The Psychological Bases of Social Science

Floyd Henry Allport
School of Citizenship and Public Affairs,
 Syracuse University


Within the last few years the entrance of psychologists into the socio-psychological field has tipped the scales of interest toward the psychological side. Though still important to sociologists, social psychology is now regarded by many as a branch distinctly of psychology, dealing with the responses of the individual to the social part of his environment and describing the social consciousness of the individual.

Thus Hunter (50) regards " interstimulation and response " as the fundamental fact to be studied. Broadening the field to include the social behavior of animals, he rejects Ellwood's limitation of the social category to "consciously interacting" groups. Hunter recognizes that behavior often serves not only as response, but as stimulus, to other individuals. Gault (37) similarly defines social psychology as a study of "interactions among animals " and, more specifically, of reactions of human beings to one another. His illustrations refer to responses of individuals in the presence of others, rather than exclusively to one another. Such situations are classified by Allport (1) as responses to "contributory social stimulation," which underlie the influence of the social surroundings in the " co-acting group" and the crowd. They are distinguishable from the "direct" social stimulations which occur in conversation, discussion, conflict, and all face-to-face groups. Allport also includes the behavior comprised in the " making of social stimulations " (language, expression,

(562) gesture) as a portion of the field. Dunlap (27), though developing a slightly different emphasis, gives both formulation and respect to the viewpoint stated above; while Smith and Guthrie (94) employ a double definition embracing the " individual's response to his fellow men " and " concerted behavior " within groups.

Sociological writers are approaching the same definition. Bogardus (17) designates the field as one of " intersocial stimulation and response." He throws the emphasis upon the development of personalities and social attitudes out of interstimulation. In the latter and more interesting portion of his book he parts company with the casual and psychological viewpoint, and discusses group aspects and leadership descriptively and sociologically. The reviewer would regard Bogardus' attempt to ascribe causal significance to the group (as in the " interaction between group and individual" or "between one group and another") as a failure of analysis. Individuals stimulate and respond, but groups do not (except as individuals). Williams (103) defines social psychology as "the science of the motives of people living in social relations," and develops his definition through a survey of the rivalries of economic and social conflict. The discussion is practical, but it seldom penetrates to the psychological foundations. Keeping close to the concrete interactions of individuals, his work falls within the scope of the definition of social psychology which we have been tracing. Bogardus and Williams are telic and ethical' in their outlook, rather than explanatory.

Social psychology therefore has become fairly identified with situations in which individuals stimulate and respond to one another, a formulation which, for convenience, we may call the "social behavior viewpoint." Although in many ways an advantage, this somewhat precise definition narrows the field to data in which the psychologist, preëminelitly, is interested. Many human responses, for example, reactions to tools, soil, and Climate are psychological facts as important to the sociologist as reactions to other human beings,. The "group" standpoint also remains as the legitimate center of sociological interest. Hence Ellwood (29) prefers a study of the psychic factors involved in the "origin, development, structure, and functioning of social groups." The expression of this view becomes somewhat metaphorical when Ellwood (30) speaks of "a web of intercommunication " (language) along which are transmitted "mental patterns" from individual to individual, thus permitting the group-wide dissemination of " ideals," " values," and culture in

(563) general. The social behavior viewpoint would reduce the transmission of these mental patterns, which are described as if floating at large in society, to terms of stimulus and response between individuals.


