A History of Social Thought
Chapter 22: Psycho-Sociologic Thought

Emory S. Bogardus

A large number of references have already been made to psycho-sociologic thought. In origin it may be traced to the primitive days of the race. The folkways reveal keen psycho-sociologic observations. Undoubtedly, many phases of the psychic nature of group activities were known to the leaders of ancient civilizations. Plato wrote on the importance of custom and custom imitation as a societal force. Aristotle understood the socio-psychic nature of man when he observed that property which is owned in common is least taken care of, and when he declared that a fundamental test of good government may be found in the attitude of a people toward public service. In his theory of social attitudes Aristotle made a distinct contribution to psycho-sociologic thought.

Thomas More analyzed the causes of human actions. He was a worthy social psychologist when !lie protested against heaping punishment upon human beings, without attempting to understand the causes of criminal conduct and without seeking to remove the societal causes of such conduct. Bodin postulated a theory of interests in his ex-

(367) -planation of social evolution. He made the com m coon economic, religious, and other interests of man the basis of social organization. These interest,, according to Bodin, led primitive families to form a commonality of organization or government.

It was Hobbes who believed that man originally was a being of entirely selfish interests. Man's interest in others was based on their ability to cater to his own good. This theory still has strong sup port; there are large numbers of individuals who today apparently are living-according to this rule Nations oftentimes still seem to be motivated by no higher principle. On the basis of an introspective psychology, Hobbes made the scientific observation that "he that is going to be a whole man must read I in himself-mankind." Such a person must not simply find in himself this or that man's interests, but the interests of all mankind.

George Berkeley (1685-1753), bishop of Cloyne and eminent philosopher, in his Principles of Moral Attraction attempted to point out the analogies between the physical and social universe. His work was stimulated by the discoveries of Isaac Newton. He tried to apply the Newtonian formulas to society. While his "physical analogies" are of little value, they represent a stage in the rise of psycho sociologic thought. He made the social instinct, or the gregarious instinct, in society the analogue o I the force of gravitation. The centrifugal force in society is selfishness; and the centripetal, sociabil-

( 369) -ity. As the attractive force of one mass for another varies directly in relation to the distance between them, so the attraction of individuals for one another varies directly in proportion to their resemblances. The physical analogies, however, could not be carried far without being lost in the realm of absurdity.

The Scotch philosopher, David Hume, has been called the father of social psychology because of his splendid analysis of sympathy as a social force. "Let all the powers and elements of nature conspire to serve and obey one man, . . . he will still be miserable, till you give him some one person at least with whom he may share his happiness, and whose esteem and friendship he may enjoy ."[1] "Whatever other passions we may be actuated by, pride, ambition, avarice, curiosity, revenge or lust,-the soul or animating principle of them is sympathy."[2]

But sympathy is not always limited in its operation to the present moment. Through sympathy we may put ourselves in the future situation of any person whose present condition arouses our interest in him. Moreover, if we see a stranger in danger, we will run to his assistance.

Vice was defined by Hume as everything which gives uneasiness in human actions. By sympathy, we become uneasy when we become aware of injustice anywhere. "Self-interest is the original motive to the establishment of justice; but a sympathy with public interest is the source of the moral

( 370) approbation which attends that virtue." [3] There, a continual conflict between self-interest and sympathy, both in the individual and between individuals in society. Although at times this self-interest seems to predominate, "it does not entirely abolish the more generous and noble intercourse friendship and good offices." [4]

Sympathy causes people to be interested in the good of mankind.[5] But whatever human factor is contiguous either in space or time has a proportional effect on the will, passions, and imagination. [6] It commonly operates with greater force than any factor that lies in a distant and more obscure light. This principle explains why people often act in contradiction to their interests, and "why they prefer any trivial advantage that is present to the maintenance of order in society."

In accordance with the analysis of sympathy by Hume, Adam Smith made sympathy a leading concept in his theory of political economy. Smith also carried the concept of self-interest, with the result ant conflict between self-interest and social interest, into nearly all his economic theories.

According to Adam Smith there are four classes of people in modern life. (1) There are those who live by taking rent. They have social interests but are not socially productive; they grow listless and careless. (2) There is the class which takes wages. This group is large, productive, and socially interested, but their widespread lack of education makes

( 371) them subject to the passions of the day, and hence socially useless or even harmful. (3) Those who take profit have interests at direct variance with the welfare of society. Their selfish interests become unduly developed; their public attitudes are usually dangerous to all except themselves. (4) The fourth group is composed of all who derive a living from serving one or more of the three aforementioned classes. The interests of the three first mentioned groups often clash, leading to destructive social conflicts. Despite this conclusion, Adam Smith was an advocate of laissez faire. He urged that natural laws be allowed to express themselves normally.

