“Making a Case for Cripple: Dethroning Richard III as the King of Disability in Early Modern Literature” by Daryl Wakunick, PhD. 

Friday, March 27, 2026 | 2:00 – 3:30 PM | PLZ600 F

Abstract:
This paper uses concepts from the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (corporeal schema) and critical disability studies (especially, cripple-consciousness and the contrasting medical and social models of disability) to carry out a comparison of how disability is depicted in Shakespeare’s Richard III and the anonymously written early modern city comedy, The Fair Maid of the Exchange. Though Richard III is the most studied disabled character in early modern literature, Shakespeare’s depiction of the king affirms harmful stereotypes that plague disabled people to this day. To counter the false notions about disability in Richard III the paper turns to the lesser-known character called Cripple from The Fair Maid of the Exchange to highlight a more productive, agentic version of disability. The goal of the paper is to decentre Richard as the pinnacle of early modern disability and present a fresh perspective of how we understand historical depictions of embodied difference.

“Humean Constructivism, Intractability, and Deep Disagreements ” by Adam Jackson

Thursday, March 5, 2026 | 5:00 – 7:00 PM | GLN-B 104

Abstract:
Recently in metaethics, Sharon Street has developed a sophisticated view of Humean constructivism about practical reason in contradistinction to Korsgaard’s Kantian constructivism. Important for Street is that we adequately characterize the attitude of valuing from the standpoint of valuers, i.e., humans. When we do this, she says we will see that, compared to what she calls the attitude of ‘mere desiring’, the attitude of valuing has a ‘range, nuance, and depth of human emotion and feeling’ that mere desiring lacks. In this paper, I have two aims. First, I will argue that deep disagreements—those disagreements caused by divergent fundamental values and beliefs—pose a problem for Street’s characterization of the attitude of valuing. In particular, I will argue that her characterization implies that since the attitude of valuing only relates to human emotion and feeling, the intractability of deep disagreements seems unresolvable. Second, I will argue that part of the way out of this predicament is to understand the attitude of valuing not in terms of human emotion and feeling, but rather—to use Wittgenstein’s words—in terms of ‘accompaniments’ that often come with our attributions of, and discourse about, value. Once we do this, I argue that we should see that those engaged in deep disagreements can be mutually responsive to reasons, if only they knew on what fundamental values and beliefs they converge and diverge.

“Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Values, Holy Lies and Manu’s Code of Law” by Sajan Karn

Thursday, February 12, 2026 | 5:00 – 7:00 PM | GLN-B 104

Abstract:
Breaking with the Western philosophical tradition, Nietzsche calls into question the perennial quest for absolute truth and its value, casting doubt on the assumption that philosophers are justified in privileging truth more than various forms of untruth, even outright lies. While on some occasions Nietzsche appears dubious about the traditional dichotomy between truth and lies, on other occasions he lavishes extraordinary praise for lies and their value for life, and even advocates falsification, concealment, and evasion. Nietzsche postulates that inventing lies has been the prerogative of not only priests but also philosophers since antiquity and accordingly concludes that Manu, Mohammed, Confucius, the Christian and Jewish teachers and even Plato never doubted their right to tell lies. How might we interpret Nietzsche’s skepticism about philosophers’ perennial quest after truth and his persistent exaltation of lies, errors and deceptions and their value for life? How are we to make sense of Nietzsche’s new conception of philosophy, given that it is to allow various forms of lies and specifically holy lies and glorifies their value for life? In this paper, I argue that Nietzsche inaugurates what I call “the philosophy of holy lies,” modelled after Hindu thought which, he judges, engages in the art of fabricating holy lies— the lies which, however, deify humanity and human existence devoid of God and intrinsic moral order. I will substantiate my argument by showing that, like their Hindu counterparts, Nietzsche’s ideal philosophers, whom he famously designates as “value creators,” are to invent “holy lies” to re-deify humanity and existence.

“NIETZSCHE’S CONCEPT OF THE ÜBERMENSCH AND HINDU THOUGHT ” by Sajan Karn

Friday, February 16, 2024 | 4:00 – 6:00 PM | GLN-B 104

Abstract:
Until recently, the received view has been that Nietzsche was a staunch secularist and hence, his philosophy is hostile to religiosity in its entirety. Commentators often appeal to Nietzsche’s most quoted blasphemous proclamation about the death of God, his unrelenting condemnation of Christian morality, his categorical denial of the existence of an immaterial soul and the otherworld, and his recurrent advocacy for naturalism to establish that Nietzsche is a secular philosopher par excellence. Nevertheless, the past two decades have witnessed a gradual shift in interpreting Nietzsche’s attitude towards religiosity. They are gradually coming to acknowledge that Nietzsche, despite his scathing criticism of Christianity, remained ‘religious’ throughout his philosophical career. Further, it is now largely conceded that Nietzsche’s denunciation of religiosity is that of a life-denying religiosity, i.e., while he destroys a life-denying religiosity, he inaugurates a life-affirming religiosity. In this paper, I make a fresh claim that Nietzsche’s alleged new religiosity is influenced by Hindu thought. Specifically, I argue that Nietzsche’s doctrine of the Übermensch appropriates some important attributes of its Hindu parallel. I appeal to Nietzsche’s acknowledgement of Hindu (Brahmanical) asceticism of the strong, with its idea of intensifying feeling of power in ascetics, Vedantic theodicy of the world as divine order, its morality of beyond good and evil and value creation (i.e., its invention of “holy lies” to make life with its “terrifying and questionable character” acceptable) to support my claim that Nietzsche’s Übermensch is inspired and influenced by Hindu thought.