The more definite delimitation of the field of social psychology has thus left out of account a number of problems for whose classification a new socio-psychological science seems to be indicated. These problems may best be summarized under Professor Giddings' viewpoint of " pluralistic behavior ". The basic fact here is not interaction (social behavior) but a plurality of separate and similarly acting individuals. Giddings (38) begins, on the subjective side, with 'a plurality of like-minded individuals, each conscious of his similarity to the others. Objectively the situation is a " plurum " of similarly reacting units. Stimulations from the others, being closely like stimulations received from one's self in the same activities, develop on the one hand a consciousness of kind, and upon the other, a reinforcement of one's behavior through the like responses of others. We tend to respond more readily to reactions which are like our own. The phenomenon agrees closely with that which, under the name of "social facilitation", Allport (1, Ch. 11) has recognized as basic in the co-acting group. Giddings' principle, however, is deeper than the social behavior setting, and prior to it; for he assumes a plurum of reacting units similar in constitution and therefore 'in response before any interaction has taken place. Two important conditions influence the extent and pattern of the plural response. They are (1) the range (number of individuals reached by the stimulus), and (2) the "reaction area" of the collective response as determined by imperativeness of the stimulus, degree of homogeniety, and similar factors (39).[1] The Willeys (102) attempt to explain the consciousness of kind as due to a conditioning stimulus (common element, i.e., "kind ") which evokes the reaction attaching to the original situation in which kind was experienced. Humphrey (49) has made a similar use of the conditioned response to explain that resistance to the unfamiliar in conduct upon which adherence to custom is based.


The pluralistic approach as developed by Kantor rests upon uniform (or institutionalized) responses to stimulating objects (e.g., weather, culture objects, and personages) common to the group. He rejects both instincts and physiological psychology as false or irrelevant viewpoints (54, 55, 56). Natural biological similarities are recognized ; but the acquired or cultural reactions learned in the social environment (tradition) and common to the group he regards as the true field for scientific social psychology (54, 56, 58). This theory, which throws valuable light on the nature of institutions, belongs rather to the pluralistic than to the interactional field of socio-psychological science. Only genetically, that is, in the individual's learning of cultural reactions, is social behavior involved. Smith and Guthrie (94) also list a number of situations which call forth, common, or " concerted ", responses. These " coenotropes " are the basis of tradition, morality, and institutions. A similar conception in terms of social attitudes (approval, etc.) is suggested by Reuter (85).

Summary. The two psychological approaches described in sections I and II may be summarized and differentiated as follows. The second position will be stated first.

A. There is, first, the mass of similar responses of the members of a group or society to the common objects (other than persons) of their environment. These like responses, innate or acquired, are the very stuff of tradition, custom, institutions and organized social living. The science dealing with them is fundamental, 'relatively simple, and constitutes a psychological restatement, in behavior terms, of all the social sciences. Using the term, and in part the conception, of Giddings (39), we may call it societal psychology.

B. Secondly, there arises upon the simple pluralistic basis phenomena of a secondary and complex nature. These are the responses of individuals to one another, that is, the making of social stimulations and the responding to them. Facts belonging to this class comprise the field of social psychology.

Since both sciences are psychological, both deal only with individuals as units of explanation. Group aspects are used merely to depict and delimit the mass phenomena to be explained. There is no " psychology of society " as contrasted with the psychology of the individual. Societal psychology deals with individuals as discrete units of pluralistic aggregates; social psychology deals with individuals as stimulating and responding to one another. In spite of

(565) the obvious overlapping and interweaving of these two fields, the distinction seems to be both warranted by the literature, and useful.


A few dying echoes of the social mind metaphor are still to be heard. With the "collective racial unconscious" of the Jung school we may class Rivers' elaboration of social conflict upon the analogy of mental conflict in the individual (87). Bodenhafer (16) argues that every sort of datum studied really begins as an aggregate of units. Opponents of the group mind have been aggressive. M. Ginsberg (40) finds the " group mind " and " general will " to be concepts quite incompatible with psychological notions of mind and will. . Perry's amusing analysis (79) deflates collective mind to verbalism and abstraction of inconsequentials. Laird (62) and Hubert (48) have given further penetrating analyses. Allport has assailed Rivers' pathological metaphor, and has urged against the practice of prefixing the term "social " to psychological terms (e.g., "social habits "), a usage likely to prove a veiled form of the group mind fallacy (4). Sociologists have objected to Allport's contention, in the same paper, that such concepts as " the group " and " the super-organic order " are valid only for descriptive, not for explanatory, purposes. Every science, he says, draws its causal principles from the science just beneath it in the hierarchy of complexity of data. The social sciences, therefore, may depict phenomena in group and culture terms, but they must explain them through the individual, that is, by the aid of psychology. Sacred sociological soil is here invaded.