In 1859, Moritz Lazarus and Heymann Steinthal began to contribute to social thought in the Zeitschrift fur Volker-Psychologie und Sprachwissenschaft. They applied psychological methods to the study of primitive society. In this journal they made notable contributions concerning the social customs and mental traits of early mankind. It is in this field, which was discussed in Chapter XVIII, that the original work of such men as Franz Boas, W. G. Sumner, W. I. Thomas, and L. T. Hobhouse belongs. Fundamental pioneering in psycho-sociologic thought was done by Lester F. Ward (see Chapter XVII). Ward opposed the prevailing belief of his time, and particularly of Herbert Spencer, that society must continue as it now is going on, namely, an exhibition of a blind struggle of

( 372) competitive forces. He not only perceived the rise of mind out of the obscure processes of social evolution, but more important still, he noted the part that mind may play in modifying the course o f social forces. Although he considered the human desires to be the dynamic social elements, he gave to mind, through its power of prevision, the prerogative of directing the desires of mankind. Moreover, he pointed out the direction in which mind could best guide the desires. He urged a sociocracy in which the desires of the individual are so controlled that they operate only when ill harmony with the welfare of other individuals. For establishing these fundamental considerations, Ward ranks high in the history of psycho-sociologic thought.

The chief founder o f social psychology was Gabriel Tarde (1843-1904). He wrote the first important treatise in the field of the psychology of society. The Lois de l'imitation established Tarde's reputation as a social psychologist, and at the same time aroused the world of thought to the existence of a new phase of social science. Tarde was a jurist who inquired into the causes of anti-social conduct. He was greatly impressed by the observation that criminal acts are committed in waves. Upon examination of this fact he found imitation to be a potent factor, and began to analyze the laws of imitation. This study soon showed that not all is imitation but that much human conduct arises out

(373) of opposition. His analysis of the laws of opposition led him to the conclusion that imitation and opposition are the bases of a third social factor, invention. The social process, as he observed it, is characterized (1) by an ever-widening imitation of inventions, (2) by the opposition of conflicting circles of imitation, and (3) by the rise of new inventions (out of these oppositions), which in turn become the centers of new imitations. Thus, the social process goes on, endlessly and unconsciously or consciously. To understand society, Tarde believed that one must understand how minds act and interact.

Tarde's work, first presented is Les Lois de l'imitation, was formally developed in his Logique sociale, and summarized in his Lois sociale (English translation, Social Laws). Together, these books constitute a unique social theory. Although Tarde's approach to the psychology of society was objective and sociological, and although he (lid not give serious attention to the purely psychological nature of the mind nor to the instinctive bases of conduct, he nevertheless made a contribution to social thought which is valid and enlightening.

Society, according to Tarde, is a group of people "who display many resemblances, produced either by imitation or by counter-imitation."[7] Again, he says that society is "a group of distinct individuals who render one another mutual services."[8] Societies are groups of people who are organized because

( 374) of agreement or disagreement of beliefs.[9] "Society is imitation."[10] The outstanding element in social ii life is a psychological process in which inventions are followed by imitations, which when coming into inevitable oppositions produce new inventions.

To the degree that a person is social he is imitative. In the way that vital, or biological, resemblances are due to heredity, so human resemblances are caused by imitation. The closer the human resemblances between individuals, even though they be occupational competitors, the larger will be the proportion of imitations and the closer the social relationships. The father will always be the son's first model. [11] A beloved ruler will so fascinate his people that they will imitate blindly, yea, even 1w thrown into a state of catalepsy by him. In such a case imitation becomes a kind of somnambulism.[12]

Imitations are characterized by inclines, plateaus, and declines.[13] The incline refers to the period of time which an imitation requires for adoption The plateau is the length of time during which an imitation is in force. The decline, of course, has to d,, with the passing away of an imitation. Each these phases are of varying lengths-dependent upon the operation of almost countless socio-psychical factors. It is this career through which all imitations must pass that is the important phase of history.[14]

There are two causal factors determining the nature of imitation: logical, and non-logical.[15] Logical

( 375) causes operate when the imitator adopts an innovation that is in line with the principles that have already found a place in his own mind. Extralogical, or non-logical, imitations are those which are determined by the adventitious factors of place, date, or birth of the individual.