“But What Should I do in my methodology chapter?” Promoting Philosophy as Research” by Dr. Trevor Norris

Friday, February 2, 2024 | 4:00 – 6:00 PM | GLN-B 104

Abstract:
What counts as ‘research’ in the modern university? Philosophy faces many challenges, new and old. Current emphasis on empirical evidence, perhaps an understandable response to fake news and misinformation, marginalizes and minimizes more abstract and conceptual research, often construed as mere opinion or arbitrary speculations. This presentation considers concrete and specific strategies for justifying, promoting and undertaking philosophical as ‘research’ in the face of demands for more overtly empirical research. I examine the relative merits of specific remedies, questions, and tactics aiming towards a deeper understanding of strategies that might help promote and justify philosophical research. This presentation explores how best to defend the value of not doing empirical work—even arguing that philosophy itself is empirical work: our “data sets” are books, ideas, the imagination, and the range of human possibilities. Our “method” consists of arguments, reasoning, induction, and the exercise of writing itself. Philosophy must justify itself as a rigorous normative undertaking that is not mere arbitrary opinion. I begin by describing the problematic character of most research methods courses, consider appropriate terminology (is philosophy ‘empirical’?), and conclude with a discussion of practical strategies to effectively advocate for philosophy as a legitimate research method.

The Subject Reimagined: Ontological Anthropology in Dastur, Foucault, and Merleau-Ponty by Kenton Engel

Friday, January 13, 2023 | 4:00 – 6:00 PM | Online

Abstract:
In this talk, I attempt to think through the relation between psychē and logos in event thought, specifically to propose a subjectivity that is capable of experiencing event. Such a subjectivity is elusive, as transcendental phenomenology’s nomological impulse creates an interior delimitation between language and phenomenology. To the extent that event is excess, the event must, then, exceed some limit in relation to the subject and its concatenation to the linguistic and phenomenological registers. From this view, event would appear subjectively limited and thus impossible; hence, the turn to an ontological anthropology that in-builds event into the nature of subjectivity. The psychē, as it appears in Heraclitus and his interpretation by Dastur, Focault, Merleau-Ponty (and their interlocutors) is useful in this context, because it is proposed as always more than that which ostensibly contains it (the subject) – and is thus already eventful, but must be exposed to that which is otherwise by some ontologically salient mechanic. Because many phenomenologists have followed Heidegger’s adversarial turn to psychoanalysis, this talk is a mediatory work in which I propose logos, through Dastur’s reconfiguration of Austrag, as this mechanism. In it, I attempt to show that Heidegger – and following, Dastur – misunderstand the value in Ludwig Binswanger’s Daseinanalyse, which in its anthropological rejection of the ontological difference, though it is a mistake on Binswanger’s part, provides the mediation between ontological and ontic that event commands. To provide a sensible architecture for a psychē that phenomenology cannot, but must access, I link the young Foucault with the late Merleau-Ponty to show what underlines the subject is an ontological anthropology, which has for its most appropriate implement psychoanalysis.

Interrogating Historical Narratives of Progression within the Trans Community by Courtney Earl

Friday, November 11, 2022 | 4:00 – 6:00 PM | Online

Abstract:
Utilizing a Foucauldian genealogical method of analysis, I intend to examine the ways in which specifically trans bodies are made subject by systems which exercise power over them through institutional restrictions and limiting medical taxonomies. The privileges of power specific to the creation of knowledge endowed medical professionals with the ability to define what transness is while simultaneously denying trans people the right to define themselves. I will juxtapose the contrasting methods of subjugation exercised on trans people throughout the last century by relying primarily on the works of Leslie Fienberg and Sandy Stone. Through this juxtaposition I hope to challenge the historical narrative of progression regarding transness by illustrating that the punishment of trans bodies is something that, while significantly deterred by trans-inclusive policies, is far from over; in addition, I intend to highlight the importance of the voices of trans individuals when contextualizing subjugation of trans bodies.

Learned Milkers of He-Goats: Problem, Purpose and Pathology in some discussions of academic freedom by Professor Rohit Dalvi

Friday, November 4, 2022 | 4:00 – 6:00 PM | Online

Abstract:
Abstract: Contesting the force of opinion has been the historical burden of philosophy. Sophistry of every sort is deployed to defend opinion and to disguise it as knowledge. Entrenched opinions continue to be among the stumbling block in the development of a progressive and democratic university. Underneath idealizations of notions of “academic freedom” and what it means to be an in academic in the present, is an inability to engage philosophically with the problem of opinion and its pervasiveness. How do we explain this inability? Why does it remain impervious to rational edification? Is it a neurotic discourse? In what sense can the demand for the protection of academic opinion be considered “fraudulent”? Can we attribute this inability to epistemic defects or to willful ignorance? The resources available in the literature on psychopathology are particularly relevant here. Bion’s concepts of “arrogance” and “pseudo-stupidity” can help up articulate what is at work in this philodoxy, the “love of opinion”.