Instinct versus Social Determination. Many sociologists, welcoming support for their social determinism, have joined forces with the critical movement, current in psychology, against the theory of instincts. McDougall has striven doughtily against his critics, and has renewed his appeal to sociologists (71, 72). There have been a few recent books on social topics written from the standpoint of instincts. The most important are those by Groves (44, 45), Bartlett (11), and Eldridge (28). Miller (75) has argued for the existence of a powerful "group instinct". A number of writers, however, use the term " instinct " with guarded reservations or apologies. The following are among the social psychologists who

(566) have rejected specific and complex instincts: Dewey (26), Bogardus (17), Gault (37), (retains indifferentiated "instinct"), Josey (52), Kantor (57), Williams (103), (substitutes "dispositions"), Dunlap (27), (substitutes physiologically grounded " desires "), Allport (1), (criticizes in particular the maturation theory), and Bernard (12). The " gregarious instinct " has been especially attacked by Cason (23), and Suttie (95) ; and the "maternal instinct " by R. Reed (83). Balz and Pott (8) emphasize the obscuring of instinctive elements by later modification in relation to habit, intelligence, and special Capacities. Bernard, in his monumental work (12), catalogues inconsistencies and obscurities in the use of the concept, and considers that so-called " instincts " are really habits built up through the play of the social environment upon innumerable, nonspecific, reflex tendencies which are present at birth. He further analyzes systematically the formative influences present in the environment throughout life (13). Having in, his book bustled instincts unceremoniously out of the house, Bernard, in a subsequent discussion (14), slams the door on them.

Dewey's position (26) may be instructively compared with that of McDougall in his Introduction to Social Psychology. The latter asserts an elaborate innate basis of behavior as an explanation of societal facts. Instincts are definite, specific, and socially oriented. Dewey, on the other hand, maintains that, although simple and random instinctive activities may have existed at birth, they have been overlaid by learning through social agencies to an unrecognizable extent. Society rather than instinct is responsible for the nature, conduct, and morality of mankind. Social psychology in this sense is fundamental to all psychology. In criticism, it may he said that Dewey's view, in its extreme, involves the " group fallacy ". " Society " does not teach the individual anything, but only other individuals who are members of the "society ". Balz and Pott (8) make the same error of considering the elementary social situation, a group of two, as the primary causal fact. Secondly, it is possible to overdo the theory of social determination. Few indeed of the critics of instinct have given fair recognition to McDougall for his insistence that there is something directive and formulative (though it need not be interpreted as purpose) behind the learning process. There is a determining tendency or drive which directs habit acquisition along useful lines (protection, sex, etc.), rather than toward haphazard patterns. This is the truly inherited factor; it may be mechanistically explained, but it can not he denied.


The reviewer (1, Ch. 3) has conceived this innate factor to be a relatively small number of reflexes, present in infancy, which are prepotent (i.e., control the final common path) over other reflexes. Upon this basis he has worked out, through conditioning and learning, a substitute for the doctrine of instincts. McDougall and Dewey seem to him, therefore, to be both partially right, though neither exclusively. There is an innate dynamic factor (prepotent responses) directing the social life of the individual; and at the same time other individuals, as " vehicles " of tradition. and culture, help to modify these responses, through social stimulation (language, etc.), into socially accepted patterns of behavior. The individual makes society; society (other individuals) makes the individual.