The fundamental law of imitation, stated in simplest terms, is that the superior are imitated by the inferior, for example: the patrician by the plebeian; the nobleman by the commoner; the beloved by the lover.[16] A more accurate statement of the law of imitation is that "the thing that is most imitated is the most superior one of those that are nearest." The term "superior" in all these cases must be used in the subjective sense, that is to say, that which seems to the specific individual to be superior, not necessarily that which actually is the superior, is imitated.

A country or period of time is democratic if the distance between the highest and lowest classes is lessened enough so that the highest may be imitated freely by the lowest.[17] Democracy will keep the distance between classes reduced to that minimum where imitation may operate.

An important phase of sociology involves the knowledge and control of imitations.[18] Sociological statistics should determine (1) "the imitative power which inheres in every invention at any given time and place;" and (2) "the beneficial or harmful effects which result from the imitation of given in-

( 374) -ventions."

Imitation is divided into sets of complementary tendencies; custom imitation and fashion imitation; sympathy imitation and obedience imitation; naive imitation and deliberate imitation.[19] Everywhere custom imitation and fashion imitation are embodied in two parties, divisions, or organizations--the conservative and the liberal .[20]

Through custom imitation, usages acquire autocratic power. They control habit, regulate private conduct, and define morals and manners with imperial authority. Usages are frequently extralogical imitations. Usages are commonly accepted first by the upper classes. They usually are related primarily to objects of luxury; they stick tenacious)} to the leisure-time phases of life. Their most favorable milieu is a social and individual status of ignorance.

Fashion imitation rules by epochs, for example Athens under Solon, Rome under the Scipios, Florence in the fifteenth century .[21] These epochs of fashion produce great individualities-illustrious legislators, and founders of empire. Whenever the currents of fashions are set free, the inventive imagination is excited and ambitions are stimulated.

Fashion imitation has a democratizing influence. A prolonged process of fashion imitation ends "by putting pupil-peoples upon the same level, both in their armaments and in their arts and sciences, with their master people. [22] In fact, the very desire to

( 375) be like the superior is a latent democratizing force. The counterpart of imitation is opposition. Opposition, however, may be a very special kind of repetition. There are two types of opposition interference-combinations and interference-conflicts.[23] The first type refers to the coming together of two psychological quantities of desire and belief with the result that combination takes place and a total gain is made. The second type refers to the opposition resulting from incompatible forces. In this case an individual or social loss is registered.

From another standpoint, opposition appears in one of three forms, namely, war, competition, and discussion.[24] Conflicts often pass through these three forms, which are obedient to the same law of development, but in order are characterized by everwidening areas of pacification, alternating however with renewals of discord. As war is the lowest, most brutal form of conflict, discussion is the high-est, most rational form.

Opposition in human life is society's logical duel. [25] This duel sometimes ends abruptly when one of the adversaries is summarily suppressed by force. Sometimes a resort to arms brings a military victory. Sometimes a new invention or discovery expels one of the adversaries from the social scene.

The logical result of opposition is invention or adaptation. "Invention is a question followed by an answer." [26] Invention, or adaptation, at its best

( 378) is "the felicitous interference of two imitations, occurring first in one single mind."[27] Inventions grow in two ways: (1) in extension-by imitative diffusion; and (2) in comprehension-by a series of logical combinations, such as the combination of the wheel and the horse in the inventions of the horse-cart.[28]

Inventions partially determine the nature of new inventions and new discoveries. A new invention makes possible other inventions, and so on. Each invention is the possible parent of a thousand off spring inventions.

To be inventive, one must be wide-awake, inquiring, incredulous, not docile and dreamy, or living in a social sleep. The inventor is one who escapes, for the time being, from his social surroundings.[29] Inventing develops from wanting. A man experiences some want, and in order to satisfy this want he in vents. Inventiveness is contrary in nature to sheepishness.

Since an invention is the answer to a problem, inventions are the real objective factors which mark the stage of progress. But invention, according to Tarde, becomes increasingly difficult. Problem naturally grow increasingly complex as the simpler ones are mastered. Unfortunately, the mind of man is not capable of indefinite development, and therefore will reach a limit in solving problems.[30] At this point, Tarde is on doubtful ground. His argument can neither be proved nor disproved. Ap-

( 379) -parently, man's ability to solve problems increases with his training and experience in that connection,, Moreover, man appears to be at the very dawn of his possibilities in the field of invention. He is only beginning to gather together systematically the materials for inventing, and to understand slightly the principles of inventing.

