The Symbolic Process and its Integration in Children
Chapter 8: The Symbolic Process and Delayed Reaction
John Fordyce Markey
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FACTS were reviewed in Chapter III showing that apparently the most Sound explanation of symbolic integration is that which bases it upon social conditioning and the interchange of social stimuli through the mechanisms of the social-vocal-auditory situation. The necessary mechanisms for the beginnings of symbols are given in this social-behaviour situation. This means that a study of symbolic development may be made through an observation of such social behaviour and that this process may be analysed in terms of behaviour. In the next four chapters an attempt was made to trace social behaviour processes in the early symbolic development in children. Although in the past chapters the study of symbols has centred around the language symbols in general and spoken symbols in particular, symbolic behaviour is not limited to verbal language. When once symbols have arisen in behaviour, practically any act or object may become symbolic in character.
Another problem must be considered before taking up the question of symbolic integration and its relation to thinking. It is, are there symbolic mechanisms other than those which we have discussed which might perform the symbolic function in animals and children who cannot talk ? The question is not concerning those cases in which deaf-and-dumb have been taught to use symbols by those who already use language. It is a more fundamental problem than that ; namely, may there not be substitutive symbols independent of such language symbols and which function without necessary dependence upon social interaction and vocalization and the consequent language integration ?
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This problem falls under the general category of substitute responses. Symbols are substitute responses for acts and objects, and function in behaviour in place of these acts and objects. Thus, the person can adjust to an absent situation by means of symbolic behaviour. Now if we take a problem situation and remove a certain simple but essential part, and the subject is still able to respond " as if " this essential part were present, it may be taken as evidence that the subject had in his behaviour processes substituted some response which serves the same function in his adjustment as did the part of the stimulus-situation which is now absent.
The most adequate technique which we have developed to test the existence of this type of substitution is the delayed-reaction experiment. In the delayed-reaction experiment an essential part (S) of the stimulus-situation is removed. If the subject can respond successfully " as if " the S were still there, we assume that it is able to substitute in some way another or possibly a symbolic S which defines the situation so that he can respond adequately to it. It would be equally legitimate to remove a part (R) of the response reaction in order to see whether the subject could substitute another R. At present, we are not able to remove the R as readily as we can the S.
Hunter's experiments (1913, 1917) in 'delayed reaction are the only substantial ones carried out with children. He also tested rats, dogs, and raccoons. Thus we get a comparison between children and other animals. Walton's experiment (1915) on the dog, and Kohler's on chimpanzees (1925), are also instructive in this connection.
The experiment of Hunter (1913) consisted in placing before the subject two or three similar entrances to compartments. The correct compartment was indicated by turning on an electric light at its entrance. If the subject selected the correct compartment, it would then be fed. After the subject was used to this proceeding, the light was turned oft before the subject was allowed to respond. The length of time which the animal could wait after the
( 107) light was gone and still make a correct response constituted the period of delay.
The results of his experiments are given in Table XXI. The rats and dogs were able to make a successful delay only when they maintained bodily orientation Here the delay and response is obviously a function of bodily position and set; there is no necessity of introducing a substitute S in explaining their behaviour. The raccoons and children, however, were able to respond correctly even though distraction took place and bodily orientation was lost. In the latter case there is apparently a substitution of some kind for the absent stimulus at the time of the release.
| Subject. | Minimum Delay. | Maximum Delay. |
| Rats | Either no learning or 3rd stage.[1] | 10 sec. |
| Dogs | 2 sec | 5 min. |
| Raccoons | 3 sec | 25 sec. |
| Children | 50 sec. | 25 min. |
| 1 The 3rd stage was shutting off light at time of release from release box. | ||
The amount of delay for the raccoons, however, is much less than the minimum delay for children. But the minimum delay for children is much below the maximum for the children. Table XXII shows the relation of age to the maximum delay. The raccoons and 2 1/2-year-old child are much closer together.
| Subject. | Maximum Delay. |
| Raccoons | 25 sec. |
| 2 1/2 -year-old child | 50 sec. |
| 6-8-year children | 25 min. or more. |
Hunter concludes that there is a type of response which he calls " sensory thought," involving the reinstatement of a recent sensory process but not requiring ideas or
( 108) "images." The raccoons and younger child illustrate this. But a second type of thought requires ideas or images. The older children illustrate the latter.