Personality, Social Attitudes, Adjustments. Much of the modern treatment in this important field is derived from psychoanalysis. All the recent textbooks have given attention to the social adjustments of personality. The family environment is studied by Groves (45), and Allport (1). Klüver (60) finds difficulty in connecting sociological types (e.g., criminal) with proposed psychological categories. G. W. Allport applies the Gestaltlehre (6) in a demonstration that a personality must be socially "intuited " as a whole, whose meaning is lost upon analysis into traits or profiles. Burgess (19) and Bogardus (17) show the importance of social factors in determining the trend of personal development. Through their definition of " the person " as an " individual with status " they attempt (unjustifiably, the reviewer thinks) to lift the main problem of personality over into sociology. Social-self attitudes derived through identification with the mother are discussed by Burrow (20), while Willey and Herskovitz (100) find identification to he important in the relation of employer and employee. Ream's results (81) indicate that people prefer as working mates individuals with an activity level similar to their own.

Social and Religious Problems. Ames (7) has developed a definition of religion as the highest social consciousness within the group. Suggestion and other social behavior phenomena have been found by Shepherd (90) to be regularly employed in revival services. In addition to further crowd studies (70) Martin has given us a stimulating work showing the presence of neurotic manifestations and regressional attitudes toward the father throughout religious practices and symbols (67). Mecklin's account of the Ku Klux Klan (73) reveals such psychological factors as fear, love of ritual, and compensation for mediocrity. Intelligence levels in the general

(568) population and in the flux of immigration have received attention from Brigham (18) and Gault (37). Willis (104) finds first-born children to be slightly less intelligent than second-born. Psychological problems of rural communities are considered by Groves (44), while Friedman (34) suggests reasons for the nervousness of the Jew.

Experiment in Social Psychology. Using groups for experimentation Whittemore (99) found differing effects of competition upon quantity and quality of work. Gates (36) discovered very slight effects upon performance due to being watched at work. Marked influences upon attention to lectures were found by Griffith to result from the social stimulations received from surrounding members of the audience (43).


The work of psychoanalytic interpretation of historical leaders and movements has been profitably continued by Hartman (47), Barnes (10), and O'Higgins (78). Kallen (53) argues significantly that since political science studies political behavior, it is really a form of psychology. Merriam (74) and Gosnell (42) have pointed out vital relations between psychological measurement and political procedure. Governmental process and the concepts of sovereignty, rights, liberty, and progress have been lucidly analyzed by Barnes (9). Psychological weakness of representation and detachment of executives and legislators from their constituents have been dealt with by M. Ginsberg (40) and Weeks (98). Garth (35) bases successful democracy upon freedom for learning by trial and error. The crowd-like speciousness of public opinion and political control is the theme of Martin (68, 69) ; while Lippman's challenge (64) portrays the " stereotyping " of. popular beliefs through habit and conditioned emotional response. Willey and Rice (101) have measured the influence of a speech by W. J. Bryan upon the religious and scientific convictions of Dartmouth students. Eldridge (28) bases the hope of progress upon the ability of the sponsors of enlightened control to get possession of the popular suggestion process and other forms of the " technique of democracy."

Social and political attitudes (radicalism, conservatism, etc.) are vividly treated in current writing. The intricate mazes of inferiority conflict, projection, anger, rationalization, biased reasoning, hypocrisy, and distortions of scientific attitude are discussed by Wolfe

(569) (106, 107, 108), Rice (86), E. F. Reed (82), Reid (84), Ogburn (77), Taylor (96), Allport (1), B. Ginzburg (41), Pruette (80), and Schmalhausen (88, 89). Very important contributions have been made to problems of leadership and group conflict adjustment by Follett (32) and Lindeman (63). Suppression and compromise are both rejected, and the possibility of an " integrated " solution involving, by finer analysis, the real needs of all claimants is concretely illustrated. Miss Follett applies her " participation theory " suggestively to existing political practice. Recent Freudian contributions to the origin of leadership and the State are worthy of notice. Contributors to this field are Freud (33), Rivers (87), Kelsen (59), and Kolnai (61). A discussion of these tendencies is also given by Allport (5). Symbolization of the father by the leader, " libidinal fixation " resembling hypnotic suggestion between leader and followers, sublimation of thwarted sexual impulses into bonds of group affiliation, and regression to infantile utopian ideas are among the principal themes.