Inventors are imitative.[31] This statement is but another way of saying that inventions are cumulative, that they come in droves, that they are gregarious. A new discovery will arouse the ambition of many wide-awake persons to make similar discoveries. "There is in every period a current of inventions which is in a certain general sense religious or architectural or sculptural or musical or philosophical. [32]

Invention and imitation represent the chief forces in society.[33] Invention is "intermittent, rare, and eruptive only at certain infrequent intervals." It explains "the source of privileges, monopolies, and aristocratic inequalities." Imitation, on the other hand, is democratic, leveling, and "incessant like the stream deposition of the Nile or Euphrates." At times the eruptions of invention take place faster than they can be imitated. At other times imitations flow in a monotonous circular current.

The contributions of Tarde to social thought have stimulated numerous investigators to enter the field of social psychology. While Tarde's thinking has been severely criticised by the psychologists and

( 380) modified by the sociologists, it has opened mines of valuable social ores. Not the least important consideration was the impetus which the Tardian thought gave to American writers, such as E. A. Ross.[34] Tarde's name, however, will be long revered for the penetrating way in which he developed the concept of imitation. Although Walter Bagehot, an English publicist, in an epoch-stirring book, Physics and Politics, published an important chapter on "Imitation" as early as 1872, it was Tarde's Lois de l'imitation in 1890 which at once became the authority on the subject. In the United States, Michael M. Davis, Jr., has written an excellent summary of Tarde's socio-psychology thought.`' As a critical digest of Tardian thought, Dr. Davis' Psychological Interpretations of Society is unsurpassed.

In 1892, Profesor H. Schmidkunz published an elaborate work on the Psychologie der Suggestion. This book is an important pioneer work. In the English language, the writings of Boris Sidis on the psychology of suggestion are well-known. Professor E. A. Ross has given an intensive treatment of the theme in his Social Psychology. In these various discussions, however, the fact is not made clear that suggestion and imitation are correlative phases of the same phenomenon. The point, also, is not developed that suggestion-imitation phenomena are natural products of social situations iii which like stimuli normally produce like responses.


In 1895, the first book by Gustave Le Bon on crowd psychology was published. Le Bon has also written on the psychology of revolutions, of war, and of peoples. He gave a limited definition to the term, crowds, and then applied the term to nearly all types of group life. He conceived of crowds as "feeling phenomena." They are more or less pathological. Since the proletariat are subject to crowd psychology, they are untrustworthy and to be rewarded perpetually with suspicion. A sounder, more synthetic, and historical position concerning the psychology of groups and of society is taken by G. L. Duprat in La Psychologie sociale.

Italian contributions in the field of crowd and group psychology are represented by Paolo Orano's Psicologia sociale, which includes only a partial treatment of the subject that is indicated by the title; and by Scipio Sighele's La foule criminelle and Psychologie des sectes. Permanent groups, according to Sighele (following Tarde), are either sects, castes, classes, or states.[36] The sect is a group of individuals which possesses a common ideal and faith, such as a religious denomination or a political party. The caste arises from identity of profession. The class is characterized by a strong unity of interests. States possess common bonds of language, national values, and national prestige.

The concept of "consciousness of kind" was developed by Franklin H. Giddings in his Principles of Sociology (1896). Consciousness of kind is the

( 382) original and elementary subjective fact in society.[37] Professor Giddings defines this term to mean "a state of consciousness in which any being, whether low or high in the scale of life, recognizes another conscious being as of like kind with itself." In its widest meaning, consciousness of kind marks the difference between the animate and the inanimate. Among human beings it distinguishes "social con duct" from purely economic or purely religious activity. Around consciousness of kind, as a determining principle, all other human motives organize themselves.

People group together according to the development of the consciousness of kind in them. Roughly speaking, there are four such groupings.[38] (1) The non-social are persons in whom the consciousness of kind has not yet developed -in whom it finds imperfect but not degenerate expression, and from whom the other classes arise. (2) The antisocial, or criminal, classes include those persons in whom the consciousness of kind is approaching extinction. They detest society. (3) The pseudo social, or pauper, classes are characterized by a degeneration of the genuine consciousness of kind. (4) The social classes are noted for a high develop ment of the consciousness of kind; they constitute the positive and constructive elements in society. At the head of the list are the pre-eminently social. These people devote their lives and means to the amelioration of society; they are called the natural

( 383) aristocracy of the race, the true social elite.

