Social Value
Chapter 7: Professor Clark's Theory of Social Value
Benjamin McAlester Anderson Jr.
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AND all attempts to explain value in terms of these abstract factors must become similarly entangled. The Austrians themselves have pointed out that the explanation of value from the standpoint of individual costs involves a circle, that costs resolve themselves into value-complexes, and that the cost theorists are really explaining value by Value.[1] I have shown that the same is true of the Austrian attempt to reduce values to terms of individual utilities. It is also true of Hobson's attempt to combine the two explanations, as shown, and the same could be shown of at least the earlier writings of Professor Marshall.[2] There is another attempt to work out the explanation of value, still in terms of sacrifices in production and satisfactions in consumption, but no longer from the same standpoint, which deserves special attention here. Professor Clark, in the Yale Review for 1892, in the article above referred to, "The Ultimate Standard of Value" (since reproduced as chapter XXIV of the Distribution of Wealth), has attempted so to add up individual units of cost and individual units of
(50) utility, as to get absolute social units of utility and cost either of which might serve as the ultimate standard of value. It will be remembered that I have already quoted from this article with reference to the quantitative nature of value, and that Professor Clark stands as the leading exponent of the conception that value is a social fact, "is social and subjective," the value put on goods by the social organism. In this article, he is seeking the unit of social value, the measure of the importance of a good to society. Either the unit of social utility or the unit of social detriment would serve, but it happens, he holds, that the unit of detriment is the more available for purposes of measurement, and so the final unit[3] of value is the sacrifice entailed by a quantity of distinctively social labor (p. 261). Professor Clark avoids the complication that labor and -capital work together, by isolating labor at the margin, in the manner made familiar in his Distribution of Wealth. Assume capital constant, introduce or subtract a small quantity of labor, and whatever of product is added or subtracted is due to that labor only (p. 263).
This virtually unaided labor is the only kind that can measure values. Attempts to use the labor standard have come short -of success, because of their failure to isolate from capital the labor to which products are due.
Work, however, is miscellaneous and heterogeneous. There is needed "a pervasive element
(51) in the actions, and one that can be measured." This is "personal sacrifice," which is "common to all varieties of labor." An isolated worker, making and using his own products, readily finds an equilibrium point, where utility and sacrifice are equal, and where he stops his day's work (pp. 364-65). If the product of any hour's labor be destroyed (p. 366) he will not suffer the loss of anything more important than the product of the last hour's labor,, for he will forego that, and re-create the good with the higher utility. The utility of the last hour's product and the pain of the last hour's labor are equal. Either is his unit of value.
Of society regarded as a unit the same is true.
Take away the articles that the society gains by the labor of a morning hour, - the necessary food, clothing and shelter that it absolutely must have, - and it will divert to making good the loss the work performed at the approach of evening, which would otherwise have produced the final luxuries on its list of goods.
(It might be questioned parenthetically here whether all are fed before any begin to enjoy luxuries, or, if not, just what is considered the " socially necessary" amount of food, and whom does social necessity require that we feed before we devote an hour to making luxuries?) Professor Clark finds the final hour of social labor-pain to be a compound, the sum of the final hour's dissatisfactions of all the laborers. This sum is the ultimate standard of value. It is in equilibrium with the sum of the utilities of the final hour's products to all the laborers considered as consumers. This
(52) is illustrated by a diagram on page 271. But the problem still remains as to the value of particular goods. Granted that the sum of the satisfactions got from the total amount -a vast amount of the final hour's product is equal to the sum of the pains incurred in producing this giant composite, and granted that the pain incurred by each man in making his part of the composite is equal to the satisfaction gained by him in consuming his part of the composite - not the same part I - the problem still remains as to the connection of the marginal utility and the value of the particular good!j that make up the composite, with social labor. Professor Clark concedes at once that there is no necessary connection between the utility of the good to him who enjoys it, and the pain of making it to him who makes it. What connection is there, then, between the value of the good and social labor? It is at this point, I venture to suggest, that Professor Clark's argument fails. I shall not follow his argument in detail, but shall quote a couple of paragraphs which seem to exhibit the failure (pp. 272-73):
The burden of labor entailed on the man who makes an article stands in no relation to its market value. The product of one hour's labor of an eminent lawyer, an artist, a business manager, etc., may sell for as much as that of a month's work of an engine stoker, a seamstress or a stone-breaker. Here and there are "prisoners of poverty," putting life itself into products of which a wagon load can literally be bought for a prima donna's song. Wherever there is varying personal power, or different position, giving to some the advantage of a monopoly, there is a divergence of cost and value, if by these terms we mean the cost to the
(53)
producer, and the value in the market. Compare the labor involved in maintaining telephones with the rates demanded for the use of them. Yet of monopolized products as of others our rule holds good; they sell according to the disutility of the terminal social labor expended in order to acquire them.