The culture problem has come to the fore through Ogburn's brilliant discussion of social change (76). Though recognizing psychology, this author states his laws of culture-dynamics (rate of change, accumulation, inertia, lag, etc.) from an inductive survey at the cultural level itself. Allport's criticism (2) alleges that this treatment is too much limited to description, explanation being possible only by considering the human individual (biological and psychological) as the unit of social change. The rôle of the individual has also been stressed, in respect to leadership, racial traits, capacity, and biological aspects, by Blackmar (15), Hankins (46), Chapin (24), and Huxley (51). But the strongest support has come from the anthropologist himself. Wissler (105) significantly asserts that culture is founded upon human behavior, which may be both innate and acquired. Although culture transmission may account for the content of the culture pattern (acquired behavior) in any people, it can not explain the form of that pattern, a form which is peculiar to mankind and universal among all races. Wissler's effort to link up the various complexes of the universal pattern with instinctive categories, though tentative, is nevertheless ingenious. Allport offers an explanation of the cultural trait-complexes through the universal operation of the prepotent responses (2, 4, 1).

(569) Case (21) ascribes war to a combined instinctive and cultural causation. Culture patterns have been given a " mentalistic " or " psychic " reference by Wallis (97) and Ellwood (30). A further discussion of the culture concept containing some socio-psychological definitions has been given by Case (22).

Folkways and customs characteristic of a group have been termed by Bartlett " group difference tendencies " (11). He considers them as the adequate bases for the popular acceptance of folk-tales and similar culture elements. Allport (3) maintains that this view over looks the psychological (i.e., individual) factors upon which the continuance of folkways itself depends. Faris (31) turns the tables again by showing how much the psychologist himself might learn from ethnology. Notwithstanding the over-petulant invectives of G. E. Smith (91, 92), Malinowski, a first-hand observer, has shown that, with some revision as to the nature of the " nuclear complex ", Freud was essentially right in his interpretation of conflict and repression as forces underlying and explaining primitive social organization (65, 66). Though fraught with disputes and misunderstandings, the liaison between psychology and anthropology seems interesting and full of promise.

NOTE.-This review was received in manuscript in November, 1924. 


1. ALLPORT, F. H. Social Psychology. Houghton Mifflin, 1924.

2. ————. Social Change: An Analysis of Professor Ogburn's Culture Theory. J. Soc. Forces, 1924, 2, 671-676.

3. ————. The Group Fallacy in Relation to Culture. J. Abnor. Psychol. and Soc. Psychol., 1924-25, 19, 185-191.

4. ————. The Group Fallacy in Relation to Social Science. J. Abnor. Psychol. and Soc. Psychol., 1924-25, 19, 60-73. (Published also in Amer. J. Sociol., 1924, 29, 688-703.)

5. ————. Recent Psychoanalytic Contributions to Social Theory and Practice. J. Abnor. Psychol, and Soc. Psychol., 1924-25, 19, 208-219.

6. ALLPORT, G. W: A Study of the Undivided Personality. J. Abnor. Psychol. and Soc. Psychol., 1924-25, 19, 132-141.

7. AMES, E. S. Religion in Terms of Social Consciousness. J. of Relig., 1921, 1, 264-270.

8. BALZ, A. G. A., and POTT, W. S. A. The Basis of Social Theory. Knopf, 1924.

9. BARNES, H. E. Sociology and Political Theory. Knopf, 1924.

10. ————. Some Reflections on the Possible Service of Analytical Psychology to History. Psychoanal. Rev.. 1921, 8, 22-37.

11. BARTLETT, F. C. Psychology and Primitive Culture. Macmillan, 1923.

12. BERNARD, L. L. Instinct: . A Study in Social Psychology. Holt, 1924.


13. BERNARD, L. L. The Significance o£ Environment as a Social Factor. Publ. Amer. Social. Soc., 1921, 16, 84-112.

14 ————. Present Trends in Social Psychology. J. Soc. Forces, 1924, 2, 737-743.