Consciousness of kind is made possible in part by the operation of physical factors. Fertility of soil is one of the sources of human aggregation. Favorable climate makes aggregation possible. Aggregation of population is either genetic (due to the birth rate) or congregate (due to immigration). Aggregation leads to association-the proper milieu for the growth of consciousness of kind.

Aggregation guarantees social intercourse, which is a mode of conflict. Conflict, according to Professor Giddings, becomes the basis of social growth.[39] Primary conflicts are those in which one adversary is completely outdone, and hence likely to be crushed, by the other. Secondary conflict refers to the contests between more or less evenly balanced forces. Primary conflict is conquest; secondary conflict is growth. Among people secondary conflict leads to the development of consciousness of kind through the successive steps of communica-tion, imitation, toleration, co-operatiom, alliance. The supreme result is the production of pre-eminently social classes. Of these various factors, Professor Giddings particularly stresses imitation. "It is the factor of imitation in the conflict that gradually assimilates and harmonizes."[40]

Association reacts upon individuals and produces self-consciousness, which in turn creates social self-consciousness, or group awareness of itself. Social self-consciousness is characterized by rational dis-

( 384) -cussion. With the rise of discussion, social memory, or traditions, becomes possible. Moreover, a sense of social values arises. Public opinion springs from the passing of judgment by the members of the group upon any matters of general interest.[41]

Social memory, or traditions, becomes highly differentiated.[42] It consists of impressions concerning the tangible world, the intangible world, and the conceptional world. The traditions in any field, plus current opinion in that field, form the standards, ideals, faiths, "isms" of the time. For example, the integration of economic traditions with current economic opinions is the general standard of living of the time and place. The integration of the aesthetic tradition with current criticism is taste, and the modification of a traditional religious belief by current religious ideas is a faith.

Inasmuch as consciousness of kind is the psychological basis of social phenomena, it is natural that the chief social value is the kind itself, or the type of conscious life that is characteristic of the society.[43] The social cohesion is another important social value. Social cohesion is vital to the unity of any group; therefore the group is usually willing to make many sacrifices in its own behalf. The distinctive possessions and properties of the community, such as territory, sacred or historic places, heroes, ceremonies, constitute the third class of social values. A fourth group is found in the general principles which promote the growth of the

( 385) group; for example, the principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity. The social values largely determine the social choices of groups and the nature of social organizations.

Professor Giddings develops an interesting theory of the dualism in social structures. Civilization is marked by the contemporaneous existence of public and private associations. Civilized society affords four main sets of dualistic associations political, juristic, economic, and cultural. In the political field there are private political parties and the public association, namely, the government, or the political party in power. Among juristic associations there are the privately-organized vigilance committees and the public associations, such as the police, the courts, the prisons. In the realm of economics there are private individual entrepreneurs, partnerships, corporations; and cm the other ]land, there are the governmentally-owned railroads, postal service, the water systems, the coinage systems. In regard to cultural associations we may note the privately endowed universities and state universities, privately organized churches and state churches, private charities and public charities. This dualism in social structure is supported by Professor Giddings on the grounds that private associations are needed for purposes of initiation, experimentation, and stimulation; and the public associations serve the useful purposes of regulation and maintenance of balance among various contend-

( 386) -in- factors.

The highest test of social organization is the development of social personality. An efficient social organization is one which makes its members "snore rational, more sympathetic, with an- an ever-broadening consciousness of kind." [44]

In recent works Professor Giddings has developed the concept of pluralistic behavior. "Any one or any combination of behavior inciting stimuli may on occasion be reacted to by more than one individual." [45] The character of pluralistic reactions, whether similar or dissimilar, simultaneous or not, equal or unequal, is determined by two variables (1) the strength of the stimulation; (2) the similarity or dissimilarity of the reacting mechanisms.[46] Thus Professor Giddings considers pluralistic behavior the subject matter of the psychology of society, or sociology.