But suppose they are bought with monopolized products, and suppose that a monopoly element enters, at some stage or other, into every product of the market, and in varying degrees in each, either in the form of control of raw material, or special native mental or physical aptitude, or patent right, or any other of the innumerable forms that monopoly takes? Can these monopoly products then call forth a definite amount of social labor? Or can they merely call out a definite amount of value? [4] "Differences in wealth between different producers cause the cost of products to vary from their value." (Italics mine.) But surely this is our old circle again. If differences in wealth, which is the embodiment of value, are to modify the working of the " pervasive element " of "personal sacrifice " (p. 263), it is difficult to see
(54) how that pervasive element can in any -way be an ultimate explanation or measure of value.
The rich worker stops producing early, while the sacrifice entailed is still small; but his product sells as well as if it were costly.
If we say that the prices of things correspond with the amount and efficiency of the labor that creates them, we say what is equivalent to the above proposition. The efficiency that figures in the case is power and willingness to produce a certain effect. The willingness is as essential as the power. . . . Moreover, the effect that gauges the efficiency of a worker is the value of what he creates; and this value is measured by the formula that we have attained.
But surely the circle is very clear here: the price (the expression of the value) of the good depends on the efficiency of the labor that produces it; and the efficiency of the labor depends on the value (of which price is the expression) of the good produced. Our "pervasive element" is complicated, as a determinant of social value, with several factors, among them the value of the wealth of the different producers, and the efficiency, which can be defined only in terms of value product, of the workers. Value is an ultimate in the explanation of value, and the effort to make individual costs and utilities an ultimate explanation of value has failed - as it must needs fail -- even in the hands of Professor Clark.
The validity of this criticism, assuming it valid, in no way invalidates Professor Clark's contention that value is, after all, the work of the social organism, and that the value of a good, at a given time, measures its importance to the social organism at that time. The difficulty with the
(55) analysis just criticized is that it has not been an analysis of an organic process, but rather, a mathematical study of sums. The individuals have been treated, not as interacting in their mental processes, but as isolated atoms, each of whom has a definite individual quantum of pain or pleasure, and the social unit of pain or pleasure has been treated as simply a sum of these. But it is characteristic of an organism that the simple rules of arithmetic do not hold precisely in its activity. The whole is more than the sum of its parts, and something different from that sum. Professor Clark elsewhere says:
But the owner is a part of the social body, and is the organic whole indifferent to his suffering? if so, society is an imperfect and nerveless organism. It ought to feel, as a whole, the sufferings of every member, and what makes or mars the happiness of every slightest molecule, should make or mar the happiness of all.
A sympathetic connection between members of society exists, etc.[5]
True: and indicative of the true line of study for the conception of value as a product of
an organic society. But in the foregoing analysis we have no hint of "nerves" or
social sympathy or other manifestation of a collective mental activity. The "social
psychology" promised on page 261 of the article just reviewed, turns out not a social
psychology at all, but simply a summation of the. results of many individual psychologies.
But the line along which the true nature of value is to be found is clearly indicated in
the
(56) general conception of the psychical organic unity of society, and it remains for the present writer to make use of the studies in social psychology of Tarde, Cooley, Baldwin, and others,[6] not available, for the most part, when Professor Clark's article was written, in an effort to get nearer the heart of the problem.
The doubly abstract conceptions of individual costs and individual satisfactions, connected with economic goods, - abstracted first from the social milieu, and second, from the rest of the individual's interests and desires, -lead us around in a circle, from value to value, but never to anything else. It is the belief of the writer that we get out of the circle only by broadening our explanation phenomena, by giving up these abstractions, and getting back to the concrete reality of the total intermental life of men in society.