15. BLACKMAR, F. W. Influence of Hereditary Traits on Human Progress. Publ. Amer. Social. Soc., 1921, 16, 154-165.

16. BODENHAFER, W. B. The Group as a Valid Concept. J. Appl. Sociol., 1923-24, 8, 160-163.

17. BOGARDUS, E. S. Fundamentals of Social Psychology. Century, 1924.

18. BRICHAM, C. C. A Study of American Intelligence. Princeton Univ. Press, 1923.

19. BURGESS, E. W. The Study of the Delinquent as a Person. Amer. J. Social., 1922-23, 28, 657-680.

20. BURROW, T. Social Images Versus Reality. J. Abnor. Psychol. and Soc. Psycho!., 1924-25, 19, 230-235.

21. CASE, C. M, Instinctive and Cultural Factors in Group Conflict. Amer. J. Sociol., 1922-23, 28, 1-20.

22.————. The Culture Concept in Social Science. J. Appl. Sociol., 1923-24, 8, 146-155.

23. CASON, H. Gregariousness Considered as a Common Habit. J. Abnor. Psychol. and Soc. Psychol., 1924-25, 19, 96-105.

24. CHAPIN, F. S. Leadership and Group Activity. J. Appl. Sociol., 1923-24, 8, 141-145.

25. COFFIN, J. H. Personality ire the Making. Houghton Mifflin, 1923.

26. DEWEY, J. Human Nature and Conduct. Holt, 1922.

27. DUNLAP, K. The Foundations of Social Psychology. Psychol. Rev., 1923, 29, 81-102.

28. ELDRIDGE, S. Political Action. Lippincott, 1924.

29. ELLWOOD, C. A. The Relations of Sociology and Social Psychology. J. Abnor. Psychol. and Soc. Psychol., 1924-25, 19, 3-12.

30.————. Mental Patterns in `Social Evolution.' Publ. Amer. Social. Soc., 1922, 17, 88-100.

31. FARIS, E. Ethnological Light on Psychological Problems. Pub[. Amer. Social. Soc., 1921, 16, 113-120.

32. FOLLETT, M. P. Creative Experience. Longmans, 1924.

33. FREUD, S. Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego. Translated by James Strachey. Internat. Psychoanalytical Press, 1922.

34. FRIEDMAN, E. M. The Jewish Mind in the Making. Ment. Hyg., 1923 7, 345-356.

35. GARTH, T. R. The Psychological Basis of Democracy. Sci. Mo., 1923, 17, 577-582.

36. GATES, G. S. The Effect of an Audience Upon Performance. J. Abnor. Psychol. and Soc, Psychol., 1923-24, 18, 334-344.

37. GAULT, R. H. Social Psychology. Holt, 1923.

38. GIDDINGS, F. H. Studies in the Theory of Human Society. Macmillan, 1922.

39. ————. Stimulation Ranges and Reaction Areas. Psychol. Rev., 1924, 31, 449-455.

40. GINSBERG, M. The Psychology of Society.


41. GINZBURG, B. Hypocrisy as a Pathological Symptom. Internat. l. Ethics, 1922, 32, 160-166.

42. GOSNELL, H. F. Some Practical Applications of Psychology in Government. Amer. J. Sociol., 1922-23, 28, 735-743.

43. GRIFFITH, C. R A Comment Upon the Psychology of the Audience. Psychol. Mono., 1921, 30 (No. 136), 36-47.

44. GROVES, E. R. The Rural Mind and Social Welfare. University of Chicago Press, 1922.

45. ————. Personality and Social Adjustment. Longmans, 1923.

46. HANKINS, F. H. Individual Differences and Their Significance for Social Theory. Publ. Amer. Sociol. Soc., 1922, 17, 27-39.

47. HARTMAN, D. A. The Psychological Point of View in History: Some Phases of the Slavery Struggle. J. Abnor. Psychol., and Soc. Psychol., 1922-23, 17, 261-273.