In 1897, Social and Ethical Interpretations, by J. Mark Baldwin, was printed; it bears the subtitle of "A Study in Social Psychology." This was the first time that the term, social psychology, had appeared in the title of a book in America, though three years earlier, in 1894, one of the leading parts of Small and Vincent's Introduction to the Study of Society was designated "social psychology" and included a discussion of social consciousness, social intelligence, and social volition. Baldwin's Social and Ethical Interpretations and Giddings' Principles of Sociology appeared almost simultaneously,

( 387) one by a psychologist and the other by a sociologist. One was written from the genetic viewpoint, and the other from the objective viewpoint; one dealt primarily with social psychology, and the other with a psychology of society; one was built around the concept of the social self, and the other around the concept of a consciousness of kind. They both hastened the development of an organic social psychology.

Professor Baldwin demonstrated that the self is largely a product of the give-and-take of social life. A child becomes aware of his self by setting himself off from other selves. It is in group life, that is, in contact with other selves, that the child develops a self consciousness.

Moreover, the self is bi-polar. One end of the self-pole is characterized by what one thinks of himself, and the other end by what he thinks of other persons. [47] "The ego and the alter are to our thought one and the same thing."[48]

People are so much alike because they are imitative. It is imitation which keeps people alike. Imitation integrates individuals. Imitation is either (1) a process whereby one individual consciously or unconsciously copies another individual, or (2) the copying of a model, that is, adopting a model which arises in one's own mind.[49]

Baldwin found the law of social growth in the particularization by the individual of society's store of material, and by the generalization on the part

( 388) of society of the individual's particularizations. The essence of the first phase of this process is invention and of the second, imitation. Baldwin considered invention and imitation the two fundamental processes of social growth.

In this chapter the strength of the psychological approach to an understanding of societary processes has been demonstrated. In the chapter which follows the reader will find further materials, showing the tremendous vitality of psycho-sociologic thought.


  1. David Home, A Treatise of Human Nature, edit. by Selby-Bigge, Oxford, 1896, p. 363.
  2. Ibid., p. 362.
  3. Ibid., pp. 499, 500.
  4. Ibid., p. 521.
  5. Ibid., pp. 575 ff.
  6. Ibid., p. 535.
  7. Gabriel Tarde, The Laws of Inittation, tr. by Parsons, Holt, 1903, p. XVII
  8. Ibid., p. 59.
  9. Ibid., p. 146.
  10. Ibid., p. 74.
  11. Ibid., p. 78.
  12. Ibid., p. 87.
  13. Ibid., p. 114.
  14. Ibid., p. 39.
  15. Ibid., p. 141 ff.
  16. Ibid., p. 213; cf. Tarde, Social Laws, trans. by Warren, Macmillan, 1907, p. 65.
  17. The Laws of Imitation, p. 225.
  18. Ibid., p. 111.
  19. Ibid., p. 14.
  20. Ibid., p. 288.
  21. Ibid., pp. 341 ff.
  22. Ibid., p. 369.
  23. Ibid., p. 30.
  24. Social Laws, p. 132.
  25. Laws of Imitation, p. 169.
  26. Social Laws, p. 195.
  27. Ibid., p. 204.
  28. Ibid., p 171; cf. Tarde, La logique sociale, Paris, 1898, Ch. IV.
  29. Laws of Imitation, p. 87.
  30. Ibid., p. 138.
  31. Ibid,, p. 344.
  32. Ibid.,
  33. Ibid., p. 387.
  34. E. A. Ross, Social Psychology, Macmillan, 1908, p. viii.
  35. M. M. Davis, Jr., Psychological Interpretations of Society, Longmans, Green, 1909.
  36. Tarde, L'opinion et la foule, Paris, 1901, pp. 177 ff. Cf. Sighele, Psychologic des sectes, Paris, 1898, pp. 45 ff.
  37. F. H. Giddings, Principles of Sociology, Macmillan, 1896, p. 17.
  38. Ibid., pp. 71, 126 ff.
  39. Ibid., pp. 101 ff. Cf. Giddings, Descriptive and Historical Sociology, Macmillan, 1911, Ch. III.
  40. Principles of Sociology, p. 109; Descriptive and Historical Sociology, pp. 157 ff.
  41. Principles of Sociology, p. 138.
  42. Ibid., pp. 141 ff.
  43. Ibid., pp. 147 ff.
  44. Descriptive and Historical Sociology, p. 541. Cf. Giddings, Inductive Sociology, Macmillan, 1914, Part III.
  45. American Journal of Sociology, Vol. XXV, p. 387.
  46. Ibid., p 388.
  47. J. M. Baldwin, Social and Ethical Interpretations, Macmillan, 1906, p. 15.
  48. Ibid., p. 18.
  49. Ibid., pp. 529 ff.

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