Before we examine these conclusions, it might be well to refer to the other delayed-reaction experiments mentioned above. Walton tried a larger variety of experiments on the dog and found it able to delay reaction one minute without the aid of bodily orientation. This is for a longer period than for either the raccoons or the 22year-old child. K6hler tried burying fruit so that the chimpanzees could see the proceedings (1925, p. 290 ff). Sultan, after half an hour, succeeded in digging up the fruit at the first attempt. A second time, after one hour, he dug 30 centimetres off, then succeeded on the second attempt. Another time the fruit was buried in the lot at night with the apes watching. Next morning, after 162 hours, they went to the right spot (several control spots had been dug and covered in the meantime) 6o centimetres off. The second attempt was successful. Another time, after 162 hours, they went straight to the spot in the morning. Sufficient controls were not established to make these experiments by K6hler wholly comparable with the other experiments on delayed reaction. It is not certain that the stimulus at the end of the delay was not the same as it was in the final form at the beginning ; thus the present stimulus would be sufficient to produce a correct response without involving the reproduction of an absent one. This seems somewhat comparable to the situation in which any animal returns to the place where it has been stimulated by food at some previous time. K6hler feels that the experiments should be carried out under more controlled conditions. However, it is suggestive of a type of response, possibly as complex as those of the raccoons, the child, and Walton's dog. But it hardly seems necessary to call symbols to our aid in explaining this behaviour of the apes. Engramic principles and learning are apparently sufficient to account for such behaviour without the aid of symbols. A problem more applicable for testing the use of symbols
( 109) is that involving the use of tools. In regard to this K6hler says (1925, p. 25), " The best tool easily loses its situational value if it is not visible simultaneously or quasi-simultaneously with the region of the objective." This indicates the difficulty which the ape has in not being able to substitute a symbol for the tool when absent. It is probable that we need a but little, if any, more complex form of integration to explain the behaviour of apes than we do to explain that of the young child and the dog.
Hunter somewhat later (1917) tried an experiment on a younger child, T, from 13 to 16 months of age. His object was to take the child before true vocal language had developed. This child was evidently in the " parrot stage," without true vocal symbols. When its father was away and the door made a noise, it would sometimes say " Daddy." It said " boob-boob " for dog, " y-gob, y-gob " for turkey, and the like. Instead of light and food, Hunter used three similar boxes in which a toy could be concealed while the child was looking. After delay the child was to select the right box in order to find its toy. In the meantime the child was distracted in some manner. This was apparently very interesting sport for the child. Hunter's results are as follows : At December 2nd, ten seconds may be considered mastered. At January l0th, the 20-second interval may be considered as being approximately mastered. (See Table XXIII.)
The real situation seems to be more favourable than this for both dates ; for instance, on November 12th, he was correct seven out of ten times at 20 seconds' or more delay. Problems of fatigue and motivation are such as to have a tendency to underrate the child in such an experiment.
Hunter says that it is probable that the 22-year-old child, F, in the earlier experiment, would have been more successful under the conditions used for T. His delay would probably have been substantially longer.
( 110) A summary of the results regarding those cases which possibly involve some sort of substitution gives
| Maximum Delay | ||
| 1 | The 13-16 months child | 20 seconds or more |
| Raccoons | 25 seconds | |
| 2 | The 2.5-year child | 50 seconds (would probably have been more with Hunter’s second technique) |
| The dog — Walton | 1 minute | |
| 3 | The 6-8-year-old children | 25 minutes or more |
By placing the results of these three experiments together, it is not intended to indicate that they are strictly comparable in the amount of delay for the different experiments. Some of the varying factors have already been indicated. However, the comparison is sufficiently close to give evidence of the two types of response as well as of continuity between children and other animals in this respect.