48. HUBERT, R. Le Problem de l'existence sociale. Rev. Phil., 1923, 48, 403-423.

49. HUMPHREY, G. The Conditioned Reflex and the Elementary Social Reaction. J. Abnor. Psychol. and Soc. Psychol., 1922-23, 17, 113-119.

50. HUNTER, W. S. General Psychology. Revised edition. University of Chicago Press, 1924.

51. HUXLEY, J. S. Biology and Sociology. Monist, 1923, 33, 364-389.

52. JOSEY, C. C. The Social Philosophy of Instinct. Scribners, 1922.

53. KALLEN, H. M. Political Science as Psychology. Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev., 1923, 17, 181-203.

54. KANTOR, J. R. How Is a Science of Social Psychology Possible? J. Abnor. Psychol. and Soc. Psychol., 1922-23, 17, 62-78.

55. ————. Concerning Some Faulty Conceptions of Social Psychology. J. o f Phil., 1923, 20, 421-433.

56. ————. What Are the Data and Problems of Social Psychology? J. of Phil., 1923, 20, 449-457.

57. ————. The Problem of Instinct and Its Relations to Social Psychology. J. Abnor. Psychol. and Soc. Psychol., 1923-24, 18, 50-77.

58. ————. The Institutional Foundation of a Scientific Social Psychology. J. Abnor. Psychol. and Soc. Psychol., 1924-25, 19, 46-56. (Published also in Amer. J. Social., 1924, 29, 674-685.)

59. KELSEN, H. Der Begriff des Staates and die Sozial-psychologie. Imago, 1922, 8, 97-141.

60. KLÜVER, H. Psychological and Sociological Types. Psychol. Rev., 1924, 31, 456-462.

61. KOLNAI, A. Psychoanalysis and Sociology. Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1922.

62. LAIRD, J. The Group Mind and the General Will. Monist, 1923, 33, 453-472.

63. LINDEMAN, E. C. Social Discovery. Republic Publishing Co., 1924.

64. LIPPMAN, W. Public Opinion. Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1922.

65. MALINOWSKI, B. The Psychology of Sex and the Foundations of Kinship in Primitive Societies. Psyche, 1923-24, 4, 98-128.

66. ————. Psychoanalysis and Anthropology. Psyche, 1923-24, 4, 293-332.

67. MARTIN, E. D. The Mystery of Religion. Harper and Brothers, 1924.


68. MARTIN, E. D. The Psychology of Propaganda and Public Opinion. Lecture No. 14 of course in psychology, People's Institute, New York. People's Institute Pub. Co.

69. ————. The Psychology of Politics. Lecture No. 16 of course in psychology, People's Institute, New York. People's Institute Pub. Co.

70. ————. Some Mechanisms Which Distinguish the Crowd from Other Forms of Social Behavior. J. Abnor. Psychol. and Soc. Psychol., 1923-24, 18, 188-203.

71. MCDOUGALL, W. The Use and Abuse of Instinct in Social Psychology. J. Abnor. Psychol. and Soc. Psychol., 1921-22, 16, 285-333.

72. ————. Can Sociology and Social Psychology Dispense With Instincts? J. Abnor. Psychol. and Soc. Psychol., 1924-25, 19, 13-41. (Published also in abridged form in Amer. J. Sociol., 1924, 29, 657-670.)

73. MECKLIN, J. M. The Ku Klux Klan. Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1924.

74. MERRIAM, C. E. The Significance of Psychology for the Study of Politics. Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev., 1924, 18, 469-488.

75. MILLER, H. A. The Group as an Instinct. Amer. J. Sociol., 1921-22, 27, 334-343.

76. OGBURN, W. F. Social Change. Huebsch, 1922.

77. ————. Bias, Psychoanalysis, and the Subjective in Relation to Social Science. Publ. Amer. Sociol. Soc., 1922, 17, 62-74.

