone we have a right to use the principle of suggestion, and to illustrate the broader principle of dynamogenesis, whenever we mean to say simply that action follows stimulus. But when we come to ask what kind of action follows, in each case, each special kind of stimulus, we have two possibilities before us. A habit may follow, or an accommodation may follow. Which is it? And why is it one rather than the other? These are the questions of the theory of organic development, to which our next chapters are devoted.

Endnotes

  1. We may distinguish dynamogenesis from suggestion by saying that the former is the broader, -- the fact that changes in movement always follow changes in stimulus. Suggestion, on the other hand, defines the particular change that issues from a particular stimulus of a sort that is accompanied by consciousness.
  2. Handbook, Feeling and Will, p. 49.

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