| Last part of Oct. and Nov. through Dec. 2nd. | ||
| Delays. | % Correct. | |
| 3--7 sec. | 88 | |
| 8-12 sec. | 72 | |
| 13-17 sec. | 55 | |
| 18-22 sec. | 37 | |
| 23-35 sec. | 44 | |
| Ten-sec. interval may be considered mastered. | ||
| Jan. 2nd --Jan. 10th. | ||
| 5-7 sec. | 77 | |
| 8-12 sec. | 32 | |
| 15 sec. .. | 75 | |
| 20 sec. ... | 70 | |
| 25 sec. ... | 50 | |
| Twenty-sec. interval may be considered as approximately mastered. | ||
The type of substitution in 1 and 2 probably represents different degrees of a similar substitution --what Hunter calls " sensory thought."
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What seems to happen in these cases is that there are relatively temporary and plastic residual responses to the absent stimulus. When the situation minus the stimulus again is presented, these residual responses occur or are occurring, and are adequate substitutes for the original but absent part. They constitute a plastic or temporary tendency to respond with reference to the total situation in a particular fashion due to a previous particular stimulus. In the light of the Gestalt findings it may be that a temporary configuration is established and the stimulus still remains adequate for a correct response due to its " form " value, and in spite of the fact that a part of the stimulus is absent. Although Hunter thinks that the possibility of an after-image is not involved, still there may be some sort of motor change or after-effect, possibly engramic, which carries over directly to the end of the successful delay. In any case, the ability to respond correctly is very limited regarding the amount of delay, and represents a much lower degree in comparison with the older children.
This complex mechanism of response, however, is evidently material out of which symbols are made, but it is evidently not the type of behaviour called symbolic in the sense in which the substitute is performed accompanied by the associated behaviour which sets it off as a definition of the stimulus and response. The small amount of delay indicates that the substitution is apparently a rather direct function of the original stimulus. Removal of the original stimulus-situation for longer than a very short period makes successful response a. platter of chance. Whereas the true symbolic substitution after being initiated by the original stimulus-situation becomes relatively independent of it and becomes substitutive as a function of the stimulus-situation-minus-S. The symbol is no longer immediately dependent upon the original stimulus-situation, but now defines the stimulus-situation-minus-S and makes possible a correct response to it when it is presented after a long delay.
Symbolic integration thus involves a more complicated
( 112) behaviour pattern. It represents a much more unitary organization of behaviour than that represented by the short delay.
There is no sharp dividing line, however, between these two kinds of substitutive action, nor no sharp one between the more simple and the complex conditioned responses. The child in infancy is apparently on the same footing as other so-called higher animals. He is capable of becoming more complexly conditioned and integrated, but does not represent a form sui generis in the animal world. The degree of difference subsequently obtained is substantial. It is probable that a great deal of the adjustment of humans goes on in the realm of the short delayed reaction which may be classified as belonging to sub-symbolic processes.
Now to return to the main question with which we started. It seems true from these and other data that, as far as is known, the symbolic type of behaviour develops only with the social-vocal beginnings. The child of 2 ½ who delayed only 50 seconds probably represents a case where the experimental situation was not so well adapted to the child's stage of development as it might have been. As Hunter states, under conditions similar to those of T, his delay would probably have been substantially longer. Walton's situation probably was quite favourable for the dog, as it should be, due to its previous habits, such as food-getting and the like. Thus under more favourable experimental conditions for the 21/2--year child, who had already begun to use true vocal language, his period of delay might have been considerably more than that of the dog. However, we should not expect a very great amount of delay at the stage of integration obtained by a 2 1/2-yearold child.
For the present, the point of emphasis is merely that the social-vocal behaviour situation apparently furnishes the requisite mechanisms for true symbolic integration when associated with a sufficiently complex-behaviour system. And up to the present, this social-behaviour situation is the only situation in which such a type of
( 113) behaviour has occurred. It is true, of course, that with the use of similar principles, language has been developed in the deaf-and-dumb, but by highly mechanical and artificial manipulation and by those who already have developed language by means of the vocal integration. Symbolic integration will be considered in the following chapter.