78. O'HIGGINS, H., and REEDE, E. H. The American Mind in Action. Harper and Brothers, 1924.

79. PERRY, R. B. Is There a Social Mind? Amer. J. Sociol., 1921-22, 27, 561-572, 721-736.

80. PRUETTE, L. Some Applications of the Inferiority Complex to Pluralistic Behavior. Psychoanal. Rev., 1922, 9, 28-39.

81. REAM. J. Temperament in Harmonious Human Relationships. J. Abnor. Psychol. and Soc. Psychol., 1922-23, 17, 58-61.

82. REED, E. F. Psychic Mechanisms and Social Radicalism. I. Soc. Forces, 1923-24, 2, 36-40.

83. REED, R. Changing Conceptions of the Maternal Instinct. J. Abnor. Psychol. and Soc. Psychol., 1923-24, 18, 78-87.

84. REID, L. A. The Roots of Social Desire. Psyche, 1922, 3, 150-160.

85. REUTER, E. B. The Social Attitude. J. Appl. Sociol., 1923-24, 8, 97-100.

86. RICE, S. A. Motives in Radicalism and Social Reform. Amer. J. Sociol., 1922-23, 28, 577-585.

87. RIVERS, W. H. R. Psychology and Politics. Harcourt, Brace, 1923.

88. SCHMALHAUSEN, S. D. Our Tainted Ethics. Psychoanal. Rev., 1921, 8, 382-406.

89. ————. The Hinterland of the Human Motives. The Modern Quarterly, 1924, 2, 146-154.

90. SHEPHERD, W. T. A Study of the Methods of Revivalists. J. Abnor. Psychol. and Soc. Psychol., 1921-22, 16, 137-143.

91. SMITH, G. E. Ethnology and Psychology. Psyche, 1922, 3, 115-117.

92. ————. Freud's Speculations on Ethnology. Monist, 1923, 33, 81-97.

94. SMITH, S., and GUTHRIE, E. #Z. General Psychology in Terms of Behavior. Appleton, 1921.


95. SUTTIE, I. D. Critique of the Theory of Herd Instinct. J. Ment. Sci., 1922, 68, 245-254.

96. TAYLOR, W. S. Rationalization and Its Social Significance.' J. Abnor. Psychol. and Soc. Psycho!., 1922-23, 17, 410-418.

97. WALLIS, W. D. Mental Patterns in Relation to Culture. J. Abnor. Psychol. and Soc. Psychol., 1924-25, 19, 179-184.

98. WEEKS, A. D. The Control of the Social Mind. Appleton, 1923.

99. WHITTEMORE, I. The Influence of Competition Upon Performance. J. Abnor. Psychol. and Soc. Psychol., 1924-25, 19, 236-253.

100. WILLEY, M. M., and HERSKOVITZ, M. J. Servitude and Progress. J. Soc. Forces, 1922-23, 1, 228-234.

101. ———— and RICE, S. A. William Jennings Bryan as a Social Force. J. Soc. Forces, 1924, 2, 338-344.

102. WILLEY, N. B., and WILLEY, M. M. The Conditioned Response and the Consciousness of Kind. Amer. J. Sociol., 1924, 30, 22-28.

103. WILLIAMS, J. M. The Principles of Social Psychology. Knopf, 1922.

104. WILLIS, C. B. The Effect of Primogeniture on Intellectual Capacity. J. Abnor. Psychol. .and Soc. Psychol., 1923-24, 18, 375-317.

105. WISSLER, C. Man and Culture. Crowell, 1923.

106. WOLFE, A. B. The Motivation of Radicalism. Psychol. Rev., 1921, 28, 280-300.

107. ————. Conservatism, Radicalism, and Scientific Method. Macmillan, 1923.

108. ————. The Rôle of Sympathy and Ethical Motivation in Scientific Social Research. J. of Phil., 1923, 20, 225-234.


  1. Further developments of the "pluralistic behavior" concept, together with suggestions for a measuring technique, are to be found in Professor Giddings' The Scientific Study of Human Society, University of North Carolina Press. This important work appeared too late to be included in this review.

Valid HTML 4.01 Strict Valid CSS2